Noel P Johnston
Biographic Data
| ID | 4375048 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Noel P Johnston |
| GIVEN NAMES | Noel P |
| FAMILY NAME | Johnston |
| SIGNATURE | JOHNSTON N P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7281-0681 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 150 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Even Constrained Governments Take: The Domestic Politics of Transfer and Expropriation Risks
This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal …
Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment
The recent backlash against globalization in many advanced economies raises questions about the source of this protectionist sentiment. Traditional accounts generally attribute the welfare consequences of trade to skill level or industry characteristics, or instead emphasize the nonmaterial determinants of support for openness. Consequently, we know little about how a major labor market characteristic—occupation—shapes both the distributional con…
Improving Reputation BIT by BIT: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Accountability
The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has paid an increasing interest to international institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but whether BITs help attract FDI is an unsettled question. Building on the existing literature, this article argues that BITs can change investors’ perceptions and the corresponding investment they make because signing BITs signals the involvement of another powerful country that is able to…
Local public goods as vote-purchasing devices? Persuasion and mobilization in the choice of clientelist payments
We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable of monitoring voter turnout, a common scenario in secret-ballot polities. As advanced by recent literature, the ability to monitor turnout rather than vote choice implies that politicians should use targetable private goods to mobilize voters. However, politicians also deploy non-excludable lo…
Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse
There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to this literature by focusing on how natural resource wealth affects the incentives of governments to uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although all states suffer reputation costs from reneging on contracts, governments in natural-resource-dependent economies are …
Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment
The recent backlash against globalization in many advanced economies raises questions about the source of this protectionist sentiment. Traditional accounts generally attribute the welfare consequences of trade to skill level or industry characteristics, or instead emphasize the nonmaterial determinants of support for openness. Consequently, we know little about how a major labor market characteristic—occupation—shapes both the distributional con…
Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse
There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to this literature by focusing on how natural resource wealth affects the incentives of governments to uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although all states suffer reputation costs from reneging on contracts, governments in natural-resource-dependent economies are …
Even Constrained Governments Take: The Domestic Politics of Transfer and Expropriation Risks
This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal …
Local public goods as vote-purchasing devices? Persuasion and mobilization in the choice of clientelist payments
We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable of monitoring voter turnout, a common scenario in secret-ballot polities. As advanced by recent literature, the ability to monitor turnout rather than vote choice implies that politicians should use targetable private goods to mobilize voters. However, politicians also deploy non-excludable lo…
Improving Reputation BIT by BIT: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Accountability
The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has paid an increasing interest to international institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but whether BITs help attract FDI is an unsettled question. Building on the existing literature, this article argues that BITs can change investors’ perceptions and the corresponding investment they make because signing BITs signals the involvement of another powerful country that is able to…
Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse
There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to this literature by focusing on how natural resource wealth affects the incentives of governments to uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although all states suffer reputation costs from reneging on contracts, governments in natural-resource-dependent economies are …
Local public goods as vote-purchasing devices? Persuasion and mobilization in the choice of clientelist payments
We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable of monitoring voter turnout, a common scenario in secret-ballot polities. As advanced by recent literature, the ability to monitor turnout rather than vote choice implies that politicians should use targetable private goods to mobilize voters. However, politicians also deploy non-excludable lo…
Improving Reputation BIT by BIT: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Accountability
The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has paid an increasing interest to international institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but whether BITs help attract FDI is an unsettled question. Building on the existing literature, this article argues that BITs can change investors’ perceptions and the corresponding investment they make because signing BITs signals the involvement of another powerful country that is able to…
Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment
The recent backlash against globalization in many advanced economies raises questions about the source of this protectionist sentiment. Traditional accounts generally attribute the welfare consequences of trade to skill level or industry characteristics, or instead emphasize the nonmaterial determinants of support for openness. Consequently, we know little about how a major labor market characteristic—occupation—shapes both the distributional con…
Even Constrained Governments Take: The Domestic Politics of Transfer and Expropriation Risks
This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal …
Economics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Public economics (3 works) · Expropriation (2 works) · Government (linguistics (2 works)