Philip Arena
Biographic Data
| ID | 4375041 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philip Arena |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philip |
| FAMILY NAME | Arena |
| SIGNATURE | ARENA P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University at Buffalo, State University of New York |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 129 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
External Subsidies and Lasting Peace
Third parties are thought to face a trade-off in that those actions most likely to bring peace in the short run appear least likely to ensure its long-run stability. Yet the trade-off between conflict management and conflict resolution may be overstated. Analyzing an iterated three-player bargaining model with both information and commitment problems, we first demonstrate two conditions under which third parties may produce lasting peace through …
Challenges to Inference in the Study of Crisis Bargaining
The possibility that actors strategically condition their behavior on partially unobservable factors poses a grave challenge to causal inference, particularly if only some of the actors whose behavior we analyze are at risk of experiencing the outcome of interest. We present a crisis bargaining model that indicates that targets can generally prevent war by arming. We then create a simulated data set where the model is assumed to perfectly describ…
Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars
Why do democracies sometimes fight long, politically divisive wars that end poorly? I argue that electoral accountability, induced by party competition, can sometimes promote this and other tragic outcomes. To demonstrate this, I analyze a bargaining model in which one state is conceived of as a unitary actor while the other consists of a government and an opposition that is motivated both by electoral ambition and concern for the national intere…
Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision
We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of th…
Incentives to Rebel, Bargaining, and Civil War
To fully understand the effects of factors that encourage rebellion, we must differentiate between the way such factors influence mass decisions to join an ongoing rebellion and the way they influence the level of concessions offered by the government. We analyze a three-player bargaining model that allows us to do so. Our results indicate that governments tolerate a greater risk of conflict with their chosen concessions when any conflict that do…
Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining
We do not yet have strong evidence that the rally effect motivates domestically vulnerable leaders to become engaged in international conflict. We draw upon mechanism design to argue that, if anything, diversionary incentives should be associated with a greater likelihood of being the target of disputes, though the conditions under which the result obtains are restrictive. Our analysis of all dyad-months involving the United States and its rivals…
Arms, Intelligence, and War: Arms, Intelligence and War
Arena, Philip and Scott Wolford. (2012) Arms, Intelligence, and War. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00724.x © 2012 International Studies Association How do states respond to uncertainty over their opponents’ military strength? We analyze a model of crisis bargaining in which, prior to negotiation, an uninformed state chooses how to allocate scarce resources across armaments and intelligence gathering. Arming improv…
Why Not Guns and Butter: Responses to Economic Turmoil
Diversionary approaches rarely explain why leaders use force in response to economic turmoil rather than addressing the problem directly. Those few studies that do address this often assume leaders can either respond with foreign policy or economic policy, but not both. I develop a formal model in which governments may employ macroeconomic policy tools, enter into an international crisis, or both. The results indicate that the relationship betwee…
Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Developed Democracies
Consideration of the effects of domestic politics on international conflict behavior often consists simply of contrasting democracies with non-democracies. One notable exception is work that links economic performance and the use of force. This link has often been addressed through use of a diversionary perspective. In this paper, we argue that more important than the alleged incentive to pursue a rallying effect when times are bad are domestic p…
Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections
War outcomes are unlikely to effect elections if the major parties did not disagree over the war. Leaders who enter into wars are more likely to be punished for defeat or rewarded for victory if the opposition did not support the government during the war. Employing original data on legislative opposition during interstate wars, this paper examines all elections since WWII in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and India. The results c…
Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Developed Democracies
Consideration of the effects of domestic politics on international conflict behavior often consists simply of contrasting democracies with non-democracies. One notable exception is work that links economic performance and the use of force. This link has often been addressed through use of a diversionary perspective. In this paper, we argue that more important than the alleged incentive to pursue a rallying effect when times are bad are domestic p…
Arms, Intelligence, and War: Arms, Intelligence and War
Arena, Philip and Scott Wolford. (2012) Arms, Intelligence, and War. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00724.x © 2012 International Studies Association How do states respond to uncertainty over their opponents’ military strength? We analyze a model of crisis bargaining in which, prior to negotiation, an uninformed state chooses how to allocate scarce resources across armaments and intelligence gathering. Arming improv…
Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections
War outcomes are unlikely to effect elections if the major parties did not disagree over the war. Leaders who enter into wars are more likely to be punished for defeat or rewarded for victory if the opposition did not support the government during the war. Employing original data on legislative opposition during interstate wars, this paper examines all elections since WWII in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and India. The results c…
External Subsidies and Lasting Peace
Third parties are thought to face a trade-off in that those actions most likely to bring peace in the short run appear least likely to ensure its long-run stability. Yet the trade-off between conflict management and conflict resolution may be overstated. Analyzing an iterated three-player bargaining model with both information and commitment problems, we first demonstrate two conditions under which third parties may produce lasting peace through …
Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars
Why do democracies sometimes fight long, politically divisive wars that end poorly? I argue that electoral accountability, induced by party competition, can sometimes promote this and other tragic outcomes. To demonstrate this, I analyze a bargaining model in which one state is conceived of as a unitary actor while the other consists of a government and an opposition that is motivated both by electoral ambition and concern for the national intere…
Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision
We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of th…
Challenges to Inference in the Study of Crisis Bargaining
The possibility that actors strategically condition their behavior on partially unobservable factors poses a grave challenge to causal inference, particularly if only some of the actors whose behavior we analyze are at risk of experiencing the outcome of interest. We present a crisis bargaining model that indicates that targets can generally prevent war by arming. We then create a simulated data set where the model is assumed to perfectly describ…
Incentives to Rebel, Bargaining, and Civil War
To fully understand the effects of factors that encourage rebellion, we must differentiate between the way such factors influence mass decisions to join an ongoing rebellion and the way they influence the level of concessions offered by the government. We analyze a three-player bargaining model that allows us to do so. Our results indicate that governments tolerate a greater risk of conflict with their chosen concessions when any conflict that do…
Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining
We do not yet have strong evidence that the rally effect motivates domestically vulnerable leaders to become engaged in international conflict. We draw upon mechanism design to argue that, if anything, diversionary incentives should be associated with a greater likelihood of being the target of disputes, though the conditions under which the result obtains are restrictive. Our analysis of all dyad-months involving the United States and its rivals…
Why Not Guns and Butter: Responses to Economic Turmoil
Diversionary approaches rarely explain why leaders use force in response to economic turmoil rather than addressing the problem directly. Those few studies that do address this often assume leaders can either respond with foreign policy or economic policy, but not both. I develop a formal model in which governments may employ macroeconomic policy tools, enter into an international crisis, or both. The results indicate that the relationship betwee…
Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections
War outcomes are unlikely to effect elections if the major parties did not disagree over the war. Leaders who enter into wars are more likely to be punished for defeat or rewarded for victory if the opposition did not support the government during the war. Employing original data on legislative opposition during interstate wars, this paper examines all elections since WWII in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and India. The results c…
Politics or the Economy? Domestic Correlates of Dispute Involvement in Developed Democracies
Consideration of the effects of domestic politics on international conflict behavior often consists simply of contrasting democracies with non-democracies. One notable exception is work that links economic performance and the use of force. This link has often been addressed through use of a diversionary perspective. In this paper, we argue that more important than the alleged incentive to pursue a rallying effect when times are bad are domestic p…
Why Not Guns and Butter: Responses to Economic Turmoil
Diversionary approaches rarely explain why leaders use force in response to economic turmoil rather than addressing the problem directly. Those few studies that do address this often assume leaders can either respond with foreign policy or economic policy, but not both. I develop a formal model in which governments may employ macroeconomic policy tools, enter into an international crisis, or both. The results indicate that the relationship betwee…
Arms, Intelligence, and War: Arms, Intelligence and War
Arena, Philip and Scott Wolford. (2012) Arms, Intelligence, and War. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00724.x © 2012 International Studies Association How do states respond to uncertainty over their opponents’ military strength? We analyze a model of crisis bargaining in which, prior to negotiation, an uninformed state chooses how to allocate scarce resources across armaments and intelligence gathering. Arming improv…
Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining
We do not yet have strong evidence that the rally effect motivates domestically vulnerable leaders to become engaged in international conflict. We draw upon mechanism design to argue that, if anything, diversionary incentives should be associated with a greater likelihood of being the target of disputes, though the conditions under which the result obtains are restrictive. Our analysis of all dyad-months involving the United States and its rivals…
Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision
We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of th…
Incentives to Rebel, Bargaining, and Civil War
To fully understand the effects of factors that encourage rebellion, we must differentiate between the way such factors influence mass decisions to join an ongoing rebellion and the way they influence the level of concessions offered by the government. We analyze a three-player bargaining model that allows us to do so. Our results indicate that governments tolerate a greater risk of conflict with their chosen concessions when any conflict that do…
Challenges to Inference in the Study of Crisis Bargaining
The possibility that actors strategically condition their behavior on partially unobservable factors poses a grave challenge to causal inference, particularly if only some of the actors whose behavior we analyze are at risk of experiencing the outcome of interest. We present a crisis bargaining model that indicates that targets can generally prevent war by arming. We then create a simulated data set where the model is assumed to perfectly describ…
Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars
Why do democracies sometimes fight long, politically divisive wars that end poorly? I argue that electoral accountability, induced by party competition, can sometimes promote this and other tragic outcomes. To demonstrate this, I analyze a bargaining model in which one state is conceived of as a unitary actor while the other consists of a government and an opposition that is motivated both by electoral ambition and concern for the national intere…
External Subsidies and Lasting Peace
Third parties are thought to face a trade-off in that those actions most likely to bring peace in the short run appear least likely to ensure its long-run stability. Yet the trade-off between conflict management and conflict resolution may be overstated. Analyzing an iterated three-player bargaining model with both information and commitment problems, we first demonstrate two conditions under which third parties may produce lasting peace through …
Economics (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Politics (6 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · Incentive (3 works)