Ben Noble
Biographic Data
| ID | 4375001 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ben Noble |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ben |
| FAMILY NAME | Noble |
| SIGNATURE | BEN NOBLE |
| AFFILIATIONS | University College London, UK |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6844-8886 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 143 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Navalny
Alexei Navalny—the anti-corruption activist and leading figure of the Russian opposition—was poisoned in August 2020. Following recovery in Germany, he returned to Russia in January 2021 in the full glare of the world’s media. But who exactly is Navalny? To some, he is a democratic hero. To others, he is a traitor. To others still, he is a dangerous nationalist. Media portrayals of Navalny are often black and white—of Navalny versus Vladimir Puti…
From Constitution to Law
Although 4 July 2020 saw the coming into force of constitutional changes in Russia, this was far from the end of the story. Most clearly, these changes to the 1993 constitution required implementation, including through amendments to, and the writing of new pieces of, federal legislation. In part, this process was the mundane work of legal bureaucrats, tweaking and creating many pieces of legislation to reflect the new constitutional text. But th…
Authoritarian Amendments
Why are executive bills sometimes amended significantly in authoritarian legislatures? Bill change clashes with the conventional picture of parliaments in nondemocracies as “rubber stamp” bodies. Recent work challenging the “rubber stamp” model suggests that cases of amendment are the result of legislator influence. This article proposes an alternative argument: Amendment can result from intraexecutive policy-making processes, unresolved in the p…
Legislatures and Legislative Politics Without Democracy
What do authoritarian legislatures and legislators do? Would outcomes in dictatorships be different if they were absent? Why do dictatorships have legislatures in the first place? These questions represent central puzzles in the study of authoritarian politics and institutions. The introductory article to this special issue on legislatures in nondemocracies discusses what we now know about these assemblies; what the issue’s articles contribute to…
Regional legislatures and national lawmaking
Recent work has noted the supposedly 'exceptional' constitutional authority of sub-national legislatures in Mexico to introduce legislative initiatives into the national congress. Rather than a mechanism unique to Mexico, however, this debate article notes other states' constitutions with similar provisions, drawing on data from the Comparative Constitutions Project, as well as a new dataset on lawmaking in the Russian Federation. The article cal…
The Origins of Dominant Parties. Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia
Why do dominant parties not emerge in some authoritarian settings?As Ora John Reuter notes at the outset of this magisterial work, 'the puzzling thing about dominant parties is not their prevalence but rather their nonexistence in so many non-democracies' (p. 1).Reuter's solution to this puzzle is both novel and intuitive.Presenting the construction of dominant parties as the solution to a two-sided commitment problem between political leaders an…
Pluralism by Default. Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics
Budgetary change in authoritarian and democratic regimes
We compare patterns of change in budgetary commitments by countries during periods of democracy and authoritarianism. Previous scholarship has focused almost exclusively on democratic governments, finding evidence of punctuated equilibria. Authoritarian regimes may behave differently, both because they may operate with fewer institutional barriers to choice and because they have fewer incentives to gather and respond to policy-relevant informatio…
Clientelism, social policy, and the quality of democracy
What impact does clientelism have on democratic performance and the realisation of social policy goals? The crux of the evaluative dilemma is that – however much clientelism diverges from the Weber
Legislatures and Legislative Politics Without Democracy
What do authoritarian legislatures and legislators do? Would outcomes in dictatorships be different if they were absent? Why do dictatorships have legislatures in the first place? These questions represent central puzzles in the study of authoritarian politics and institutions. The introductory article to this special issue on legislatures in nondemocracies discusses what we now know about these assemblies; what the issue’s articles contribute to…
Budgetary change in authoritarian and democratic regimes
We compare patterns of change in budgetary commitments by countries during periods of democracy and authoritarianism. Previous scholarship has focused almost exclusively on democratic governments, finding evidence of punctuated equilibria. Authoritarian regimes may behave differently, both because they may operate with fewer institutional barriers to choice and because they have fewer incentives to gather and respond to policy-relevant informatio…
Authoritarian Amendments
Why are executive bills sometimes amended significantly in authoritarian legislatures? Bill change clashes with the conventional picture of parliaments in nondemocracies as “rubber stamp” bodies. Recent work challenging the “rubber stamp” model suggests that cases of amendment are the result of legislator influence. This article proposes an alternative argument: Amendment can result from intraexecutive policy-making processes, unresolved in the p…
Regional legislatures and national lawmaking
Recent work has noted the supposedly 'exceptional' constitutional authority of sub-national legislatures in Mexico to introduce legislative initiatives into the national congress. Rather than a mechanism unique to Mexico, however, this debate article notes other states' constitutions with similar provisions, drawing on data from the Comparative Constitutions Project, as well as a new dataset on lawmaking in the Russian Federation. The article cal…
From Constitution to Law
Although 4 July 2020 saw the coming into force of constitutional changes in Russia, this was far from the end of the story. Most clearly, these changes to the 1993 constitution required implementation, including through amendments to, and the writing of new pieces of, federal legislation. In part, this process was the mundane work of legal bureaucrats, tweaking and creating many pieces of legislation to reflect the new constitutional text. But th…
The Origins of Dominant Parties. Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia
Why do dominant parties not emerge in some authoritarian settings?As Ora John Reuter notes at the outset of this magisterial work, 'the puzzling thing about dominant parties is not their prevalence but rather their nonexistence in so many non-democracies' (p. 1).Reuter's solution to this puzzle is both novel and intuitive.Presenting the construction of dominant parties as the solution to a two-sided commitment problem between political leaders an…
Pluralism by Default. Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics
Clientelism, social policy, and the quality of democracy
What impact does clientelism have on democratic performance and the realisation of social policy goals? The crux of the evaluative dilemma is that – however much clientelism diverges from the Weber
Pluralism by Default. Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics
Budgetary change in authoritarian and democratic regimes
We compare patterns of change in budgetary commitments by countries during periods of democracy and authoritarianism. Previous scholarship has focused almost exclusively on democratic governments, finding evidence of punctuated equilibria. Authoritarian regimes may behave differently, both because they may operate with fewer institutional barriers to choice and because they have fewer incentives to gather and respond to policy-relevant informatio…
The Origins of Dominant Parties. Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia
Why do dominant parties not emerge in some authoritarian settings?As Ora John Reuter notes at the outset of this magisterial work, 'the puzzling thing about dominant parties is not their prevalence but rather their nonexistence in so many non-democracies' (p. 1).Reuter's solution to this puzzle is both novel and intuitive.Presenting the construction of dominant parties as the solution to a two-sided commitment problem between political leaders an…
Regional legislatures and national lawmaking
Recent work has noted the supposedly 'exceptional' constitutional authority of sub-national legislatures in Mexico to introduce legislative initiatives into the national congress. Rather than a mechanism unique to Mexico, however, this debate article notes other states' constitutions with similar provisions, drawing on data from the Comparative Constitutions Project, as well as a new dataset on lawmaking in the Russian Federation. The article cal…
Authoritarian Amendments
Why are executive bills sometimes amended significantly in authoritarian legislatures? Bill change clashes with the conventional picture of parliaments in nondemocracies as “rubber stamp” bodies. Recent work challenging the “rubber stamp” model suggests that cases of amendment are the result of legislator influence. This article proposes an alternative argument: Amendment can result from intraexecutive policy-making processes, unresolved in the p…
Legislatures and Legislative Politics Without Democracy
What do authoritarian legislatures and legislators do? Would outcomes in dictatorships be different if they were absent? Why do dictatorships have legislatures in the first place? These questions represent central puzzles in the study of authoritarian politics and institutions. The introductory article to this special issue on legislatures in nondemocracies discusses what we now know about these assemblies; what the issue’s articles contribute to…
Navalny
Alexei Navalny—the anti-corruption activist and leading figure of the Russian opposition—was poisoned in August 2020. Following recovery in Germany, he returned to Russia in January 2021 in the full glare of the world’s media. But who exactly is Navalny? To some, he is a democratic hero. To others, he is a traitor. To others still, he is a dangerous nationalist. Media portrayals of Navalny are often black and white—of Navalny versus Vladimir Puti…
From Constitution to Law
Although 4 July 2020 saw the coming into force of constitutional changes in Russia, this was far from the end of the story. Most clearly, these changes to the 1993 constitution required implementation, including through amendments to, and the writing of new pieces of, federal legislation. In part, this process was the mundane work of legal bureaucrats, tweaking and creating many pieces of legislation to reflect the new constitutional text. But th…
Law (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Democracy (6 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Authoritarianism (5 works) · Public Administration (4 works) · Public Administration (4 works)