Michael S Lewis‐beck
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371850 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael S Lewis‐beck |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael S |
| FAMILY NAME | Lewis‐beck |
| SIGNATURE | BECK M S L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Iowa |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 333 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
The abiding voter
Although the theory of retrospective voting receives wide support in the literature on voting behaviour, less agreement exists on voters’ time horizon when assessing the government's performance – that is, whether voters are myopic. Previous studies on voter myopia tend to focus on aggregate‐level measures of the economy, or use an experimental approach. Using panel data, this article offers the first investigation into voter myopia that uses ind…
Economic Voting in Latin America
The impact of institutions on the economic vote stands as a well‐established proposition for the advanced democracies of Europe. We know less, however, regarding the institutional effects on the economic vote in the developing democracies of Latin America. Carrying out an analysis of presidential elections in 18 Latin American countries, we offer evidence that the usual Eurocentric conceptualization of the clarity of responsibility is not ideal f…
Proxy Models and Nowcasting
U.S. presidential election forecasting has lately received considerable attention. A leading approach, statistical modeling, has undergone considerable change. We have contributed to that change in two ways, by stressing prediction over explanation and dynamics over statics. For prediction, we offer a proxy model of U.S. presidential election forecasting, based on an empirical (political economy) indicator measured six months in advance. For dyna…
Economic vote instability
While the economic vote exists in Western democracies, the question of its stability remains a subject of controversy. This article focuses on two possible factors behind the instability observed: the endogeneity problem and the restricted variance problem. The former concerns the influence of partisan thinking on economic perception, while the latter concerns the influence of economic crisis, when virtually all voters may perceive a bad economy.…
The Economic Vote in Transitional Democracies
For the advanced industrial democracies, the link between economics and elections has been much studied. Indeed, this research enterprise has become something of a cottage industry. A current liter...
Economics, Party, and the Vote
Conventional wisdom argues that national economic perceptions generally have an important impact on the vote choice in democracies. Recently, a revisionist view has arisen, contending that this link, regularly observed in election surveys, is mostly spurious. According to the argument, partisanship distorts economic perception, thereby substantially exaggerating the real vote connection. These causality issues have not been much investigated empi…
Reordering the French election calendar
French politicians sometimes change election rules for political advantage. In the Spring of 2001, the ruling Socialists pushed through the inversion of the 2002 election calendar despite stiff opposition. What were the consequences of scheduling the presidential election before the legislature elections? Employing new techniques for French election forecasting, we show that the inversion brought great vote gains to the Socialist‐led coalition in…
Is local politics local? French evidence
In advanced democracies, are local political decisions determined by local events? Or are they really shaped by national forces? For the United States case, the evidence on this question is mixed. For the French case, the focus here, the evidence is also mixed, but less hard. In fact, for cantonal elections, in many ways archtypical local affairs, relevant systematic findings are virtually absent. We ask whether the cantonal elections of the Fift…
Who's the chef? Economic voting under a dual executive
Standard economic voting models assume a dominant locus of policy responsibility, a single chief executive whose powers are fixed by certain inviolate institutional rules. The president‐centred US system serves as the paradigm here. However, economic voting may occur under a dual executive, whose powers change in response to the institutional rules themselves. France represents this second scenario. There are two executives, the President and the…
Capitalism, socialism, and democracy
Some prominent economists have argued that the structure of a nation's economic life – capitalist or socialist ‐ helps to shape its political institutions. Though its importance seems self‐evident, scholars have not yet integrated this idea into the literature of empirical democratic theory. Drawing on previous work, we formulate four propositions about the relationship between economic structure and political democracy. Economic structure does i…
Economics, Party, and the Vote
Conventional wisdom argues that national economic perceptions generally have an important impact on the vote choice in democracies. Recently, a revisionist view has arisen, contending that this link, regularly observed in election surveys, is mostly spurious. According to the argument, partisanship distorts economic perception, thereby substantially exaggerating the real vote connection. These causality issues have not been much investigated empi…
Who's the chef? Economic voting under a dual executive
Standard economic voting models assume a dominant locus of policy responsibility, a single chief executive whose powers are fixed by certain inviolate institutional rules. The president‐centred US system serves as the paradigm here. However, economic voting may occur under a dual executive, whose powers change in response to the institutional rules themselves. France represents this second scenario. There are two executives, the President and the…
Economic vote instability
While the economic vote exists in Western democracies, the question of its stability remains a subject of controversy. This article focuses on two possible factors behind the instability observed: the endogeneity problem and the restricted variance problem. The former concerns the influence of partisan thinking on economic perception, while the latter concerns the influence of economic crisis, when virtually all voters may perceive a bad economy.…
Reordering the French election calendar
French politicians sometimes change election rules for political advantage. In the Spring of 2001, the ruling Socialists pushed through the inversion of the 2002 election calendar despite stiff opposition. What were the consequences of scheduling the presidential election before the legislature elections? Employing new techniques for French election forecasting, we show that the inversion brought great vote gains to the Socialist‐led coalition in…
Capitalism, socialism, and democracy
Some prominent economists have argued that the structure of a nation's economic life – capitalist or socialist ‐ helps to shape its political institutions. Though its importance seems self‐evident, scholars have not yet integrated this idea into the literature of empirical democratic theory. Drawing on previous work, we formulate four propositions about the relationship between economic structure and political democracy. Economic structure does i…
Economic Voting in Latin America
The impact of institutions on the economic vote stands as a well‐established proposition for the advanced democracies of Europe. We know less, however, regarding the institutional effects on the economic vote in the developing democracies of Latin America. Carrying out an analysis of presidential elections in 18 Latin American countries, we offer evidence that the usual Eurocentric conceptualization of the clarity of responsibility is not ideal f…
Is local politics local? French evidence
In advanced democracies, are local political decisions determined by local events? Or are they really shaped by national forces? For the United States case, the evidence on this question is mixed. For the French case, the focus here, the evidence is also mixed, but less hard. In fact, for cantonal elections, in many ways archtypical local affairs, relevant systematic findings are virtually absent. We ask whether the cantonal elections of the Fift…
The abiding voter
Although the theory of retrospective voting receives wide support in the literature on voting behaviour, less agreement exists on voters’ time horizon when assessing the government's performance – that is, whether voters are myopic. Previous studies on voter myopia tend to focus on aggregate‐level measures of the economy, or use an experimental approach. Using panel data, this article offers the first investigation into voter myopia that uses ind…
Proxy Models and Nowcasting
U.S. presidential election forecasting has lately received considerable attention. A leading approach, statistical modeling, has undergone considerable change. We have contributed to that change in two ways, by stressing prediction over explanation and dynamics over statics. For prediction, we offer a proxy model of U.S. presidential election forecasting, based on an empirical (political economy) indicator measured six months in advance. For dyna…
Capitalism, socialism, and democracy
Some prominent economists have argued that the structure of a nation's economic life – capitalist or socialist ‐ helps to shape its political institutions. Though its importance seems self‐evident, scholars have not yet integrated this idea into the literature of empirical democratic theory. Drawing on previous work, we formulate four propositions about the relationship between economic structure and political democracy. Economic structure does i…
Who's the chef? Economic voting under a dual executive
Standard economic voting models assume a dominant locus of policy responsibility, a single chief executive whose powers are fixed by certain inviolate institutional rules. The president‐centred US system serves as the paradigm here. However, economic voting may occur under a dual executive, whose powers change in response to the institutional rules themselves. France represents this second scenario. There are two executives, the President and the…
Is local politics local? French evidence
In advanced democracies, are local political decisions determined by local events? Or are they really shaped by national forces? For the United States case, the evidence on this question is mixed. For the French case, the focus here, the evidence is also mixed, but less hard. In fact, for cantonal elections, in many ways archtypical local affairs, relevant systematic findings are virtually absent. We ask whether the cantonal elections of the Fift…
Reordering the French election calendar
French politicians sometimes change election rules for political advantage. In the Spring of 2001, the ruling Socialists pushed through the inversion of the 2002 election calendar despite stiff opposition. What were the consequences of scheduling the presidential election before the legislature elections? Employing new techniques for French election forecasting, we show that the inversion brought great vote gains to the Socialist‐led coalition in…
The Economic Vote in Transitional Democracies
For the advanced industrial democracies, the link between economics and elections has been much studied. Indeed, this research enterprise has become something of a cottage industry. A current liter...
Economics, Party, and the Vote
Conventional wisdom argues that national economic perceptions generally have an important impact on the vote choice in democracies. Recently, a revisionist view has arisen, contending that this link, regularly observed in election surveys, is mostly spurious. According to the argument, partisanship distorts economic perception, thereby substantially exaggerating the real vote connection. These causality issues have not been much investigated empi…
Proxy Models and Nowcasting
U.S. presidential election forecasting has lately received considerable attention. A leading approach, statistical modeling, has undergone considerable change. We have contributed to that change in two ways, by stressing prediction over explanation and dynamics over statics. For prediction, we offer a proxy model of U.S. presidential election forecasting, based on an empirical (political economy) indicator measured six months in advance. For dyna…
Economic vote instability
While the economic vote exists in Western democracies, the question of its stability remains a subject of controversy. This article focuses on two possible factors behind the instability observed: the endogeneity problem and the restricted variance problem. The former concerns the influence of partisan thinking on economic perception, while the latter concerns the influence of economic crisis, when virtually all voters may perceive a bad economy.…
Economic Voting in Latin America
The impact of institutions on the economic vote stands as a well‐established proposition for the advanced democracies of Europe. We know less, however, regarding the institutional effects on the economic vote in the developing democracies of Latin America. Carrying out an analysis of presidential elections in 18 Latin American countries, we offer evidence that the usual Eurocentric conceptualization of the clarity of responsibility is not ideal f…
The abiding voter
Although the theory of retrospective voting receives wide support in the literature on voting behaviour, less agreement exists on voters’ time horizon when assessing the government's performance – that is, whether voters are myopic. Previous studies on voter myopia tend to focus on aggregate‐level measures of the economy, or use an experimental approach. Using panel data, this article offers the first investigation into voter myopia that uses ind…
Economics (10 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Econometrics (4 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (4 works) · Populism, Right-Wing Movements (4 works)