Elena Leuschner
Biographic Data
| ID | 4374900 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elena Leuschner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elena |
| FAMILY NAME | Leuschner |
| SIGNATURE | LEUSCHNER E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Gothenburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1364-473X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Outcome Isn’t Everything
Incumbents often make unpopular policy decisions. But can they remedy their negative electoral consequences? We extend the wide literature concerning retrospective voting to the case of unpopular policies and examine whether voters reward a responsive withdrawal of an unpopular policy proposal or punish the disclosed policy intention despite the withdrawal. To test this, we use granular data on Swedish local election results from 2002 to 2018 and…
State Concessions and Protest Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes
Autocrats typically respond with coercion when citizens take to the streets demanding political reform. Sometimes, however, they tolerate mass protests and even give in to protesters’ demands. While the effect of coercion on mobilization is well-studied, we know less about the role of concession-making. We argue that accommodating demands is rarely an effective strategy in demobilizing opposition movements. Authoritarian rulers are usually neithe…
Institutional design and biases in evaluation reports by international organizations
Governments spend hundreds of millions on evaluations to assess the performance of public organizations. In this article, we scrutinize whether variation in the institutional design of evaluation systems leads to biases in evaluation findings. Biases may emerge because influence over evaluation processes could enable the bureaucracy to present its work in a more positive way. We study evaluation reports published by nine international organizatio…
State Concessions and Protest Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes
Autocrats typically respond with coercion when citizens take to the streets demanding political reform. Sometimes, however, they tolerate mass protests and even give in to protesters’ demands. While the effect of coercion on mobilization is well-studied, we know less about the role of concession-making. We argue that accommodating demands is rarely an effective strategy in demobilizing opposition movements. Authoritarian rulers are usually neithe…
Outcome Isn’t Everything
Incumbents often make unpopular policy decisions. But can they remedy their negative electoral consequences? We extend the wide literature concerning retrospective voting to the case of unpopular policies and examine whether voters reward a responsive withdrawal of an unpopular policy proposal or punish the disclosed policy intention despite the withdrawal. To test this, we use granular data on Swedish local election results from 2002 to 2018 and…
Institutional design and biases in evaluation reports by international organizations
Governments spend hundreds of millions on evaluations to assess the performance of public organizations. In this article, we scrutinize whether variation in the institutional design of evaluation systems leads to biases in evaluation findings. Biases may emerge because influence over evaluation processes could enable the bureaucracy to present its work in a more positive way. We study evaluation reports published by nine international organizatio…
Outcome Isn’t Everything
Incumbents often make unpopular policy decisions. But can they remedy their negative electoral consequences? We extend the wide literature concerning retrospective voting to the case of unpopular policies and examine whether voters reward a responsive withdrawal of an unpopular policy proposal or punish the disclosed policy intention despite the withdrawal. To test this, we use granular data on Swedish local election results from 2002 to 2018 and…
State Concessions and Protest Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes
Autocrats typically respond with coercion when citizens take to the streets demanding political reform. Sometimes, however, they tolerate mass protests and even give in to protesters’ demands. While the effect of coercion on mobilization is well-studied, we know less about the role of concession-making. We argue that accommodating demands is rarely an effective strategy in demobilizing opposition movements. Authoritarian rulers are usually neithe…
Political science (3 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Policy Transfer and Learning (2 works) · Political economy (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Public Administration (2 works) · Public Administration (2 works) · Public relations (2 works)