Brad Epperly
Biographic Data
| ID | 4374944 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brad Epperly |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brad |
| FAMILY NAME | Epperly |
| SIGNATURE | EPPERLY B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of South Carolina |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0424-4005 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 56 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The Demand for Insurance
Popular insurance models of judicial independence contend that electoral competition induces executives to establish or maintain independence as insurance against the risks associated with losing office. Existing accounts, however, focus only on variation in the likelihood of losing office, treating risks associated with losing as constant. This inattention to the model’s causal logic limits theoretical development and empirical conclusions. We m…
Rule by Violence, Rule by Law
Although restricting formal voting rights—voter suppression—is not uncommon in democracies, its incidence and form vary widely. Intuitively, when competing elites believe that the benefits of reducing voting by opponents outweigh the costs of voter suppression, it is more likely to occur. Internal political and state capacity and external actors, however, influence the form that voter suppression takes. When elites competing for office lack the a…
The Myth of the Post-Communist Citizen
In assessing legacy-based explanations for the “trust deficit” observed in the post-communist region, I argue that one need first specify what kind of legacy is being considered: either between post-communist countries and another region, or among the post-communist states. I further contend that the most valid reference for legacies is Western Europe, not the globe. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–10), I examine the association …
(Re)examining the Insurance Model of Judicial Independence across Democracies
Despite being a dominant explanation of judicial independence in democracies for over a decade, the “insurance” model has received little systematic attention. I argue that how we conceptualize democracy is especially important for analyses of judicial independence employing this insurance framework, demanding more careful attention from scholars. I illustrate that empirical results are contingent on specific conceptualizations by replicating the…
Conflict and Courts
Many argue that during conflict, executive power expands at the expense of the judiciary and civil liberties. Although this is a common conjecture, no systematic study of conflict and judicial independence exists. We argue that conflict, rather than strictly inhibiting independence, is instead a critical juncture that increases the possibility of institutional change, either positive or negative. We assess this claim in three ways: cross-national…
Political competition and de facto judicial independence in non‐democracies
This article investigates the role of political competition in explaining de facto judicial independence in non‐democratic regimes. It argues that the electoral, political insurance explanation popular in the study of courts in democracies also offers explanatory power in the autocratic context, despite popular wisdom otherwise: due to the relatively greater risks of losing power in non‐democracies, electoral competition is highly salient when pr…
The Provision of Insurance
Leading explanations of judicial independence argue political competition incentivizes those in power to create independent courts as insurance against uncertain futures. While much work addresses the role competition plays, little analyzes the fundamental assumption that courts provide political insurance. I offer an original hypothesis as to how independent courts provide insurance against post-tenure punishment and test this using data on the …
Corruption and NGO Sustainability
The development and viability of the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector varies across the post-communist world. We explore the impact of corruption on NGO sustainability—the overall enabling environment and activities of the NGO sector—in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from 1998 to 2007. To test hypotheses about the relationship between corruption and NGO sustainability, we employ time-series cross-sectional analyses of 27 pos…
Institutions and Legacies
The postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have witnessed levels of electoral volatility higher than both Western Europe and Latin America, levels that have deleterious effects on party consolidation and representative democracy in the region. This article presents a model of postcommunist legislative electoral volatility, testing explanations developed in Western Europe and Latin America and refining them for the diff…
Institutions and Legacies
The postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have witnessed levels of electoral volatility higher than both Western Europe and Latin America, levels that have deleterious effects on party consolidation and representative democracy in the region. This article presents a model of postcommunist legislative electoral volatility, testing explanations developed in Western Europe and Latin America and refining them for the diff…
Political competition and de facto judicial independence in non‐democracies
This article investigates the role of political competition in explaining de facto judicial independence in non‐democratic regimes. It argues that the electoral, political insurance explanation popular in the study of courts in democracies also offers explanatory power in the autocratic context, despite popular wisdom otherwise: due to the relatively greater risks of losing power in non‐democracies, electoral competition is highly salient when pr…
The Provision of Insurance
Leading explanations of judicial independence argue political competition incentivizes those in power to create independent courts as insurance against uncertain futures. While much work addresses the role competition plays, little analyzes the fundamental assumption that courts provide political insurance. I offer an original hypothesis as to how independent courts provide insurance against post-tenure punishment and test this using data on the …
The Myth of the Post-Communist Citizen
In assessing legacy-based explanations for the “trust deficit” observed in the post-communist region, I argue that one need first specify what kind of legacy is being considered: either between post-communist countries and another region, or among the post-communist states. I further contend that the most valid reference for legacies is Western Europe, not the globe. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–10), I examine the association …
Corruption and NGO Sustainability
The development and viability of the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector varies across the post-communist world. We explore the impact of corruption on NGO sustainability—the overall enabling environment and activities of the NGO sector—in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from 1998 to 2007. To test hypotheses about the relationship between corruption and NGO sustainability, we employ time-series cross-sectional analyses of 27 pos…
(Re)examining the Insurance Model of Judicial Independence across Democracies
Despite being a dominant explanation of judicial independence in democracies for over a decade, the “insurance” model has received little systematic attention. I argue that how we conceptualize democracy is especially important for analyses of judicial independence employing this insurance framework, demanding more careful attention from scholars. I illustrate that empirical results are contingent on specific conceptualizations by replicating the…
Institutions and Legacies
The postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have witnessed levels of electoral volatility higher than both Western Europe and Latin America, levels that have deleterious effects on party consolidation and representative democracy in the region. This article presents a model of postcommunist legislative electoral volatility, testing explanations developed in Western Europe and Latin America and refining them for the diff…
The Provision of Insurance
Leading explanations of judicial independence argue political competition incentivizes those in power to create independent courts as insurance against uncertain futures. While much work addresses the role competition plays, little analyzes the fundamental assumption that courts provide political insurance. I offer an original hypothesis as to how independent courts provide insurance against post-tenure punishment and test this using data on the …
Corruption and NGO Sustainability
The development and viability of the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector varies across the post-communist world. We explore the impact of corruption on NGO sustainability—the overall enabling environment and activities of the NGO sector—in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from 1998 to 2007. To test hypotheses about the relationship between corruption and NGO sustainability, we employ time-series cross-sectional analyses of 27 pos…
Political competition and de facto judicial independence in non‐democracies
This article investigates the role of political competition in explaining de facto judicial independence in non‐democratic regimes. It argues that the electoral, political insurance explanation popular in the study of courts in democracies also offers explanatory power in the autocratic context, despite popular wisdom otherwise: due to the relatively greater risks of losing power in non‐democracies, electoral competition is highly salient when pr…
(Re)examining the Insurance Model of Judicial Independence across Democracies
Despite being a dominant explanation of judicial independence in democracies for over a decade, the “insurance” model has received little systematic attention. I argue that how we conceptualize democracy is especially important for analyses of judicial independence employing this insurance framework, demanding more careful attention from scholars. I illustrate that empirical results are contingent on specific conceptualizations by replicating the…
Conflict and Courts
Many argue that during conflict, executive power expands at the expense of the judiciary and civil liberties. Although this is a common conjecture, no systematic study of conflict and judicial independence exists. We argue that conflict, rather than strictly inhibiting independence, is instead a critical juncture that increases the possibility of institutional change, either positive or negative. We assess this claim in three ways: cross-national…
The Myth of the Post-Communist Citizen
In assessing legacy-based explanations for the “trust deficit” observed in the post-communist region, I argue that one need first specify what kind of legacy is being considered: either between post-communist countries and another region, or among the post-communist states. I further contend that the most valid reference for legacies is Western Europe, not the globe. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–10), I examine the association …
Rule by Violence, Rule by Law
Although restricting formal voting rights—voter suppression—is not uncommon in democracies, its incidence and form vary widely. Intuitively, when competing elites believe that the benefits of reducing voting by opponents outweigh the costs of voter suppression, it is more likely to occur. Internal political and state capacity and external actors, however, influence the form that voter suppression takes. When elites competing for office lack the a…
The Demand for Insurance
Popular insurance models of judicial independence contend that electoral competition induces executives to establish or maintain independence as insurance against the risks associated with losing office. Existing accounts, however, focus only on variation in the likelihood of losing office, treating risks associated with losing as constant. This inattention to the model’s causal logic limits theoretical development and empirical conclusions. We m…
Political science (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Independence (probability theory (5 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (5 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Democracy (4 works)