Anna Bassi
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4371652 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Anna Bassi |
| PRENOMES | Anna |
| SOBRENOME | Bassi |
| ASSINATURA | BASSI A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 67 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2011 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2017 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Policy Preferences in Coalition Formation and the Stability of Minority and Surplus Governments
In parliamentary democracies, political parties bargain over cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. While most of the theoretical literature predicts that only minimal winning coalitions form in equilibrium, the empirical evidence shows that minority and surplus coalitions are about as frequent. In this article, I bridge the gap between the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence by developing a noncooperative bargainin…
Voting systems and strategic manipulation
This article presents experiments that analyze the strategic behavior of voters under three voting systems: plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda count. Applying a level- k reasoning model approach, strategic behavior is found to be significantly different under each treatment (voting system). Plurality rule leads voters to play in the most sophisticated (i.e. best response), but not necessarily insincere, manner. Thus, this voting syste…
A Model of Endogenous Government Formation
Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. Noncooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the “formateur” enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions. However, empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a government party contributes to the government coalitio…
The Effects of Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting
We report on majority voting experiments where subjects are randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate. However, subjects sometimes receive a financial incentive from voting contrary to their identity. We vary the size of the incentive as well as information voters have about the advantage of the incentive. We find that subjects are influenced by their assigned identities, and the effect is stronger when voters have less information.…
A Model of Endogenous Government Formation
Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. Noncooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the “formateur” enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions. However, empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a government party contributes to the government coalitio…
Policy Preferences in Coalition Formation and the Stability of Minority and Surplus Governments
In parliamentary democracies, political parties bargain over cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. While most of the theoretical literature predicts that only minimal winning coalitions form in equilibrium, the empirical evidence shows that minority and surplus coalitions are about as frequent. In this article, I bridge the gap between the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence by developing a noncooperative bargainin…
The Effects of Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting
We report on majority voting experiments where subjects are randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate. However, subjects sometimes receive a financial incentive from voting contrary to their identity. We vary the size of the incentive as well as information voters have about the advantage of the incentive. We find that subjects are influenced by their assigned identities, and the effect is stronger when voters have less information.…
Voting systems and strategic manipulation
This article presents experiments that analyze the strategic behavior of voters under three voting systems: plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda count. Applying a level- k reasoning model approach, strategic behavior is found to be significantly different under each treatment (voting system). Plurality rule leads voters to play in the most sophisticated (i.e. best response), but not necessarily insincere, manner. Thus, this voting syste…
The Effects of Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting
We report on majority voting experiments where subjects are randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate. However, subjects sometimes receive a financial incentive from voting contrary to their identity. We vary the size of the incentive as well as information voters have about the advantage of the incentive. We find that subjects are influenced by their assigned identities, and the effect is stronger when voters have less information.…
A Model of Endogenous Government Formation
Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. Noncooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the “formateur” enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions. However, empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a government party contributes to the government coalitio…
Voting systems and strategic manipulation
This article presents experiments that analyze the strategic behavior of voters under three voting systems: plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda count. Applying a level- k reasoning model approach, strategic behavior is found to be significantly different under each treatment (voting system). Plurality rule leads voters to play in the most sophisticated (i.e. best response), but not necessarily insincere, manner. Thus, this voting syste…
Policy Preferences in Coalition Formation and the Stability of Minority and Surplus Governments
In parliamentary democracies, political parties bargain over cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. While most of the theoretical literature predicts that only minimal winning coalitions form in equilibrium, the empirical evidence shows that minority and surplus coalitions are about as frequent. In this article, I bridge the gap between the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence by developing a noncooperative bargainin…
Economics (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Microeconomics (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 obras) · Politics (3 obras) · Public economics (3 obras) · Business (2 obras) · Cabinet (room (2 obras)