Jules Salomone-Sehr
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281763 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jules Salomone-Sehr |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jules |
| FAMILY NAME | Salomone-Sehr |
| SIGNATURE | SALOMONE-SEHR J |
| AFFILIATIONS | McGill University , Montreal, Canada |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations
Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants' resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher a…
Cooperation
This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to φ are neither necessary nor sufficient for φ to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intenti…
No prominent works on this page.
Cooperation
This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to φ are neither necessary nor sufficient for φ to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intenti…
Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations
Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants' resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher a…
Agency (philosophy) (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Business (1 work) · Coercion (linguistics) (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)