Saurabh Pant
Biographic Data
| ID | 4371975 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Saurabh Pant |
| GIVEN NAMES | Saurabh |
| FAMILY NAME | Pant |
| SIGNATURE | PANT S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Princeton University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3881-3456 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars
The “hearts and minds” model of combating rebellions holds that civilians are less likely to support violent opposition groups if the government provides public services and security. Building on this model, we argue that a political event that raises popular expectations of future public service and security provision increases support for the government and decreases sympathy for violent opposition groups. To test this argument, we leverage a u…
The Frontier Crimes Regulation in Colonial India
In their pursuit of self-serving goals, sometimes governments create and use various instruments as the means to relatively short-term ends. Such instruments, however, can be tenacious, and have perverse, long-lasting impacts. This paper focuses on one such instrument created during the British Raj: the Frontier Crimes Regulation. Often, the literature on the Regulation focuses on the rationale for its creation from the perspective of the colonis…
Power-sharing ‘discontinuities
Power-sharing arrangements between a leader and a popular outsider can be mutually beneficial and threatening. The literature has focused primarily on the former’s trade-off where a leader gains legitimacy when sharing power with a respected outsider but also subsequently creates a rival who could challenge their rule. Yet this outsider also faces a simultaneous trade-off between power and credibility in acquiescing to the leadership. I incorpora…
Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars
The “hearts and minds” model of combating rebellions holds that civilians are less likely to support violent opposition groups if the government provides public services and security. Building on this model, we argue that a political event that raises popular expectations of future public service and security provision increases support for the government and decreases sympathy for violent opposition groups. To test this argument, we leverage a u…
Power-sharing ‘discontinuities
Power-sharing arrangements between a leader and a popular outsider can be mutually beneficial and threatening. The literature has focused primarily on the former’s trade-off where a leader gains legitimacy when sharing power with a respected outsider but also subsequently creates a rival who could challenge their rule. Yet this outsider also faces a simultaneous trade-off between power and credibility in acquiescing to the leadership. I incorpora…
The Frontier Crimes Regulation in Colonial India
In their pursuit of self-serving goals, sometimes governments create and use various instruments as the means to relatively short-term ends. Such instruments, however, can be tenacious, and have perverse, long-lasting impacts. This paper focuses on one such instrument created during the British Raj: the Frontier Crimes Regulation. Often, the literature on the Regulation focuses on the rationale for its creation from the perspective of the colonis…
Power-sharing ‘discontinuities
Power-sharing arrangements between a leader and a popular outsider can be mutually beneficial and threatening. The literature has focused primarily on the former’s trade-off where a leader gains legitimacy when sharing power with a respected outsider but also subsequently creates a rival who could challenge their rule. Yet this outsider also faces a simultaneous trade-off between power and credibility in acquiescing to the leadership. I incorpora…
Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars
The “hearts and minds” model of combating rebellions holds that civilians are less likely to support violent opposition groups if the government provides public services and security. Building on this model, we argue that a political event that raises popular expectations of future public service and security provision increases support for the government and decreases sympathy for violent opposition groups. To test this argument, we leverage a u…
Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works)