Miguel F P De Figueiredo
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371303 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Miguel F P De Figueiredo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Miguel F P |
| FAMILY NAME | De Figueiredo |
| SIGNATURE | DE FIGUEIREDO M F P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Connecticut |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2003-2929 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Corruption and the Voter's Decision
Despite voters' distaste for corruption, corrupt politicians frequently get reelected. This Element provides a framework for understanding when corrupt politicians are reelected. One unexplored source of electoral accountability is court rulings on candidate malfeasance, which are increasingly determining politicians' electoral prospects. The findings suggest that (1) low-income voters – in contrast to higher-income voters – are responsive to suc…
When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from a Field and Survey Experiment
When do voters punish corrupt politicians? Heterogeneous views about the importance of corruption can determine whether or not increased information enhances accountability. If partisan cleavages correlate with the importance voters place on corruption, then the consequences of information may vary by candidate, even when voters identify multiple candidates as corrupt. We provide evidence of this mechanism from a field experiment in a mayoral ele…
Reputational economies of scale
When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from a Field and Survey Experiment
When do voters punish corrupt politicians? Heterogeneous views about the importance of corruption can determine whether or not increased information enhances accountability. If partisan cleavages correlate with the importance voters place on corruption, then the consequences of information may vary by candidate, even when voters identify multiple candidates as corrupt. We provide evidence of this mechanism from a field experiment in a mayoral ele…
Reputational economies of scale
When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from a Field and Survey Experiment
When do voters punish corrupt politicians? Heterogeneous views about the importance of corruption can determine whether or not increased information enhances accountability. If partisan cleavages correlate with the importance voters place on corruption, then the consequences of information may vary by candidate, even when voters identify multiple candidates as corrupt. We provide evidence of this mechanism from a field experiment in a mayoral ele…
Corruption and the Voter's Decision
Despite voters' distaste for corruption, corrupt politicians frequently get reelected. This Element provides a framework for understanding when corrupt politicians are reelected. One unexplored source of electoral accountability is court rulings on candidate malfeasance, which are increasingly determining politicians' electoral prospects. The findings suggest that (1) low-income voters – in contrast to higher-income voters – are responsive to suc…
Accountability (2 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Language change (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Adversary (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work)