Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371135 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Silje Synnøve Lyder |
| FAMILY NAME | Hermansen |
| SIGNATURE | HERMANSEN S S L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Copenhagen |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1919-4365 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 91 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
The politics of the Court of Justice of the European Union
This essay reviews recent research on how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) influences the development and enforcement of European Union (EU) law. First, we focus on the supply of cases and how the procedural routes to the court affect the impact of its rulings. Second, we discuss how the collective and individual preferences of the judges shape how they dispose of those cases. To that end, we present a measurement strategy and or…
Shaping the Bench
Lingering bias
How does biased political recruitment—and the legislation of gender quotas—affect the quality of representation? The article theorizes that biased selection implies a higher hurdle for women than for men. As a consequence, fewer—but more talented and ambitious—female legislators enter office. When quotas are legislated, the bias lingers but takes new forms. Uncertain about their initial choice, parties compensate by drawing on incumbent women’s l…
Leveling and Spotlighting
As private actors turn to international courts (ICs), we argue that judges can adopt pro-individual rights agendas to promote their own legitimacy. By leveling the odds for disempowered individuals and spotlighting their rights claims, ICs rebut charges that they are playthings of the powerful and cultivate support networks in civil society. We assess our theory by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ)…
The CJEU Database Platform
This article presents the CJEU Database Platform, which provides scholars with an extensive collection of easily accessible, research-ready data on the the universe of cases, decisions, and judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU Database Platform provides a foundation for the broader CJEU Database currently being developed by The IUROPA Project, a multidisciplinary group of scholars researching judicial politics in …
Blurred lines between electoral and parliamentary representation
Parliamentarians receive public funding to employ local staff in the constituency. Local staff help members of parliament to execute their representative duties, but can also become an electoral asset. Drawing on theories of personal vote-seeking we study local staff as an example of constituency service. Modelling within-individual changes in local staff size among 1174 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we find that the number of local …
Introducing Comepelda
We introduce a new collection of data that consolidates information on European Parliament elections into one comprehensive source. It provides information on formal electoral rules as well as national-level and district-level election results for parties and individual politicians (including full candidate lists). The use of existing and new key variables makes it easy to link the data across the different units of observation (country, party, c…
Building legitimacy
Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a ‘judge-rapporteur’ who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court’s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges’ political accountability can polarize already politic…
Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament
Committee coordinators face a classic delegation problem when assigning reports to their committee members. Although a few theoretical developments have focused on the effects of expertise on delegation, empirical studies have commonly assumed monotonic effects. Based on existing informational models, we argue that a more loyal committee member, everything else being equal, is more likely to be appointed as a rapporteur and that more expertise, h…
(Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament
Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members in terms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups. In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both their collective needs and individual requests. This article explores situations in which the collective need for information is prioritised: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year perio…
Striving for influence
I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse selection model, I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case …
Striving for influence
I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse selection model, I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case …
Building legitimacy
Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a ‘judge-rapporteur’ who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court’s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges’ political accountability can polarize already politic…
Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament
Committee coordinators face a classic delegation problem when assigning reports to their committee members. Although a few theoretical developments have focused on the effects of expertise on delegation, empirical studies have commonly assumed monotonic effects. Based on existing informational models, we argue that a more loyal committee member, everything else being equal, is more likely to be appointed as a rapporteur and that more expertise, h…
Introducing Comepelda
We introduce a new collection of data that consolidates information on European Parliament elections into one comprehensive source. It provides information on formal electoral rules as well as national-level and district-level election results for parties and individual politicians (including full candidate lists). The use of existing and new key variables makes it easy to link the data across the different units of observation (country, party, c…
(Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament
Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members in terms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups. In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both their collective needs and individual requests. This article explores situations in which the collective need for information is prioritised: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year perio…
Blurred lines between electoral and parliamentary representation
Parliamentarians receive public funding to employ local staff in the constituency. Local staff help members of parliament to execute their representative duties, but can also become an electoral asset. Drawing on theories of personal vote-seeking we study local staff as an example of constituency service. Modelling within-individual changes in local staff size among 1174 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we find that the number of local …
The CJEU Database Platform
This article presents the CJEU Database Platform, which provides scholars with an extensive collection of easily accessible, research-ready data on the the universe of cases, decisions, and judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU Database Platform provides a foundation for the broader CJEU Database currently being developed by The IUROPA Project, a multidisciplinary group of scholars researching judicial politics in …
Lingering bias
How does biased political recruitment—and the legislation of gender quotas—affect the quality of representation? The article theorizes that biased selection implies a higher hurdle for women than for men. As a consequence, fewer—but more talented and ambitious—female legislators enter office. When quotas are legislated, the bias lingers but takes new forms. Uncertain about their initial choice, parties compensate by drawing on incumbent women’s l…
(Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament
Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members in terms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups. In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both their collective needs and individual requests. This article explores situations in which the collective need for information is prioritised: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year perio…
Striving for influence
I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse selection model, I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case …
Building legitimacy
Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a ‘judge-rapporteur’ who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court’s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges’ political accountability can polarize already politic…
Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament
Committee coordinators face a classic delegation problem when assigning reports to their committee members. Although a few theoretical developments have focused on the effects of expertise on delegation, empirical studies have commonly assumed monotonic effects. Based on existing informational models, we argue that a more loyal committee member, everything else being equal, is more likely to be appointed as a rapporteur and that more expertise, h…
Introducing Comepelda
We introduce a new collection of data that consolidates information on European Parliament elections into one comprehensive source. It provides information on formal electoral rules as well as national-level and district-level election results for parties and individual politicians (including full candidate lists). The use of existing and new key variables makes it easy to link the data across the different units of observation (country, party, c…
The CJEU Database Platform
This article presents the CJEU Database Platform, which provides scholars with an extensive collection of easily accessible, research-ready data on the the universe of cases, decisions, and judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU Database Platform provides a foundation for the broader CJEU Database currently being developed by The IUROPA Project, a multidisciplinary group of scholars researching judicial politics in …
Blurred lines between electoral and parliamentary representation
Parliamentarians receive public funding to employ local staff in the constituency. Local staff help members of parliament to execute their representative duties, but can also become an electoral asset. Drawing on theories of personal vote-seeking we study local staff as an example of constituency service. Modelling within-individual changes in local staff size among 1174 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we find that the number of local …
Lingering bias
How does biased political recruitment—and the legislation of gender quotas—affect the quality of representation? The article theorizes that biased selection implies a higher hurdle for women than for men. As a consequence, fewer—but more talented and ambitious—female legislators enter office. When quotas are legislated, the bias lingers but takes new forms. Uncertain about their initial choice, parties compensate by drawing on incumbent women’s l…
Leveling and Spotlighting
As private actors turn to international courts (ICs), we argue that judges can adopt pro-individual rights agendas to promote their own legitimacy. By leveling the odds for disempowered individuals and spotlighting their rights claims, ICs rebut charges that they are playthings of the powerful and cultivate support networks in civil society. We assess our theory by scrutinizing the first IC with private access: the European Court of Justice (ECJ)…
The politics of the Court of Justice of the European Union
This essay reviews recent research on how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) influences the development and enforcement of European Union (EU) law. First, we focus on the supply of cases and how the procedural routes to the court affect the impact of its rulings. Second, we discuss how the collective and individual preferences of the judges shape how they dispose of those cases. To that end, we present a measurement strategy and or…
Shaping the Bench
Politics (9 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (6 works) · Parliament (6 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (5 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works)