Teemu Toppinen
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4281797 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Teemu Toppinen |
| PRENOMES | Teemu |
| SOBRENOME | Toppinen |
| ASSINATURA | TOPPINEN T |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Helsinki |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 5 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 1 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2014 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Why We Should Not Worry about the Triviality of Normative Supervenience
A common worry regarding normative supervenience theses is that they are easily trivialized unless we somehow restrict the set of descriptive base properties on which the normative properties supervene. The idea is that if all descriptive properties are included in the base, any two individuals that share all their base properties must be the same individual in the same world, from which it follows that they have the same normative properties. We…
Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists
Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox
No abstract
Rule Consequentialism (And Kantian Contractualism) at Top Rates
Journal Article Rule Consequentialism (and Kantian Contractualism) at Top Rates Get access Teemu Toppinen Teemu Toppinen University of Helsinki, Finland E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 66, Issue 262, January 2016, Pages 122–135, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv065 Published: 07 August 2015
Expressivism and Moore's Paradox
No abstract
Expressivism and Moore's Paradox
No abstract
Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox
No abstract
Rule Consequentialism (And Kantian Contractualism) at Top Rates
Journal Article Rule Consequentialism (and Kantian Contractualism) at Top Rates Get access Teemu Toppinen Teemu Toppinen University of Helsinki, Finland E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 66, Issue 262, January 2016, Pages 122–135, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv065 Published: 07 August 2015
Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists
Why We Should Not Worry about the Triviality of Normative Supervenience
A common worry regarding normative supervenience theses is that they are easily trivialized unless we somehow restrict the set of descriptive base properties on which the normative properties supervene. The idea is that if all descriptive properties are included in the base, any two individuals that share all their base properties must be the same individual in the same world, from which it follows that they have the same normative properties. We…
Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Expressivism (3 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 obras) · Sociology (2 obras) · Action (physics (1 obras) · Computer Science (1 obras)