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David Heering

Biographic Data

ID4281722
NAMEDavid Heering
GIVEN NAMESDavid
FAMILY NAMEHeering
SIGNATUREHEERING D
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Potsdam
ORCID0000-0002-4943-6943
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR4
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX1
  • Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective

    Open Access•David Heering•ARTICLE•Erkenntnis•2024

    Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In…

  • Failure and Success in Agency

    Open Access•David Heering•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to φ only if S successfully φ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false …

  • Reasons-responsiveness, modality and rational blind spots

    Open Access•David Heering•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • Actual Sequences, Frankfurt-Cases, and Non-accidentality

    David Heering•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2022

    There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: (i) free agency is grounded in an agent’s possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, (ii) only actual sequence features (not alternative possibilities) can ground free agency (conclusion of Frankfurt-Cases). This paper argues that (i) and (ii) can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict be…

  • Failure and Success in Agency

    Open Access•David Heering•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to φ only if S successfully φ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false …

  • Actual Sequences, Frankfurt-Cases, and Non-accidentality

    David Heering•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2022

    There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: (i) free agency is grounded in an agent’s possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, (ii) only actual sequence features (not alternative possibilities) can ground free agency (conclusion of Frankfurt-Cases). This paper argues that (i) and (ii) can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict be…

  • Reasons-responsiveness, modality and rational blind spots

    Open Access•David Heering•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2023

  • Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective

    Open Access•David Heering•ARTICLE•Erkenntnis•2024

    Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In…

  • Failure and Success in Agency

    Open Access•David Heering•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to φ only if S successfully φ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false …

Epistemology (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Agency (philosophy) (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Possession (linguistics) (2 works)

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