Jennifer L Tobin
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371885 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jennifer L Tobin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jennifer L |
| FAMILY NAME | Tobin |
| SIGNATURE | TOBIN J L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgetown University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 152 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
A network model of creditor coordination
Framing Unpopular Foreign Policies
How can governments implement foreign economic policies that are popular among political elites but unpopular among their voters? Studying international financial rescues, we argue that governments strategically frame policies in an attempt to minimize their expected political costs, which increases their ability to implement those policies successfully. We theorize that framing strategies allow governments to offer financial bailouts, and we tes…
The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts
IMF loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues. These bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises. We analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade-offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress. Creditor governments want to sta…
The Social Cost of International Investment Agreements: The Case of Cigarette Packaging
National governments have signed and ratified over three thousand International Investment Agreements (IIAs), which for the first time give multinational firms standing to sue host governments in international arbitration tribunals. IIAs have led to a host of high-profile and controversial legal disputes that have led to claims that investor state arbitration may be impeding governments in their ability to regulate and to protect their citizens’ …
Portfolio Similarity and International Development Aid
How do governments distribute their foreign aid resources across international development organizations (IDO)? We argue that governments’ distributional choices across IDOs derive from their attempt to minimize the costs of delegation and to pursue their own interests in foreign aid policy. Governments make decisions about the allocation of resources across a large number of IDOs, and they delegate their scarce aid resources to IDOs that pursue …
Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements
Conditions on aid agreements aim to increase aid effectiveness, and are, therefore, an important component of aid agreements. Yet little is known about why aid-recipient governments comply with these conditions. Some scholars have suggested a strategic-importance hypothesis: recipients comply when donors enforce conditions—and donors enforce conditions when recipients are not strategically important. However, there are many cases where strategica…
Which Countries’ Citizens Are Better Off With Trade
Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union
This paper analyzes multilateral aid allocation in the European Union (EU). We argue that EU members can influence the aid allocation process toward their national interests if they form powerful coalitions that bias the European Commission's development policies. When EU members' preferences over aid allocation are heterogeneous, the Commission can implement multilateral aid according to its programmatic goals. Greater homogeneity of EU members'…
When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties
A BIT Is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements
The landscape of the global economy is dotted with institutions that regulate investment and trade. In recent years, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in particular, has grown at a torrid pace; practically every country is a member of at least one—if not many—of these institutions. For all the scholarly attention that these institutions have received, however, there is little research tyi…
Excavations on the Kastro at Kavousi: An Architectural Overview
Donald C. Haggis, Margaret S. Mook, William D. E. Coulson, Jennifer L. Tobin, Excavations on the Kastro at Kavousi: An Architectural Overview, Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1997), pp. 315-390
Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union
This paper analyzes multilateral aid allocation in the European Union (EU). We argue that EU members can influence the aid allocation process toward their national interests if they form powerful coalitions that bias the European Commission's development policies. When EU members' preferences over aid allocation are heterogeneous, the Commission can implement multilateral aid according to its programmatic goals. Greater homogeneity of EU members'…
A BIT Is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements
The landscape of the global economy is dotted with institutions that regulate investment and trade. In recent years, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in particular, has grown at a torrid pace; practically every country is a member of at least one—if not many—of these institutions. For all the scholarly attention that these institutions have received, however, there is little research tyi…
The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts
IMF loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues. These bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises. We analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade-offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress. Creditor governments want to sta…
Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements
Conditions on aid agreements aim to increase aid effectiveness, and are, therefore, an important component of aid agreements. Yet little is known about why aid-recipient governments comply with these conditions. Some scholars have suggested a strategic-importance hypothesis: recipients comply when donors enforce conditions—and donors enforce conditions when recipients are not strategically important. However, there are many cases where strategica…
Portfolio Similarity and International Development Aid
How do governments distribute their foreign aid resources across international development organizations (IDO)? We argue that governments’ distributional choices across IDOs derive from their attempt to minimize the costs of delegation and to pursue their own interests in foreign aid policy. Governments make decisions about the allocation of resources across a large number of IDOs, and they delegate their scarce aid resources to IDOs that pursue …
Excavations on the Kastro at Kavousi: An Architectural Overview
Donald C. Haggis, Margaret S. Mook, William D. E. Coulson, Jennifer L. Tobin, Excavations on the Kastro at Kavousi: An Architectural Overview, Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1997), pp. 315-390
Framing Unpopular Foreign Policies
How can governments implement foreign economic policies that are popular among political elites but unpopular among their voters? Studying international financial rescues, we argue that governments strategically frame policies in an attempt to minimize their expected political costs, which increases their ability to implement those policies successfully. We theorize that framing strategies allow governments to offer financial bailouts, and we tes…
Which Countries’ Citizens Are Better Off With Trade
The Social Cost of International Investment Agreements: The Case of Cigarette Packaging
National governments have signed and ratified over three thousand International Investment Agreements (IIAs), which for the first time give multinational firms standing to sue host governments in international arbitration tribunals. IIAs have led to a host of high-profile and controversial legal disputes that have led to claims that investor state arbitration may be impeding governments in their ability to regulate and to protect their citizens’ …
Excavations on the Kastro at Kavousi: An Architectural Overview
Donald C. Haggis, Margaret S. Mook, William D. E. Coulson, Jennifer L. Tobin, Excavations on the Kastro at Kavousi: An Architectural Overview, Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1997), pp. 315-390
A BIT Is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements
The landscape of the global economy is dotted with institutions that regulate investment and trade. In recent years, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in particular, has grown at a torrid pace; practically every country is a member of at least one—if not many—of these institutions. For all the scholarly attention that these institutions have received, however, there is little research tyi…
When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties
Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union
This paper analyzes multilateral aid allocation in the European Union (EU). We argue that EU members can influence the aid allocation process toward their national interests if they form powerful coalitions that bias the European Commission's development policies. When EU members' preferences over aid allocation are heterogeneous, the Commission can implement multilateral aid according to its programmatic goals. Greater homogeneity of EU members'…
Which Countries’ Citizens Are Better Off With Trade
Portfolio Similarity and International Development Aid
How do governments distribute their foreign aid resources across international development organizations (IDO)? We argue that governments’ distributional choices across IDOs derive from their attempt to minimize the costs of delegation and to pursue their own interests in foreign aid policy. Governments make decisions about the allocation of resources across a large number of IDOs, and they delegate their scarce aid resources to IDOs that pursue …
Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements
Conditions on aid agreements aim to increase aid effectiveness, and are, therefore, an important component of aid agreements. Yet little is known about why aid-recipient governments comply with these conditions. Some scholars have suggested a strategic-importance hypothesis: recipients comply when donors enforce conditions—and donors enforce conditions when recipients are not strategically important. However, there are many cases where strategica…
The Social Cost of International Investment Agreements: The Case of Cigarette Packaging
National governments have signed and ratified over three thousand International Investment Agreements (IIAs), which for the first time give multinational firms standing to sue host governments in international arbitration tribunals. IIAs have led to a host of high-profile and controversial legal disputes that have led to claims that investor state arbitration may be impeding governments in their ability to regulate and to protect their citizens’ …
The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts
IMF loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues. These bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises. We analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade-offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress. Creditor governments want to sta…
Framing Unpopular Foreign Policies
How can governments implement foreign economic policies that are popular among political elites but unpopular among their voters? Studying international financial rescues, we argue that governments strategically frame policies in an attempt to minimize their expected political costs, which increases their ability to implement those policies successfully. We theorize that framing strategies allow governments to offer financial bailouts, and we tes…
A network model of creditor coordination
Economics (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · International Development and Aid (7 works) · International economics (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Argument (complex analysis (4 works) · Business (4 works) · International trade (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works)