Zeren Li
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371216 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Zeren Li |
| GIVEN NAMES | Zeren |
| FAMILY NAME | Li |
| SIGNATURE | LI Z |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2821-2390 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Brokerage and patronage: Regional chambers of commerce and firm subsidies in China
Although conventional wisdom suggests that corporations form groups to obtain policy benefits through lobbying, we argue that business interest groups can secure distributive benefits for their members without advocating for policy changes. We introduce broker theory, which posits that interest groups act as intermediaries, linking member firms with political patrons who deliver tangible favors. We test this theory by examining China's interprovi…
Does Affluence Influence Authoritarian Responsiveness? Evidence From Urban China
While research on advanced democracies highlights unequal political responsiveness favoring the affluent, less is known about such bias in authoritarian regimes without competitive elections. This paper analyzes how wealth affects bureaucratic responsiveness in an authoritarian context. By matching administrative data on municipal service records with apartment complex-level housing prices in downtown Shanghai, we show mixed findings on unequal r…
Subsidies for Sale: Postgovernment Career Concerns, Revolving-Door Channels, and Public Resource Misallocation in China
The Last Strike: Age, Career Incentives and Taxation in China
Judicial recentralization as political control: Evidence from the judicial leader rotation in China
Objective This study analyzes how authoritarian leaders use the judicial system to solve the principal–agent problem in the government hierarchy. We argue that autocrats recentralize court personnel to enhance the central government's monitoring power over local officials. Methods Our empirical analysis takes advantage of a judicial personnel rotation reform in which the Chinese Communist Party recentralized court personnel by rotating provincial…
Connections as Liabilities: The Cost of the Politics–Business Revolving Door in China
The established literature has recognized revolving-door hiring as a means for firms to obtain protection against political risks and advance their business interests. This article theorizes about the cost of the revolving door between politics and business, which transmits uncertainty during turbulent times from the political system to firms. I empirically estimate the cost of revolving-door recruitment for over 3,000 publicly listed firms in th…
The Decline of Factions: The Impact of a Broad Purge on Political Decision Making in China
We conceptualize broad purges, which extend far below top powerholders in authoritarian regimes and operate according to a logic fundamentally different from coup-proofing purges that target rivals to the supreme leader. Broad purges induce risk reduction in decision making because they grossly exacerbate uncertainty and raise the likelihood and cost of political error. Empirically, we analyze political appointment decisions before and during a m…
Within-party mobility and economic performance in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from China
This study analyses a mechanism to explain how internal mobility in the dominant party enhances economic performance. We argue that authoritarian leaders incentivize their political agents to advance economic development by using age-based promotion and retirement rules. We empirically examine our theoretical claim using China’s cadre rejuvenation policy, which rewards younger leaders with more opportunities for career advancement. Drawing on pan…
The Decline of Factions: The Impact of a Broad Purge on Political Decision Making in China
We conceptualize broad purges, which extend far below top powerholders in authoritarian regimes and operate according to a logic fundamentally different from coup-proofing purges that target rivals to the supreme leader. Broad purges induce risk reduction in decision making because they grossly exacerbate uncertainty and raise the likelihood and cost of political error. Empirically, we analyze political appointment decisions before and during a m…
Connections as Liabilities: The Cost of the Politics–Business Revolving Door in China
The established literature has recognized revolving-door hiring as a means for firms to obtain protection against political risks and advance their business interests. This article theorizes about the cost of the revolving door between politics and business, which transmits uncertainty during turbulent times from the political system to firms. I empirically estimate the cost of revolving-door recruitment for over 3,000 publicly listed firms in th…
Subsidies for Sale: Postgovernment Career Concerns, Revolving-Door Channels, and Public Resource Misallocation in China
Within-party mobility and economic performance in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from China
This study analyses a mechanism to explain how internal mobility in the dominant party enhances economic performance. We argue that authoritarian leaders incentivize their political agents to advance economic development by using age-based promotion and retirement rules. We empirically examine our theoretical claim using China’s cadre rejuvenation policy, which rewards younger leaders with more opportunities for career advancement. Drawing on pan…
The Last Strike: Age, Career Incentives and Taxation in China
Judicial recentralization as political control: Evidence from the judicial leader rotation in China
Objective This study analyzes how authoritarian leaders use the judicial system to solve the principal–agent problem in the government hierarchy. We argue that autocrats recentralize court personnel to enhance the central government's monitoring power over local officials. Methods Our empirical analysis takes advantage of a judicial personnel rotation reform in which the Chinese Communist Party recentralized court personnel by rotating provincial…
Connections as Liabilities: The Cost of the Politics–Business Revolving Door in China
The established literature has recognized revolving-door hiring as a means for firms to obtain protection against political risks and advance their business interests. This article theorizes about the cost of the revolving door between politics and business, which transmits uncertainty during turbulent times from the political system to firms. I empirically estimate the cost of revolving-door recruitment for over 3,000 publicly listed firms in th…
The Decline of Factions: The Impact of a Broad Purge on Political Decision Making in China
We conceptualize broad purges, which extend far below top powerholders in authoritarian regimes and operate according to a logic fundamentally different from coup-proofing purges that target rivals to the supreme leader. Broad purges induce risk reduction in decision making because they grossly exacerbate uncertainty and raise the likelihood and cost of political error. Empirically, we analyze political appointment decisions before and during a m…
Subsidies for Sale: Postgovernment Career Concerns, Revolving-Door Channels, and Public Resource Misallocation in China
Brokerage and patronage: Regional chambers of commerce and firm subsidies in China
Although conventional wisdom suggests that corporations form groups to obtain policy benefits through lobbying, we argue that business interest groups can secure distributive benefits for their members without advocating for policy changes. We introduce broker theory, which posits that interest groups act as intermediaries, linking member firms with political patrons who deliver tangible favors. We test this theory by examining China's interprovi…
Does Affluence Influence Authoritarian Responsiveness? Evidence From Urban China
While research on advanced democracies highlights unequal political responsiveness favoring the affluent, less is known about such bias in authoritarian regimes without competitive elections. This paper analyzes how wealth affects bureaucratic responsiveness in an authoritarian context. By matching administrative data on municipal service records with apartment complex-level housing prices in downtown Shanghai, we show mixed findings on unequal r…
China (7 works) · Economics (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Politics (6 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Authoritarianism (4 works) · Democracy (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Business (3 works)