Daniel M Kselman
Biographic Data
| ID | 4375197 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel M Kselman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel M |
| FAMILY NAME | Kselman |
| SIGNATURE | KSELMAN D M |
| AFFILIATIONS | IE University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 123 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Incentivizing Brokers in Clientelist Parties
Local brokers are essential in the implementation of clientelist politics, but their efforts on parties' behalf are not fully observable. A growing literature studies how parties address this agency problem, highlighting two distinct reward schemes: allocating promotions or prizes based on observed vote shares or doing so based on inferred effort allocations. This article develops a formal model to examine the conditions under which one or the ot…
Public goods equilibria under closed- and open-list proportional representation
Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of local public goods under closed- and open-list proportional representation (CLPR and OLPR). The core results suggest that, all thing equal, legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volat…
Measuring 'closeness' in 3-candidate elections: Methodology and an application to strategic voting
Crowded Space, Fertile Ground: Party Entry and the Effective Number of Parties
This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status qu…
Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties’ Linkage Strategies
This article examines the relationship among a country’s democratic experience, its level of economic development, and the prevalence of clientelistic and programmatic modes of democratic accountability. In contrast to the commonly accepted wisdom that clientelistic politics will decrease monotonically as a country’s economy develops and its democracy consolidates, the authors argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that clientelism tends…
Protest voting in plurality elections: A theory of voter signaling
Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections
This paper extends theCalculus of Votingof McKelvey and Ordeshook, providing the first direct derivation of the conditions under which voters will votestrategically: choose their second-most preferred candidate in order to prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning. Addressing this theoretical problem is important, as nearly all empirical research on strategic voting either implicitly or explicitly tests hypotheses which originate from …
Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties’ Linkage Strategies
This article examines the relationship among a country’s democratic experience, its level of economic development, and the prevalence of clientelistic and programmatic modes of democratic accountability. In contrast to the commonly accepted wisdom that clientelistic politics will decrease monotonically as a country’s economy develops and its democracy consolidates, the authors argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that clientelism tends…
Protest voting in plurality elections: A theory of voter signaling
Crowded Space, Fertile Ground: Party Entry and the Effective Number of Parties
This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status qu…
Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections
This paper extends theCalculus of Votingof McKelvey and Ordeshook, providing the first direct derivation of the conditions under which voters will votestrategically: choose their second-most preferred candidate in order to prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning. Addressing this theoretical problem is important, as nearly all empirical research on strategic voting either implicitly or explicitly tests hypotheses which originate from …
Public goods equilibria under closed- and open-list proportional representation
Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of local public goods under closed- and open-list proportional representation (CLPR and OLPR). The core results suggest that, all thing equal, legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volat…
Incentivizing Brokers in Clientelist Parties
Local brokers are essential in the implementation of clientelist politics, but their efforts on parties' behalf are not fully observable. A growing literature studies how parties address this agency problem, highlighting two distinct reward schemes: allocating promotions or prizes based on observed vote shares or doing so based on inferred effort allocations. This article develops a formal model to examine the conditions under which one or the ot…
Measuring 'closeness' in 3-candidate elections: Methodology and an application to strategic voting
Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections
This paper extends theCalculus of Votingof McKelvey and Ordeshook, providing the first direct derivation of the conditions under which voters will votestrategically: choose their second-most preferred candidate in order to prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning. Addressing this theoretical problem is important, as nearly all empirical research on strategic voting either implicitly or explicitly tests hypotheses which originate from …
Protest voting in plurality elections: A theory of voter signaling
Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties’ Linkage Strategies
This article examines the relationship among a country’s democratic experience, its level of economic development, and the prevalence of clientelistic and programmatic modes of democratic accountability. In contrast to the commonly accepted wisdom that clientelistic politics will decrease monotonically as a country’s economy develops and its democracy consolidates, the authors argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that clientelism tends…
Crowded Space, Fertile Ground: Party Entry and the Effective Number of Parties
This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status qu…
Public goods equilibria under closed- and open-list proportional representation
Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of local public goods under closed- and open-list proportional representation (CLPR and OLPR). The core results suggest that, all thing equal, legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volat…
Measuring 'closeness' in 3-candidate elections: Methodology and an application to strategic voting
Incentivizing Brokers in Clientelist Parties
Local brokers are essential in the implementation of clientelist politics, but their efforts on parties' behalf are not fully observable. A growing literature studies how parties address this agency problem, highlighting two distinct reward schemes: allocating promotions or prizes based on observed vote shares or doing so based on inferred effort allocations. This article develops a formal model to examine the conditions under which one or the ot…
Electoral Systems and Political Participation (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Democracy (4 works) · Argument (complex analysis (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works)