Michael K Mckoy
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371937 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael K Mckoy |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael K |
| FAMILY NAME | Mckoy |
| SIGNATURE | MCKOY M K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 76 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory
Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to exa…
Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War
January 01 2012 Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War Michael K. McKoy, Michael K. McKoy Michael K. McKay is a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department at Princeton University. He thanks John Ikenberry, Alexander Łanoszka, and Praise Oh for their comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar David A. Lake David A. Lake David A. Lake is Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Scie…
The Patron’s Dilemma
We analyze an understudied mode of democratization in which the acquiescence of an autocratic regime’s foreign ally, or patron, is pivotal to the success of a democratic movement. Although a democratic patron may prefer having democracy in its dependent allies, regime change threatens the economic and security benefits associated with the alliance. We formalize this dilemma through a repeated principal-agent model and demonstrate that the critica…
Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory
Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to exa…
The Patron’s Dilemma
We analyze an understudied mode of democratization in which the acquiescence of an autocratic regime’s foreign ally, or patron, is pivotal to the success of a democratic movement. Although a democratic patron may prefer having democracy in its dependent allies, regime change threatens the economic and security benefits associated with the alliance. We formalize this dilemma through a repeated principal-agent model and demonstrate that the critica…
Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War
January 01 2012 Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War Michael K. McKoy, Michael K. McKoy Michael K. McKay is a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department at Princeton University. He thanks John Ikenberry, Alexander Łanoszka, and Praise Oh for their comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar David A. Lake David A. Lake David A. Lake is Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Scie…
Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War
January 01 2012 Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War Michael K. McKoy, Michael K. McKoy Michael K. McKay is a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department at Princeton University. He thanks John Ikenberry, Alexander Łanoszka, and Praise Oh for their comments. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar David A. Lake David A. Lake David A. Lake is Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Scie…
The Patron’s Dilemma
We analyze an understudied mode of democratization in which the acquiescence of an autocratic regime’s foreign ally, or patron, is pivotal to the success of a democratic movement. Although a democratic patron may prefer having democracy in its dependent allies, regime change threatens the economic and security benefits associated with the alliance. We formalize this dilemma through a repeated principal-agent model and demonstrate that the critica…
Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory
Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to exa…
Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (2 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Alliance (1 work) · Art (1 work)