Charles R Hankla
Biographic Data
| ID | 4374958 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Charles R Hankla |
| GIVEN NAMES | Charles R |
| FAMILY NAME | Hankla |
| SIGNATURE | HANKLA C R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgia State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 88 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Party systems and public goods
We argue that two key party system characteristics – the effective number of parties and electoral volatility – have a curvilinear, inverted-U shaped, influence on public goods provision. Rejecting the linear pattern generally assumed in the literature, we contend that optimal governance outcomes will be observed at intermediate levels of party system size and stability. Only under these conditions will the benefits of competition be balanced aga…
Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization
Decentralization is among the most important global trends of the new century, yet there is still no consensus on how to design political institutions to realize its benefits. In this paper, we investigate the political conditions under which decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods. We begin by incorporating insights from political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the “decentralization theorem”. Our…
How Local Elections Can Transform National Politics
We examine the impact of elected local government on national politics, a subject that has been largely neglected in the decentralization literature. We theorize that the creation of locally elected government has the potential to alter contestation at the national level. It can do so, we argue, in four ways: (i) by incentivizing more democratic structures within existing national parties, (ii) by leading to the creation of new parties with more …
Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes
Over the last few decades, a vast literature has emerged examining the relationship between democratic political institutions and trade policy outcomes. While this literature has added significantly to our knowledge, it has effectively ignored policymaking in dozens of important states—those that remain autocratic. This paper fills that hole by exploring the effects of authoritarian variation on national trade policies. Our contention is that mor…
The Efficiency of Institutions
Oil consumption has varied significantly among democracies, but scholars have not systematically studied the political determinants of this variation. We examine the effects of political institutions on a democratic country’s propensity to consume oil. We argue that, other things being equal, more centralized national political institutions facilitate the adoption of policies that lower oil intensity. Our primary focus is on the impact of veto pl…
Parties and Patronage
Charles R. Hankla Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Georgia State University PO Box 4069 Atlanta, Georgia 30302-4069 [email protected] Phone: 404-413-6172 Fax: 404-413-6156 Abstract What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies? Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact. In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization ca…
Party Strength and International Trade
What explains the variation of trade protection across countries and years? The author argues that other things equal, democracies with strong parties will choose freer trade policies. He focuses on two aspects of party strength—organizational centralization and stable party linkages to large groups of the electorate. He contends that legislative logrolls leading to high protection are significantly less likely when parties are centralized. Furth…
Party Strength and International Trade
What explains the variation of trade protection across countries and years? The author argues that other things equal, democracies with strong parties will choose freer trade policies. He focuses on two aspects of party strength—organizational centralization and stable party linkages to large groups of the electorate. He contends that legislative logrolls leading to high protection are significantly less likely when parties are centralized. Furth…
Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes
Over the last few decades, a vast literature has emerged examining the relationship between democratic political institutions and trade policy outcomes. While this literature has added significantly to our knowledge, it has effectively ignored policymaking in dozens of important states—those that remain autocratic. This paper fills that hole by exploring the effects of authoritarian variation on national trade policies. Our contention is that mor…
Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization
Decentralization is among the most important global trends of the new century, yet there is still no consensus on how to design political institutions to realize its benefits. In this paper, we investigate the political conditions under which decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods. We begin by incorporating insights from political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the “decentralization theorem”. Our…
How Local Elections Can Transform National Politics
We examine the impact of elected local government on national politics, a subject that has been largely neglected in the decentralization literature. We theorize that the creation of locally elected government has the potential to alter contestation at the national level. It can do so, we argue, in four ways: (i) by incentivizing more democratic structures within existing national parties, (ii) by leading to the creation of new parties with more …
The Efficiency of Institutions
Oil consumption has varied significantly among democracies, but scholars have not systematically studied the political determinants of this variation. We examine the effects of political institutions on a democratic country’s propensity to consume oil. We argue that, other things being equal, more centralized national political institutions facilitate the adoption of policies that lower oil intensity. Our primary focus is on the impact of veto pl…
Party Strength and International Trade
What explains the variation of trade protection across countries and years? The author argues that other things equal, democracies with strong parties will choose freer trade policies. He focuses on two aspects of party strength—organizational centralization and stable party linkages to large groups of the electorate. He contends that legislative logrolls leading to high protection are significantly less likely when parties are centralized. Furth…
Parties and Patronage
Charles R. Hankla Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Georgia State University PO Box 4069 Atlanta, Georgia 30302-4069 [email protected] Phone: 404-413-6172 Fax: 404-413-6156 Abstract What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies? Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact. In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization ca…
The Efficiency of Institutions
Oil consumption has varied significantly among democracies, but scholars have not systematically studied the political determinants of this variation. We examine the effects of political institutions on a democratic country’s propensity to consume oil. We argue that, other things being equal, more centralized national political institutions facilitate the adoption of policies that lower oil intensity. Our primary focus is on the impact of veto pl…
Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes
Over the last few decades, a vast literature has emerged examining the relationship between democratic political institutions and trade policy outcomes. While this literature has added significantly to our knowledge, it has effectively ignored policymaking in dozens of important states—those that remain autocratic. This paper fills that hole by exploring the effects of authoritarian variation on national trade policies. Our contention is that mor…
How Local Elections Can Transform National Politics
We examine the impact of elected local government on national politics, a subject that has been largely neglected in the decentralization literature. We theorize that the creation of locally elected government has the potential to alter contestation at the national level. It can do so, we argue, in four ways: (i) by incentivizing more democratic structures within existing national parties, (ii) by leading to the creation of new parties with more …
Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization
Decentralization is among the most important global trends of the new century, yet there is still no consensus on how to design political institutions to realize its benefits. In this paper, we investigate the political conditions under which decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods. We begin by incorporating insights from political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the “decentralization theorem”. Our…
Party systems and public goods
We argue that two key party system characteristics – the effective number of parties and electoral volatility – have a curvilinear, inverted-U shaped, influence on public goods provision. Rejecting the linear pattern generally assumed in the literature, we contend that optimal governance outcomes will be observed at intermediate levels of party system size and stability. Only under these conditions will the benefits of competition be balanced aga…
Economics (7 works) · Political science (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Economic system (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Democracy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (3 works)