Simon Ejdemyr
Biographic Data
| ID | 4375188 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Simon Ejdemyr |
| GIVEN NAMES | Simon |
| FAMILY NAME | Ejdemyr |
| SIGNATURE | EJDEMYR S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stanford University, CA, USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5106-7246 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 80 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Do Elections Improve Constituency Responsiveness? Evidence from US Cities
Do elections motivate incumbent politicians to serve their voters? In this paper, we use millions of service requests placed by residents in US cities to measure constituency responsiveness. We then test whether an unusual policy change in New York City, which enabled city councilors to run for three rather than two terms in office, improved constituency responsiveness in previously term-limited councilors’ districts. Using difference-in-differen…
Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods
This article demonstrates that ethnic segregation is a key determinant of local public goods provision. We argue that this results from politicians’ strategic engagement in ethnic favoritism: Only when ethnic groups are sufficiently segregated can elites efficiently target coethnics with local public goods. We test this expectation with fine-grained data from Malawi on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, geolocated distributive goods (wate…
Global, regional, and national levels and trends in under-5 mortality between 1990 and 2015, with scenario-based projections to 2030: A systematic analysis by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Morta…
Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods
This article demonstrates that ethnic segregation is a key determinant of local public goods provision. We argue that this results from politicians’ strategic engagement in ethnic favoritism: Only when ethnic groups are sufficiently segregated can elites efficiently target coethnics with local public goods. We test this expectation with fine-grained data from Malawi on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, geolocated distributive goods (wate…
Do Elections Improve Constituency Responsiveness? Evidence from US Cities
Do elections motivate incumbent politicians to serve their voters? In this paper, we use millions of service requests placed by residents in US cities to measure constituency responsiveness. We then test whether an unusual policy change in New York City, which enabled city councilors to run for three rather than two terms in office, improved constituency responsiveness in previously term-limited councilors’ districts. Using difference-in-differen…
Global, regional, and national levels and trends in under-5 mortality between 1990 and 2015, with scenario-based projections to 2030: A systematic analysis by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Morta…
Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods
This article demonstrates that ethnic segregation is a key determinant of local public goods provision. We argue that this results from politicians’ strategic engagement in ethnic favoritism: Only when ethnic groups are sufficiently segregated can elites efficiently target coethnics with local public goods. We test this expectation with fine-grained data from Malawi on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, geolocated distributive goods (wate…
Do Elections Improve Constituency Responsiveness? Evidence from US Cities
Do elections motivate incumbent politicians to serve their voters? In this paper, we use millions of service requests placed by residents in US cities to measure constituency responsiveness. We then test whether an unusual policy change in New York City, which enabled city councilors to run for three rather than two terms in office, improved constituency responsiveness in previously term-limited councilors’ districts. Using difference-in-differen…
Economics (3 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (2 works) · Political economy (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Child mortality (1 works) · Confidence interval (1 works)