Frans Svensson
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281715 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Frans Svensson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Frans |
| FAMILY NAME | Svensson |
| SIGNATURE | SVENSSON F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0736-0792 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Honorable, the Useful, and the Pleasurable
Question 11 in Book 2 of John Buridan’s Questions on the Ten Books of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, concerns whether the good can be well divided into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. Aristotle, according to Buridan, claims that it can. But should we follow Aristotle in this respect? Buridan argues that we should not. In his view, the good is extensionally equivalent with the honorable, as well as with the useful and the with the…
From Morality to the End of Reason
In our age of ever increasing specialization within academic philosophy, the work of philosophers such as Donald Davidson, Frank Jackson, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and Bernard Williams, all of whom have made significant contributions in many different fields of philosophical inquiry, seems all the more impressive. Ingmar Persson should also, I think, figure on this list. While not quite as wide-ranging as his monumental The Retreat of Reason (2…
Happiness, Well‐being, and Their Relation to Virtue in Descartes' Ethics
My main thesis in this article is that Descartes' ethics should be understood as involving a distinction between happiness and well‐being . The distinction I have in mind is never clearly stated or articulated by Descartes himself, but I argue that we nevertheless have good reason to embrace it as an important component in a charitable reconstruction of his ethical thought. In section I , I present Descartes' account of happiness and of how he th…
Does Non-Cognitivism Rest on a Mistake
Philippa Foot has recently argued that non-cognitivism rests on a mistake. According to Foot, non-cognitivism cannot properly account for the role of reasons in moral thinking. Furthermore, Foot argues that moral judgements share a conceptual structure with the kind of evaluations that we make about plants and animals, which cannot be couched in non-cognitivist terms. In this article I argue that, in the form of expressivism, non-cognitivism is c…
Regimenting Reasons
The Belief‐Desire model (the B‐D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It…
A Particular Consequentialism
Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se , but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be…
No prominent works on this page.
A Particular Consequentialism
Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se , but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be…
Regimenting Reasons
The Belief‐Desire model (the B‐D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It…
Does Non-Cognitivism Rest on a Mistake
Philippa Foot has recently argued that non-cognitivism rests on a mistake. According to Foot, non-cognitivism cannot properly account for the role of reasons in moral thinking. Furthermore, Foot argues that moral judgements share a conceptual structure with the kind of evaluations that we make about plants and animals, which cannot be couched in non-cognitivist terms. In this article I argue that, in the form of expressivism, non-cognitivism is c…
Happiness, Well‐being, and Their Relation to Virtue in Descartes' Ethics
My main thesis in this article is that Descartes' ethics should be understood as involving a distinction between happiness and well‐being . The distinction I have in mind is never clearly stated or articulated by Descartes himself, but I argue that we nevertheless have good reason to embrace it as an important component in a charitable reconstruction of his ethical thought. In section I , I present Descartes' account of happiness and of how he th…
From Morality to the End of Reason
In our age of ever increasing specialization within academic philosophy, the work of philosophers such as Donald Davidson, Frank Jackson, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and Bernard Williams, all of whom have made significant contributions in many different fields of philosophical inquiry, seems all the more impressive. Ingmar Persson should also, I think, figure on this list. While not quite as wide-ranging as his monumental The Retreat of Reason (2…
The Honorable, the Useful, and the Pleasurable
Question 11 in Book 2 of John Buridan’s Questions on the Ten Books of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, concerns whether the good can be well divided into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. Aristotle, according to Buridan, claims that it can. But should we follow Aristotle in this respect? Buridan argues that we should not. In his view, the good is extensionally equivalent with the honorable, as well as with the useful and the with the…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Morality (2 works)