Christophe Crombez
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371185 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christophe Crombez |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christophe |
| FAMILY NAME | Crombez |
| SIGNATURE | CROMBEZ C |
| AFFILIATIONS | KU Leuven |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6994-5155 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 23 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 576 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 23 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 13 |
Preferences and Institutions in European (Dis)Integration
In this article, we present a game-theoretical model of political (dis)integration, and the incentives voters and politicians face during integration processes. We apply the model to the European Union. Preference homogeneity and economies of scale do not suffice to explain European integration. Rather, integration decisions are taken within an institutional setting that involves politicians with interests that may diverge from those of the voter…
Does terroir size matter? Protected geographical areas and prices of European hams
The boundaries of geographical indication (GI) areas represent the core of GI specifications. Theory suggests that smaller areas result in higher prices due to quantity restrictions and higher quality. However, empirical evidence on the importance of GI areas for using places as brands is scarce. Our regressions using newly coded data of GI areas in km2 of 22 hams provide direct empirical evidence that larger areas are associated with lower price…
The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union: Strategic interactions and legislative powers
This paper develops spatial, game-theoretical models of European Union (EU) policy-making that include the rotating Council Presidency as one of the main actors. Previous such models have typically ignored the Presidency's role, even though it is instrumental in shepherding the Commission's proposals through the legislative process. We study whether the Commission takes the Presidency's preferences into account when formulating proposals, and whe…
Making exit costly but efficient: The political economy of exit clauses and secession
This article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. After the federation has formed, members’ benefits from it may be different than expected. If a member ends up not benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on formal models, we show how state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions: they force the secessionist member to take into account the lost benefits of the f…
Voting Behavior in the Council of the European Union: The Effect of the Trio Presidency
This paper examines the Trio Presidency and its impact on voting behavior in the Council of the European Union. Trios of Member States cooperate for 18-month periods, with each member holding the Presidency for six months. We study whether belonging to the Trio increases the probability that a Member State votes in favor of a measure. We analyze roll call votes on 1038 legislative acts from January 2007 till June 2014. Conducting probit analyses …
National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union
This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game‐theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more l…
Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union
We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information. We fi…
The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the budgetary process in the European Union. We present a game-theoretical analysis and an empirical evaluation of the new annual budgetary procedure. We find that the procedure operates much like the ordinary legislative procedure, and puts the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. Given the prevailing preference configuration, our empirical analysis shows that the European Parliament does not de…
Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union
This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expecte…
The role of oversight committees in closed rule legislation
We formulate a game-theoretical model of closed rule legislation in the presence of informational asymmetries. In the model an agenda setter with private information proposes a policy to a legislature. The legislature appoints an oversight committee to monitor the agenda setter. We study the rationale for this appointment, and analyze the equilibrium oversight committee member choices for the legislators. We conclude that it is optimal for the le…
Procedural models of European Union politics: Contributions and suggestions for improvement
This article analyzes the literature on procedural models of European Union politics. We present an overview of the main models of the legislative procedures, with a focus on their relevance to European Union politics and the literature today. We discuss early controversies in the literature and examine the empirical research that tested the models. Furthermore, we consider models of other aspects of policy-making in the European Union. Finally, …
Treaty reform and the Commission’s appointment and policy-making role in the European Union
This article analyses the role of the Commission in the European Union (EU). We present a game-theoretical model of two EU processes — Commission appointment and the adoption of legislation — and apply this model to the appointment of recent Commissions and their legislative programmes. Institutional reforms of the EU have led to more involvement of the European Parliament and majority voting in the Council in both processes. We find that the int…
The party political make-up of EU legislative bodies1
This research note provides an overview of the party political makeup of EU legislative bodies for the period 1979–2004 (Commission: 1979–2007) in terms of the left–right and pro-/anti-Europe dimensions. The various methods of measuring political positions are discussed and compared. Measures for the left–right dimension based on party manifestos and expert surveys are relatively strongly correlated for the time period. This is not the case for t…
Gatekeeping
Collective choice bodies throughout the world use a diverse array of codified rules that determine who may exercise procedural rights, and in what order. This paper analyzes several two-stage decision-making models, focusing on one in which the first-moving actor has a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo, i.e., to exercise gatekeeping. Normative analysis using Pareto-dominance criteria reveals that the institution of ga…
Extracting Ideal Point Estimates from Actors’ Preferences in the EU Constitutional Negotiations
This article uses the Domestic Structures and European Integration (DOSEI) data set of actors’ preferences on 65 issues in the 2003-4 Intergovernmental Conference to extract the underlying preferences of the governments, the Commission and the European Parliament on the main dimensions of conflict in the European Union’s constitutional negotiations. The analysis starts by comparing the ideal point estimates produced by three ‘inductive’ technique…
Another Look at Connections Across German Elections
By examining connections between recent federal and state elections in Germany, we evaluate whether German elections seem to be maintaining some interesting preunification patterns broadly reminiscent of American elections, even as the re-absorption of the East has made the German party system more chaotic. Regional partisan stability does persist and there is continuity by way of a robust ‘moderating elections’ phenomenon: all parties suffer in …
The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing
This paper studies the democratic deficit in the European Union (EU). It examines what constitutes a democratic deficit, analyzes whether there is one in the EU, and offers suggestions for a solution. I focus on the output of the legislative process and study whether policies deviate from those emerging in other political systems. In particular, I present a formal model of policy-making in a bicameral system, apply it to the EU, and compare the E…
Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union
This article presents spatial models of policy-making in the European Union and focuses on interest group lobbying. It analyzes the two principal legislative procedures: consultation and codecision. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission from an informed lobbyist to uninformed policy makers. The theory characterizes sets of proposals that can be adopted under both procedures and determines the proposers' optimal propo…
Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union
Understanding the EU Legislative Process: Political Scientists' and Practitioners' Perspectives
The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union
Legislative Procedures in the European Community
This article presents spatial models of three legislative procedures in the EC: the consultation, co-operation and assent procedures. The theory characterizes for each procedure the set of policies that can be adopted and the equilibrium EC policy as a function of the ideal policies of the countries, the Commission and the Parliament, and the location of the status quo. It yields comparative statements about EC policy and the institutions' powers…
Minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities in parliamentary systems
This paper studies government formation in parliamentary systems. A formal model is presented to explain the emergence of minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities, as a function of the largest party's share of the seats in the legislature and its location in the policy space. I conclude that as the largest party becomes larger and more central, the government changes from a surplus majority to a minimal winning coal…
Legislative Procedures in the European Community
This article presents spatial models of three legislative procedures in the EC: the consultation, co-operation and assent procedures. The theory characterizes for each procedure the set of policies that can be adopted and the equilibrium EC policy as a function of the ideal policies of the countries, the Commission and the Parliament, and the location of the status quo. It yields comparative statements about EC policy and the institutions' powers…
The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union
Minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities in parliamentary systems
This paper studies government formation in parliamentary systems. A formal model is presented to explain the emergence of minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities, as a function of the largest party's share of the seats in the legislature and its location in the policy space. I conclude that as the largest party becomes larger and more central, the government changes from a surplus majority to a minimal winning coal…
Gatekeeping
Collective choice bodies throughout the world use a diverse array of codified rules that determine who may exercise procedural rights, and in what order. This paper analyzes several two-stage decision-making models, focusing on one in which the first-moving actor has a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo, i.e., to exercise gatekeeping. Normative analysis using Pareto-dominance criteria reveals that the institution of ga…
Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union
This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expecte…
The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing
This paper studies the democratic deficit in the European Union (EU). It examines what constitutes a democratic deficit, analyzes whether there is one in the EU, and offers suggestions for a solution. I focus on the output of the legislative process and study whether policies deviate from those emerging in other political systems. In particular, I present a formal model of policy-making in a bicameral system, apply it to the EU, and compare the E…
Understanding the EU Legislative Process: Political Scientists' and Practitioners' Perspectives
The party political make-up of EU legislative bodies1
This research note provides an overview of the party political makeup of EU legislative bodies for the period 1979–2004 (Commission: 1979–2007) in terms of the left–right and pro-/anti-Europe dimensions. The various methods of measuring political positions are discussed and compared. Measures for the left–right dimension based on party manifestos and expert surveys are relatively strongly correlated for the time period. This is not the case for t…
Treaty reform and the Commission’s appointment and policy-making role in the European Union
This article analyses the role of the Commission in the European Union (EU). We present a game-theoretical model of two EU processes — Commission appointment and the adoption of legislation — and apply this model to the appointment of recent Commissions and their legislative programmes. Institutional reforms of the EU have led to more involvement of the European Parliament and majority voting in the Council in both processes. We find that the int…
Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union
Procedural models of European Union politics: Contributions and suggestions for improvement
This article analyzes the literature on procedural models of European Union politics. We present an overview of the main models of the legislative procedures, with a focus on their relevance to European Union politics and the literature today. We discuss early controversies in the literature and examine the empirical research that tested the models. Furthermore, we consider models of other aspects of policy-making in the European Union. Finally, …
Another Look at Connections Across German Elections
By examining connections between recent federal and state elections in Germany, we evaluate whether German elections seem to be maintaining some interesting preunification patterns broadly reminiscent of American elections, even as the re-absorption of the East has made the German party system more chaotic. Regional partisan stability does persist and there is continuity by way of a robust ‘moderating elections’ phenomenon: all parties suffer in …
Voting Behavior in the Council of the European Union: The Effect of the Trio Presidency
This paper examines the Trio Presidency and its impact on voting behavior in the Council of the European Union. Trios of Member States cooperate for 18-month periods, with each member holding the Presidency for six months. We study whether belonging to the Trio increases the probability that a Member State votes in favor of a measure. We analyze roll call votes on 1038 legislative acts from January 2007 till June 2014. Conducting probit analyses …
Extracting Ideal Point Estimates from Actors’ Preferences in the EU Constitutional Negotiations
This article uses the Domestic Structures and European Integration (DOSEI) data set of actors’ preferences on 65 issues in the 2003-4 Intergovernmental Conference to extract the underlying preferences of the governments, the Commission and the European Parliament on the main dimensions of conflict in the European Union’s constitutional negotiations. The analysis starts by comparing the ideal point estimates produced by three ‘inductive’ technique…
National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union
This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game‐theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more l…
Making exit costly but efficient: The political economy of exit clauses and secession
This article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. After the federation has formed, members’ benefits from it may be different than expected. If a member ends up not benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on formal models, we show how state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions: they force the secessionist member to take into account the lost benefits of the f…
Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union
We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information. We fi…
The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the budgetary process in the European Union. We present a game-theoretical analysis and an empirical evaluation of the new annual budgetary procedure. We find that the procedure operates much like the ordinary legislative procedure, and puts the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. Given the prevailing preference configuration, our empirical analysis shows that the European Parliament does not de…
Legislative Procedures in the European Community
This article presents spatial models of three legislative procedures in the EC: the consultation, co-operation and assent procedures. The theory characterizes for each procedure the set of policies that can be adopted and the equilibrium EC policy as a function of the ideal policies of the countries, the Commission and the Parliament, and the location of the status quo. It yields comparative statements about EC policy and the institutions' powers…
Minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities in parliamentary systems
This paper studies government formation in parliamentary systems. A formal model is presented to explain the emergence of minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities, as a function of the largest party's share of the seats in the legislature and its location in the policy space. I conclude that as the largest party becomes larger and more central, the government changes from a surplus majority to a minimal winning coal…
The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union
Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union
Understanding the EU Legislative Process: Political Scientists' and Practitioners' Perspectives
Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union
This article presents spatial models of policy-making in the European Union and focuses on interest group lobbying. It analyzes the two principal legislative procedures: consultation and codecision. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission from an informed lobbyist to uninformed policy makers. The theory characterizes sets of proposals that can be adopted under both procedures and determines the proposers' optimal propo…
The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing
This paper studies the democratic deficit in the European Union (EU). It examines what constitutes a democratic deficit, analyzes whether there is one in the EU, and offers suggestions for a solution. I focus on the output of the legislative process and study whether policies deviate from those emerging in other political systems. In particular, I present a formal model of policy-making in a bicameral system, apply it to the EU, and compare the E…
Another Look at Connections Across German Elections
By examining connections between recent federal and state elections in Germany, we evaluate whether German elections seem to be maintaining some interesting preunification patterns broadly reminiscent of American elections, even as the re-absorption of the East has made the German party system more chaotic. Regional partisan stability does persist and there is continuity by way of a robust ‘moderating elections’ phenomenon: all parties suffer in …
Extracting Ideal Point Estimates from Actors’ Preferences in the EU Constitutional Negotiations
This article uses the Domestic Structures and European Integration (DOSEI) data set of actors’ preferences on 65 issues in the 2003-4 Intergovernmental Conference to extract the underlying preferences of the governments, the Commission and the European Parliament on the main dimensions of conflict in the European Union’s constitutional negotiations. The analysis starts by comparing the ideal point estimates produced by three ‘inductive’ technique…
Gatekeeping
Collective choice bodies throughout the world use a diverse array of codified rules that determine who may exercise procedural rights, and in what order. This paper analyzes several two-stage decision-making models, focusing on one in which the first-moving actor has a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo, i.e., to exercise gatekeeping. Normative analysis using Pareto-dominance criteria reveals that the institution of ga…
The party political make-up of EU legislative bodies1
This research note provides an overview of the party political makeup of EU legislative bodies for the period 1979–2004 (Commission: 1979–2007) in terms of the left–right and pro-/anti-Europe dimensions. The various methods of measuring political positions are discussed and compared. Measures for the left–right dimension based on party manifestos and expert surveys are relatively strongly correlated for the time period. This is not the case for t…
Treaty reform and the Commission’s appointment and policy-making role in the European Union
This article analyses the role of the Commission in the European Union (EU). We present a game-theoretical model of two EU processes — Commission appointment and the adoption of legislation — and apply this model to the appointment of recent Commissions and their legislative programmes. Institutional reforms of the EU have led to more involvement of the European Parliament and majority voting in the Council in both processes. We find that the int…
The role of oversight committees in closed rule legislation
We formulate a game-theoretical model of closed rule legislation in the presence of informational asymmetries. In the model an agenda setter with private information proposes a policy to a legislature. The legislature appoints an oversight committee to monitor the agenda setter. We study the rationale for this appointment, and analyze the equilibrium oversight committee member choices for the legislators. We conclude that it is optimal for the le…
Procedural models of European Union politics: Contributions and suggestions for improvement
This article analyzes the literature on procedural models of European Union politics. We present an overview of the main models of the legislative procedures, with a focus on their relevance to European Union politics and the literature today. We discuss early controversies in the literature and examine the empirical research that tested the models. Furthermore, we consider models of other aspects of policy-making in the European Union. Finally, …
The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the budgetary process in the European Union. We present a game-theoretical analysis and an empirical evaluation of the new annual budgetary procedure. We find that the procedure operates much like the ordinary legislative procedure, and puts the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. Given the prevailing preference configuration, our empirical analysis shows that the European Parliament does not de…
Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the European Union
This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expecte…
Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union
We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information. We fi…
Making exit costly but efficient: The political economy of exit clauses and secession
This article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. After the federation has formed, members’ benefits from it may be different than expected. If a member ends up not benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on formal models, we show how state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions: they force the secessionist member to take into account the lost benefits of the f…
Voting Behavior in the Council of the European Union: The Effect of the Trio Presidency
This paper examines the Trio Presidency and its impact on voting behavior in the Council of the European Union. Trios of Member States cooperate for 18-month periods, with each member holding the Presidency for six months. We study whether belonging to the Trio increases the probability that a Member State votes in favor of a measure. We analyze roll call votes on 1038 legislative acts from January 2007 till June 2014. Conducting probit analyses …
National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union
This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game‐theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more l…
The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union: Strategic interactions and legislative powers
This paper develops spatial, game-theoretical models of European Union (EU) policy-making that include the rotating Council Presidency as one of the main actors. Previous such models have typically ignored the Presidency's role, even though it is instrumental in shepherding the Commission's proposals through the legislative process. We study whether the Commission takes the Presidency's preferences into account when formulating proposals, and whe…
Preferences and Institutions in European (Dis)Integration
In this article, we present a game-theoretical model of political (dis)integration, and the incentives voters and politicians face during integration processes. We apply the model to the European Union. Preference homogeneity and economies of scale do not suffice to explain European integration. Rather, integration decisions are taken within an institutional setting that involves politicians with interests that may diverge from those of the voter…
Does terroir size matter? Protected geographical areas and prices of European hams
The boundaries of geographical indication (GI) areas represent the core of GI specifications. Theory suggests that smaller areas result in higher prices due to quantity restrictions and higher quality. However, empirical evidence on the importance of GI areas for using places as brands is scarce. Our regressions using newly coded data of GI areas in km2 of 22 hams provide direct empirical evidence that larger areas are associated with lower price…
Political science (22 works) · Economics (21 works) · Law (20 works) · Law (19 works) · Politics (19 works) · European union (16 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (16 works) · Public Administration (15 works) · Legislature (14 works) · Public Administration (13 works)