Aylin Aydin-Cakir
Biographic Data
| ID | 4375507 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aylin Aydin-Cakir |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aylin |
| FAMILY NAME | Aydin-Cakir |
| SIGNATURE | AYDIN-CAKIR A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yeditepe University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3481-4876 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 76 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption
In recent decades, the world has witnessed various examples of elected governments verbally attacking the judiciary, accusing judges of bias, or claiming that court decisions are politically motivated. Despite the prevalence of such court-curbing practices, we know very little about when exactly governments decide to verbally attack the judiciary. Focusing on the effect of political corruption , the objective of this study is to understand 1) whe…
On motives and means: How Approach and Justification for Court-Curbing Impact Public Trust
The varying effect of court-curbing: Evidence from Hungary and Poland
With the rise of populism, we frequently witness how elected governments try to limit judicial power by using different means. Comparing the court-curbing policies used by the Fidesz government in Hungary and the PiS government in Poland, this study has two objectives. First, it aims to explain whether different court-curbing policies effect judicial independence differently. Using synthetic control method, I find that the predominant use of info…
Public (In)Tolerance of Government Non‐Compliance with High Court Decisions
Governments‐ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non‐compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government supporters will be more tolerant towards non‐compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the under…
Duration of the constitution-making process as an indicator of post-constitutional political uncertainty: The insurance theory revisited
Criticizing the insurance theory, this article asserts that to measure post-constitutional political uncertainty, one should consider not only the power distribution among the ‘political’ actors but the power distribution among all actors involved in the constitution-making process, including the public and civil society. Comparing the constitution-making processes of the constitutions of Egypt (2012) and Tunisia (2014), this study presents the d…
An empirical analysis of the change in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government
The existing literature on Turkish foreign policy (TFP) asserts that under the rule of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Turkey’s foreign policy shifted from caution and uni-dimensionality to relative activism and multi-dimensionality. This study aims to test these arguments through a systematic analysis of the international agreements ratified by the Turkish Parliament between 1984 and 2015. By looking at the number, content and signatory pa…
Public confidence in the judiciary: The Interaction Between Political Awareness and Level of Democracy
Apart from the studies that focus on public attitudes toward higher courts in advanced democracies, we know little about the factors that can explain public confidence in the judiciary in a comparative setting. In this regard, the goal of this study is to explain whether, and to what extent, the country’s level of democracy moderates the impact of political awareness on public confidence in the judiciary. This study uses hierarchical linear model…
Judicialization of Politics by Elected Politicians: The Theory of Strategic Litigation
This study argues that the proximity to a general election would affect the frequency of the opposition parties’ referrals to the constitutional court. This effect is hypothesized to be conditioned on the opposition parties’ prediction of the upcoming election results. To test this theory, I constructed an original data set including all acts promulgated by Turkish Parliament and all cases that were brought to the constitutional court by the oppo…
Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the Varying Impact of Political Competition
One of the most prominent explanations of the creation and maintenance of independent judiciary is the "insurance theory" that proposes a positive relationship between political competition and judicial independence. But, does intense political competition inevitably lead to higher levels of judicial independence across all types of democracies? Conducting a large-N cross-country analysis over 97 democratic countries, this study shows that as dem…
Public confidence in government: Empirical Implications From a Developing Democracy
This article explores the determinants of confidence in the Turkish government. We question whether confidence-related questions in mass surveys tap specific support for the incumbent government or tap diffuse support for government as a democratic institution. For this purpose, sociocultural, performance, and party explanations are tested. Four waves of the World Values Survey for Turkey are used as the data set. The article finds that performan…
Public confidence in the judiciary: The Interaction Between Political Awareness and Level of Democracy
Apart from the studies that focus on public attitudes toward higher courts in advanced democracies, we know little about the factors that can explain public confidence in the judiciary in a comparative setting. In this regard, the goal of this study is to explain whether, and to what extent, the country’s level of democracy moderates the impact of political awareness on public confidence in the judiciary. This study uses hierarchical linear model…
Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the Varying Impact of Political Competition
One of the most prominent explanations of the creation and maintenance of independent judiciary is the "insurance theory" that proposes a positive relationship between political competition and judicial independence. But, does intense political competition inevitably lead to higher levels of judicial independence across all types of democracies? Conducting a large-N cross-country analysis over 97 democratic countries, this study shows that as dem…
The varying effect of court-curbing: Evidence from Hungary and Poland
With the rise of populism, we frequently witness how elected governments try to limit judicial power by using different means. Comparing the court-curbing policies used by the Fidesz government in Hungary and the PiS government in Poland, this study has two objectives. First, it aims to explain whether different court-curbing policies effect judicial independence differently. Using synthetic control method, I find that the predominant use of info…
Judicialization of Politics by Elected Politicians: The Theory of Strategic Litigation
This study argues that the proximity to a general election would affect the frequency of the opposition parties’ referrals to the constitutional court. This effect is hypothesized to be conditioned on the opposition parties’ prediction of the upcoming election results. To test this theory, I constructed an original data set including all acts promulgated by Turkish Parliament and all cases that were brought to the constitutional court by the oppo…
An empirical analysis of the change in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government
The existing literature on Turkish foreign policy (TFP) asserts that under the rule of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Turkey’s foreign policy shifted from caution and uni-dimensionality to relative activism and multi-dimensionality. This study aims to test these arguments through a systematic analysis of the international agreements ratified by the Turkish Parliament between 1984 and 2015. By looking at the number, content and signatory pa…
Public (In)Tolerance of Government Non‐Compliance with High Court Decisions
Governments‐ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non‐compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government supporters will be more tolerant towards non‐compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the under…
Public confidence in government: Empirical Implications From a Developing Democracy
This article explores the determinants of confidence in the Turkish government. We question whether confidence-related questions in mass surveys tap specific support for the incumbent government or tap diffuse support for government as a democratic institution. For this purpose, sociocultural, performance, and party explanations are tested. Four waves of the World Values Survey for Turkey are used as the data set. The article finds that performan…
On motives and means: How Approach and Justification for Court-Curbing Impact Public Trust
Public confidence in government: Empirical Implications From a Developing Democracy
This article explores the determinants of confidence in the Turkish government. We question whether confidence-related questions in mass surveys tap specific support for the incumbent government or tap diffuse support for government as a democratic institution. For this purpose, sociocultural, performance, and party explanations are tested. Four waves of the World Values Survey for Turkey are used as the data set. The article finds that performan…
Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the Varying Impact of Political Competition
One of the most prominent explanations of the creation and maintenance of independent judiciary is the "insurance theory" that proposes a positive relationship between political competition and judicial independence. But, does intense political competition inevitably lead to higher levels of judicial independence across all types of democracies? Conducting a large-N cross-country analysis over 97 democratic countries, this study shows that as dem…
Judicialization of Politics by Elected Politicians: The Theory of Strategic Litigation
This study argues that the proximity to a general election would affect the frequency of the opposition parties’ referrals to the constitutional court. This effect is hypothesized to be conditioned on the opposition parties’ prediction of the upcoming election results. To test this theory, I constructed an original data set including all acts promulgated by Turkish Parliament and all cases that were brought to the constitutional court by the oppo…
An empirical analysis of the change in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government
The existing literature on Turkish foreign policy (TFP) asserts that under the rule of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Turkey’s foreign policy shifted from caution and uni-dimensionality to relative activism and multi-dimensionality. This study aims to test these arguments through a systematic analysis of the international agreements ratified by the Turkish Parliament between 1984 and 2015. By looking at the number, content and signatory pa…
Public confidence in the judiciary: The Interaction Between Political Awareness and Level of Democracy
Apart from the studies that focus on public attitudes toward higher courts in advanced democracies, we know little about the factors that can explain public confidence in the judiciary in a comparative setting. In this regard, the goal of this study is to explain whether, and to what extent, the country’s level of democracy moderates the impact of political awareness on public confidence in the judiciary. This study uses hierarchical linear model…
Duration of the constitution-making process as an indicator of post-constitutional political uncertainty: The insurance theory revisited
Criticizing the insurance theory, this article asserts that to measure post-constitutional political uncertainty, one should consider not only the power distribution among the ‘political’ actors but the power distribution among all actors involved in the constitution-making process, including the public and civil society. Comparing the constitution-making processes of the constitutions of Egypt (2012) and Tunisia (2014), this study presents the d…
The varying effect of court-curbing: Evidence from Hungary and Poland
With the rise of populism, we frequently witness how elected governments try to limit judicial power by using different means. Comparing the court-curbing policies used by the Fidesz government in Hungary and the PiS government in Poland, this study has two objectives. First, it aims to explain whether different court-curbing policies effect judicial independence differently. Using synthetic control method, I find that the predominant use of info…
Public (In)Tolerance of Government Non‐Compliance with High Court Decisions
Governments‐ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non‐compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government supporters will be more tolerant towards non‐compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the under…
When do governments attack the judiciary? The explanatory power of political corruption
In recent decades, the world has witnessed various examples of elected governments verbally attacking the judiciary, accusing judges of bias, or claiming that court decisions are politically motivated. Despite the prevalence of such court-curbing practices, we know very little about when exactly governments decide to verbally attack the judiciary. Focusing on the effect of political corruption , the objective of this study is to understand 1) whe…
On motives and means: How Approach and Justification for Court-Curbing Impact Public Trust
Political science (10 works) · Law (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (7 works) · Economics (5 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Government (linguistics (4 works) · Law and economics (4 works)