Minh Trinh
Biographic Data
| ID | 4373248 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Minh Trinh |
| GIVEN NAMES | Minh |
| FAMILY NAME | Trinh |
| SIGNATURE | TRINH M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 34 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Tea Leaf Elections: Inferring Purpose for Authoritarian Elections from Postelection Responses to Defeats
The power of authoritarian elections is not unlimited. When using elections as a source of information, authoritarian regimes may not be able to collect from a single election all the information it could theoretically provide, and so they must commit to seeking only some specific signal(s) in each election. It is possible to identify the type of information each regime seeks from its elections by studying its reactions to small but unexpected de…
What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-Level Evidence from China
How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. Through a novel experiment design for mediation analysis embedded in a series of conjoint experiments conducted in China, we find individual-level evid…
How electoral integrity affects voter turnout in democracies
Does electoral integrity affect turnout? And if so, how? We analysed some variables that are closely related to electoral integrity – government actions, opposition actions, and the context in which the election is held – and find significant impact on turnout. We argue that higher turnout is often found in elections with higher electoral integrity. We tested our claims using data for over 700 elections covering 85 democracies for the 1950–2008 p…
What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-Level Evidence from China
How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. Through a novel experiment design for mediation analysis embedded in a series of conjoint experiments conducted in China, we find individual-level evid…
How electoral integrity affects voter turnout in democracies
Does electoral integrity affect turnout? And if so, how? We analysed some variables that are closely related to electoral integrity – government actions, opposition actions, and the context in which the election is held – and find significant impact on turnout. We argue that higher turnout is often found in elections with higher electoral integrity. We tested our claims using data for over 700 elections covering 85 democracies for the 1950–2008 p…
Tea Leaf Elections: Inferring Purpose for Authoritarian Elections from Postelection Responses to Defeats
The power of authoritarian elections is not unlimited. When using elections as a source of information, authoritarian regimes may not be able to collect from a single election all the information it could theoretically provide, and so they must commit to seeking only some specific signal(s) in each election. It is possible to identify the type of information each regime seeks from its elections by studying its reactions to small but unexpected de…
How electoral integrity affects voter turnout in democracies
Does electoral integrity affect turnout? And if so, how? We analysed some variables that are closely related to electoral integrity – government actions, opposition actions, and the context in which the election is held – and find significant impact on turnout. We argue that higher turnout is often found in elections with higher electoral integrity. We tested our claims using data for over 700 elections covering 85 democracies for the 1950–2008 p…
Tea Leaf Elections: Inferring Purpose for Authoritarian Elections from Postelection Responses to Defeats
The power of authoritarian elections is not unlimited. When using elections as a source of information, authoritarian regimes may not be able to collect from a single election all the information it could theoretically provide, and so they must commit to seeking only some specific signal(s) in each election. It is possible to identify the type of information each regime seeks from its elections by studying its reactions to small but unexpected de…
What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-Level Evidence from China
How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. Through a novel experiment design for mediation analysis embedded in a series of conjoint experiments conducted in China, we find individual-level evid…
Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Authoritarianism (2 works) · Democracy (2 works) · Boycott (1 works) · China (1 works)