Stephen Chaudoin
Biographic Data
| ID | 4370992 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stephen Chaudoin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stephen |
| FAMILY NAME | Chaudoin |
| SIGNATURE | CHAUDOIN S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Harvard University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0471-6247 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 320 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 10 |
Complementarity and Public Views on Overlapping International and Domestic Courts
Elections, War, and Gender: Self-Selection and the Pursuit of Victory
Why might female leaders of democratic countries commit more money, equipment, soldiers, and other resources to interstate conflicts than male leaders? We argue that gender bias in the process of democratic election helps explain this behavior. Since running for office is generally more costly for women than for men, only women who place a higher value on winning competitions will choose to run. After election, they also devote more resources to …
How International Organizations Change National Media Coverage of Human Rights
How do international organizations change the discussion of human rights violations, and how does their message reach the broader public? I show that national media is a key conduit. I analyze media coverage from the Philippines to show that the content of media coverage of the “war on drugs” changed after a major decision by the International Criminal Court. The ICC increased the proportion of media coverage focusing on human rights by triggerin…
The Election Effect: Democratic Leaders in Inter-Group Conflict
How does the experience of being elected alter subsequent leader behavior at the international level? We argue for the existence of an election effect, through which a democratic election intensifies in-group identification and generates a sense of obligation to voters, while simultaneously increasing out-group hostility. These combined effects cause leaders to overexert costly efforts in competitive situations against other groups. Using an onli…
Survey Design, Order Effects, and Causal Mediation Analysis
Causal mediation analysis requires measurement of an outcome variable (O) with and without treatment, plus a set of mediator variables (M) that constitute possible pathways for the treatment effect. There is no consensus on whether surveys should measure potentially mediating variables before or after the outcome variables—MO or OM. We use a replication exercise to demonstrate how the order of mediator and outcome items can be consequential for t…
Public Reactions to International Legal Institutions: The International Criminal Court in a Developing Democracy
We examine public attitudes concerning a possible investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC). We hypothesize that citizens tend to display lower levels of support for investigations in their own country than hypothetical ones abroad. We further argue that this decrease in support is moderated by a citizen's "proximity" to the investigation. Both perpetrators and victims of alleged crimes can be hesitant about legal interventions, wit…
Interdependence, Networks, and Public Policy Support
What arguments affect citizen support for policies? Most existing studies of preferences emphasize direct effects on personal welfare. Yet, for many regulatory policies—like financial regulations—recent theories highlight indirect policy externalities, such as interdependent foreign policies and/or global economic networks. We theorize that citizens will respond to arguments emphasizing the three distinct theoretical logics—direct, interdependent…
How Hard to Fight? Cross-Player Effects and Strategic Sophistication in an Asymmetric Contest Experiment
Many political phenomena—from wars to elections and lobbying—involve winner-take-all contests in which the value of the prize differs across the actors involved and from one issue to the next. To better understand competitive behavior in such environments, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in which participants face a series of asymmetric prize values in a lottery contest game. We find support for some, but not all, of the game’s comp…
Do We Really Know the WTO Cures Cancer
This article uses a replication experiment of ninety-four specifications from sixteen different studies to show the severity of the problem of selection on unobservables. Using a variety of approaches, it shows that membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization has a significant effect on a surprisingly high number of dependent variables (34 per cent) that have little or no theoretical relationship to the WTO. …
Science and the system: IPE and international monetary politics
A recent RIPE article by Jerry Cohen argues that current research on the political economy of money has stagnated because of its overemphasis on the scientific method and domestic variables. We argue that a wide array of scientifically oriented research on the IPE of money considers the system in many different ways. To help build a dialogue, we categorize each of these conceptions of ‘the system’ and give examples of their application from recen…
Beyond Zeroes and Ones: The Intensity and Dynamics of Civil Conflict
There is a tremendous amount of variation in conflict intensity both across and within civil conflicts. Some conflicts result in huge numbers of battle deaths, while others do not. Conflict intensity is also dynamic. Conflict intensity escalates, de-escalates, and persists. What explains this variation? We take one of the most prominent explanations for the onset and occurrence of civil conflict—variation in economic conditions—and apply it to th…
How Contestation Moderates the Effects of International Institutions: The International Criminal Court and Kenya
A broad class of theories, applied to a wide array of substantive issues, argues that international institutions facilitate compliance by mobilizing procompliance domestic groups. I develop a general model of political contestation over compliance policy in which institutions mobilize both pro- and anticompliance groups. The model predicts that institutions have the greatest ability to induce compliance when the groups have similar values to winn…
Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade
Exporters, trade lawyers, policy makers, and academics see the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding as an important, though costly, venue for facilitating the removal of harmful barriers to trade. If this conventional wisdom holds, then disputes should increase trade. We provide a careful analysis of trade flows in the wake of WTO disputes. We find that WTO disputes do not increase the respondent country's imports of the products at issue. Inst…
International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations
Following older debates in international relations literature concerning the relative importance of domestic versus systemic factors, newer debates emphasize interdependence among states and the complex interactions between systemic and domestic factors. As globalization and democratization advance, theories and empirical models of international politics have become more complicated. We present a systematic theoretical categorization of relations…
When is Good News About Pro-Co-operation Lobbies Good News About Co-operation
Lobbies are active participants in international co-operation. In a repeated game, this article allows domestic lobbies to offer contingent rewards to influence their government to make pro-co-operation policy adjustments. The effect of lobbies depends on the type and intensity of their preferences. If the lobbies are ‘internationally benefiting’ – that is, they are interested in whether the foreign government reciprocates with adjustments of its…
Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes
If international institutions are such potent alarm mechanisms that mobilize procompliance domestic audiences, as many existing theories argue, why do countries wait so long before sounding the alarm? World Trade Organization (WTO) members often wait months or even years before objecting to their trading partners’ WTO-illegal barriers. To turn a phrase, trade cooperation delayed is trade cooperation denied, so why wait? To explain this variation,…
Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions
A key assumption of audience costs theories of crisis bargaining and international cooperation is that audience members have strong preferences for consistency between their leader's commitments and actual policy choices. However, audiences also have strong preferences over the policy choices themselves, regardless of their consistency with past commitments. I conducted a randomized survey experiment to evaluate the magnitude of consistency and p…
Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court1: Ratification Patterns and the ICC
What types of countries have ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court? Because the court relies on state cooperation, it is a good example of a regime facing a "participation problem." In order to be effective, the regime requires active members, but states that fear regime effectiveness will therefore find it potentially costly to join. We analyze the extent to which this problem plagues the ICC. We find that count…
The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives
Recent research, including an article by Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz in this journal, has argued that the United States' long-standing foreign policy orientation of liberal internationalism has been in serious decline because of rising domestic partisan divisions. A reanalysis of the theoretical logic driving these arguments and the empirical evidence used to support them suggests a different conclusion. Extant evidence on congressional r…
Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions
A key assumption of audience costs theories of crisis bargaining and international cooperation is that audience members have strong preferences for consistency between their leader's commitments and actual policy choices. However, audiences also have strong preferences over the policy choices themselves, regardless of their consistency with past commitments. I conducted a randomized survey experiment to evaluate the magnitude of consistency and p…
International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations
Following older debates in international relations literature concerning the relative importance of domestic versus systemic factors, newer debates emphasize interdependence among states and the complex interactions between systemic and domestic factors. As globalization and democratization advance, theories and empirical models of international politics have become more complicated. We present a systematic theoretical categorization of relations…
How Contestation Moderates the Effects of International Institutions: The International Criminal Court and Kenya
A broad class of theories, applied to a wide array of substantive issues, argues that international institutions facilitate compliance by mobilizing procompliance domestic groups. I develop a general model of political contestation over compliance policy in which institutions mobilize both pro- and anticompliance groups. The model predicts that institutions have the greatest ability to induce compliance when the groups have similar values to winn…
Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes
If international institutions are such potent alarm mechanisms that mobilize procompliance domestic audiences, as many existing theories argue, why do countries wait so long before sounding the alarm? World Trade Organization (WTO) members often wait months or even years before objecting to their trading partners’ WTO-illegal barriers. To turn a phrase, trade cooperation delayed is trade cooperation denied, so why wait? To explain this variation,…
Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court1: Ratification Patterns and the ICC
What types of countries have ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court? Because the court relies on state cooperation, it is a good example of a regime facing a "participation problem." In order to be effective, the regime requires active members, but states that fear regime effectiveness will therefore find it potentially costly to join. We analyze the extent to which this problem plagues the ICC. We find that count…
Public Reactions to International Legal Institutions: The International Criminal Court in a Developing Democracy
We examine public attitudes concerning a possible investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC). We hypothesize that citizens tend to display lower levels of support for investigations in their own country than hypothetical ones abroad. We further argue that this decrease in support is moderated by a citizen's "proximity" to the investigation. Both perpetrators and victims of alleged crimes can be hesitant about legal interventions, wit…
The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives
Recent research, including an article by Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz in this journal, has argued that the United States' long-standing foreign policy orientation of liberal internationalism has been in serious decline because of rising domestic partisan divisions. A reanalysis of the theoretical logic driving these arguments and the empirical evidence used to support them suggests a different conclusion. Extant evidence on congressional r…
Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade
Exporters, trade lawyers, policy makers, and academics see the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding as an important, though costly, venue for facilitating the removal of harmful barriers to trade. If this conventional wisdom holds, then disputes should increase trade. We provide a careful analysis of trade flows in the wake of WTO disputes. We find that WTO disputes do not increase the respondent country's imports of the products at issue. Inst…
Survey Design, Order Effects, and Causal Mediation Analysis
Causal mediation analysis requires measurement of an outcome variable (O) with and without treatment, plus a set of mediator variables (M) that constitute possible pathways for the treatment effect. There is no consensus on whether surveys should measure potentially mediating variables before or after the outcome variables—MO or OM. We use a replication exercise to demonstrate how the order of mediator and outcome items can be consequential for t…
Do We Really Know the WTO Cures Cancer
This article uses a replication experiment of ninety-four specifications from sixteen different studies to show the severity of the problem of selection on unobservables. Using a variety of approaches, it shows that membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization has a significant effect on a surprisingly high number of dependent variables (34 per cent) that have little or no theoretical relationship to the WTO. …
Science and the system: IPE and international monetary politics
A recent RIPE article by Jerry Cohen argues that current research on the political economy of money has stagnated because of its overemphasis on the scientific method and domestic variables. We argue that a wide array of scientifically oriented research on the IPE of money considers the system in many different ways. To help build a dialogue, we categorize each of these conceptions of ‘the system’ and give examples of their application from recen…
How International Organizations Change National Media Coverage of Human Rights
How do international organizations change the discussion of human rights violations, and how does their message reach the broader public? I show that national media is a key conduit. I analyze media coverage from the Philippines to show that the content of media coverage of the “war on drugs” changed after a major decision by the International Criminal Court. The ICC increased the proportion of media coverage focusing on human rights by triggerin…
Complementarity and Public Views on Overlapping International and Domestic Courts
Beyond Zeroes and Ones: The Intensity and Dynamics of Civil Conflict
There is a tremendous amount of variation in conflict intensity both across and within civil conflicts. Some conflicts result in huge numbers of battle deaths, while others do not. Conflict intensity is also dynamic. Conflict intensity escalates, de-escalates, and persists. What explains this variation? We take one of the most prominent explanations for the onset and occurrence of civil conflict—variation in economic conditions—and apply it to th…
Elections, War, and Gender: Self-Selection and the Pursuit of Victory
Why might female leaders of democratic countries commit more money, equipment, soldiers, and other resources to interstate conflicts than male leaders? We argue that gender bias in the process of democratic election helps explain this behavior. Since running for office is generally more costly for women than for men, only women who place a higher value on winning competitions will choose to run. After election, they also devote more resources to …
Interdependence, Networks, and Public Policy Support
What arguments affect citizen support for policies? Most existing studies of preferences emphasize direct effects on personal welfare. Yet, for many regulatory policies—like financial regulations—recent theories highlight indirect policy externalities, such as interdependent foreign policies and/or global economic networks. We theorize that citizens will respond to arguments emphasizing the three distinct theoretical logics—direct, interdependent…
How Hard to Fight? Cross-Player Effects and Strategic Sophistication in an Asymmetric Contest Experiment
Many political phenomena—from wars to elections and lobbying—involve winner-take-all contests in which the value of the prize differs across the actors involved and from one issue to the next. To better understand competitive behavior in such environments, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in which participants face a series of asymmetric prize values in a lottery contest game. We find support for some, but not all, of the game’s comp…
When is Good News About Pro-Co-operation Lobbies Good News About Co-operation
Lobbies are active participants in international co-operation. In a repeated game, this article allows domestic lobbies to offer contingent rewards to influence their government to make pro-co-operation policy adjustments. The effect of lobbies depends on the type and intensity of their preferences. If the lobbies are ‘internationally benefiting’ – that is, they are interested in whether the foreign government reciprocates with adjustments of its…
The Election Effect: Democratic Leaders in Inter-Group Conflict
How does the experience of being elected alter subsequent leader behavior at the international level? We argue for the existence of an election effect, through which a democratic election intensifies in-group identification and generates a sense of obligation to voters, while simultaneously increasing out-group hostility. These combined effects cause leaders to overexert costly efforts in competitive situations against other groups. Using an onli…
The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives
Recent research, including an article by Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz in this journal, has argued that the United States' long-standing foreign policy orientation of liberal internationalism has been in serious decline because of rising domestic partisan divisions. A reanalysis of the theoretical logic driving these arguments and the empirical evidence used to support them suggests a different conclusion. Extant evidence on congressional r…
Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court1: Ratification Patterns and the ICC
What types of countries have ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court? Because the court relies on state cooperation, it is a good example of a regime facing a "participation problem." In order to be effective, the regime requires active members, but states that fear regime effectiveness will therefore find it potentially costly to join. We analyze the extent to which this problem plagues the ICC. We find that count…
Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes
If international institutions are such potent alarm mechanisms that mobilize procompliance domestic audiences, as many existing theories argue, why do countries wait so long before sounding the alarm? World Trade Organization (WTO) members often wait months or even years before objecting to their trading partners’ WTO-illegal barriers. To turn a phrase, trade cooperation delayed is trade cooperation denied, so why wait? To explain this variation,…
Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions
A key assumption of audience costs theories of crisis bargaining and international cooperation is that audience members have strong preferences for consistency between their leader's commitments and actual policy choices. However, audiences also have strong preferences over the policy choices themselves, regardless of their consistency with past commitments. I conducted a randomized survey experiment to evaluate the magnitude of consistency and p…
International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations
Following older debates in international relations literature concerning the relative importance of domestic versus systemic factors, newer debates emphasize interdependence among states and the complex interactions between systemic and domestic factors. As globalization and democratization advance, theories and empirical models of international politics have become more complicated. We present a systematic theoretical categorization of relations…
When is Good News About Pro-Co-operation Lobbies Good News About Co-operation
Lobbies are active participants in international co-operation. In a repeated game, this article allows domestic lobbies to offer contingent rewards to influence their government to make pro-co-operation policy adjustments. The effect of lobbies depends on the type and intensity of their preferences. If the lobbies are ‘internationally benefiting’ – that is, they are interested in whether the foreign government reciprocates with adjustments of its…
How Contestation Moderates the Effects of International Institutions: The International Criminal Court and Kenya
A broad class of theories, applied to a wide array of substantive issues, argues that international institutions facilitate compliance by mobilizing procompliance domestic groups. I develop a general model of political contestation over compliance policy in which institutions mobilize both pro- and anticompliance groups. The model predicts that institutions have the greatest ability to induce compliance when the groups have similar values to winn…
Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade
Exporters, trade lawyers, policy makers, and academics see the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding as an important, though costly, venue for facilitating the removal of harmful barriers to trade. If this conventional wisdom holds, then disputes should increase trade. We provide a careful analysis of trade flows in the wake of WTO disputes. We find that WTO disputes do not increase the respondent country's imports of the products at issue. Inst…
Science and the system: IPE and international monetary politics
A recent RIPE article by Jerry Cohen argues that current research on the political economy of money has stagnated because of its overemphasis on the scientific method and domestic variables. We argue that a wide array of scientifically oriented research on the IPE of money considers the system in many different ways. To help build a dialogue, we categorize each of these conceptions of ‘the system’ and give examples of their application from recen…
Beyond Zeroes and Ones: The Intensity and Dynamics of Civil Conflict
There is a tremendous amount of variation in conflict intensity both across and within civil conflicts. Some conflicts result in huge numbers of battle deaths, while others do not. Conflict intensity is also dynamic. Conflict intensity escalates, de-escalates, and persists. What explains this variation? We take one of the most prominent explanations for the onset and occurrence of civil conflict—variation in economic conditions—and apply it to th…
Interdependence, Networks, and Public Policy Support
What arguments affect citizen support for policies? Most existing studies of preferences emphasize direct effects on personal welfare. Yet, for many regulatory policies—like financial regulations—recent theories highlight indirect policy externalities, such as interdependent foreign policies and/or global economic networks. We theorize that citizens will respond to arguments emphasizing the three distinct theoretical logics—direct, interdependent…
How Hard to Fight? Cross-Player Effects and Strategic Sophistication in an Asymmetric Contest Experiment
Many political phenomena—from wars to elections and lobbying—involve winner-take-all contests in which the value of the prize differs across the actors involved and from one issue to the next. To better understand competitive behavior in such environments, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in which participants face a series of asymmetric prize values in a lottery contest game. We find support for some, but not all, of the game’s comp…
Do We Really Know the WTO Cures Cancer
This article uses a replication experiment of ninety-four specifications from sixteen different studies to show the severity of the problem of selection on unobservables. Using a variety of approaches, it shows that membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization has a significant effect on a surprisingly high number of dependent variables (34 per cent) that have little or no theoretical relationship to the WTO. …
Public Reactions to International Legal Institutions: The International Criminal Court in a Developing Democracy
We examine public attitudes concerning a possible investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC). We hypothesize that citizens tend to display lower levels of support for investigations in their own country than hypothetical ones abroad. We further argue that this decrease in support is moderated by a citizen's "proximity" to the investigation. Both perpetrators and victims of alleged crimes can be hesitant about legal interventions, wit…
Survey Design, Order Effects, and Causal Mediation Analysis
Causal mediation analysis requires measurement of an outcome variable (O) with and without treatment, plus a set of mediator variables (M) that constitute possible pathways for the treatment effect. There is no consensus on whether surveys should measure potentially mediating variables before or after the outcome variables—MO or OM. We use a replication exercise to demonstrate how the order of mediator and outcome items can be consequential for t…
How International Organizations Change National Media Coverage of Human Rights
How do international organizations change the discussion of human rights violations, and how does their message reach the broader public? I show that national media is a key conduit. I analyze media coverage from the Philippines to show that the content of media coverage of the “war on drugs” changed after a major decision by the International Criminal Court. The ICC increased the proportion of media coverage focusing on human rights by triggerin…
The Election Effect: Democratic Leaders in Inter-Group Conflict
How does the experience of being elected alter subsequent leader behavior at the international level? We argue for the existence of an election effect, through which a democratic election intensifies in-group identification and generates a sense of obligation to voters, while simultaneously increasing out-group hostility. These combined effects cause leaders to overexert costly efforts in competitive situations against other groups. Using an onli…
Elections, War, and Gender: Self-Selection and the Pursuit of Victory
Why might female leaders of democratic countries commit more money, equipment, soldiers, and other resources to interstate conflicts than male leaders? We argue that gender bias in the process of democratic election helps explain this behavior. Since running for office is generally more costly for women than for men, only women who place a higher value on winning competitions will choose to run. After election, they also devote more resources to …
Complementarity and Public Views on Overlapping International and Domestic Courts
Political science (19 works) · Economics (15 works) · Law (14 works) · Law (13 works) · Politics (10 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works)