Dennis A Yao
Biographic Data
| ID | 4372186 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dennis A Yao |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dennis A |
| FAMILY NAME | Yao |
| SIGNATURE | YAO D A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pennsylvania |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6781-4146 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 34 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Informing Dissent
The first part of this commentary argues that because the production of dissent depends on the availability of information, greater attention should focus on government restrictions on access to official information. At no time is this more important than when information is monopolized by the government. If not constrained, government’s monopoly control of information, combined with its incentives to shape support for its policies, may at some t…
Envisioning Information
Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control
Presidential Commitment and the Veto
A president's power to veto is widely recognized as an important weapon in the struggle with Congress over legislation. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of the veto weapon with a simple model of presidential powers that incorporates informal institutional structure-the president's unique position as the focus of public attention-into an otherwise standard agenda-control model of the formal institutional structure governing the legis…
Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature
James J. Anton, Dennis A. Yao, Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 60-79
Technology, Strategy and National Security
[Privatization, Information and Incentives]: Comment
The Politics of Management
Presidential Commitment and the Veto
A president's power to veto is widely recognized as an important weapon in the struggle with Congress over legislation. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of the veto weapon with a simple model of presidential powers that incorporates informal institutional structure-the president's unique position as the focus of public attention-into an otherwise standard agenda-control model of the formal institutional structure governing the legis…
Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control
Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature
James J. Anton, Dennis A. Yao, Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 60-79
Informing Dissent
The first part of this commentary argues that because the production of dissent depends on the availability of information, greater attention should focus on government restrictions on access to official information. At no time is this more important than when information is monopolized by the government. If not constrained, government’s monopoly control of information, combined with its incentives to shape support for its policies, may at some t…
[Privatization, Information and Incentives]: Comment
The Politics of Management
Technology, Strategy and National Security
Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature
James J. Anton, Dennis A. Yao, Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 60-79
Circumventing formal structure through commitment: Presidential influence and agenda control
Presidential Commitment and the Veto
A president's power to veto is widely recognized as an important weapon in the struggle with Congress over legislation. In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of the veto weapon with a simple model of presidential powers that incorporates informal institutional structure-the president's unique position as the focus of public attention-into an otherwise standard agenda-control model of the formal institutional structure governing the legis…
Envisioning Information
Informing Dissent
The first part of this commentary argues that because the production of dissent depends on the availability of information, greater attention should focus on government restrictions on access to official information. At no time is this more important than when information is monopolized by the government. If not constrained, government’s monopoly control of information, combined with its incentives to shape support for its policies, may at some t…
Political science (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Control (management (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Incentive (2 works)