Lilian O’brien
Biographic Data
| ID | 4281778 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lilian O’brien |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lilian |
| FAMILY NAME | O’brien |
| SIGNATURE | O’BRIEN L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Discipline of Practical Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Finland |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The mental in intentional action
This special section originates from a workshop `New Horizons in Action and Agency’ that we organized in August 2019 at the University of Helsinki, Finland. The aim of the workshop was to provide a
The Subjective Authority of Intention
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the ‘hold’ that an intention has on an agent—a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the sub…
The Subjective Authority of Intention
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the ‘hold’ that an intention has on an agent—a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the sub…
The Subjective Authority of Intention
While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the ‘hold’ that an intention has on an agent—a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the sub…
The mental in intentional action
This special section originates from a workshop `New Horizons in Action and Agency’ that we organized in August 2019 at the University of Helsinki, Finland. The aim of the workshop was to provide a
Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (1 work) · Engineering (1 work) · Free Will and Agency (1 work) · Mental Health and Psychiatry (1 work)