Per F Andersson
Biographic Data
| ID | 4375619 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Per F Andersson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Per F |
| FAMILY NAME | Andersson |
| SIGNATURE | ANDERSSON P F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0507-6931 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Financing the state
The 19th and 20th centuries are key periods in the development of the modern fiscal state, but a lack of reliable historical revenue data remains an obstacle for students of the period. In this research note, we introduce the Government Revenue Dataset (Govrev), which provides information on central government revenues in 31 countries in Europe, the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan from 1800 to 2012. Compared to previous efforts, our d…
The Double-Edged Sword
This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites …
Taxation and Left-Wing Redistribution
Recent research claims that the link between partisanship and policy is weak and that left-wing governments tax the poor surprisingly heavily. In this article, I argue that leftwing taxation depends on the institutional context, not constraints from unions or overall spending. Using novel data, I demonstrate that the left tax more regressively in countries using proportional electoral systems, and more progressively in majoritarian countries. The…
Democracy, Urbanization, and Tax Revenue
During the last two centuries, taxation has not only increased dramatically in level and volume; its structure has also changed: from a heavy reliance on customs revenue in the early nineteenth century to a stronger emphasis on income taxation in the twentieth. A common explanation for this development is the spread of democracy, which supposedly increases redistribution and the size of government. This paper argues that the effect of democratiza…
Crises, investments, and political institutions
On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained b…
Taxation and Left-Wing Redistribution
Recent research claims that the link between partisanship and policy is weak and that left-wing governments tax the poor surprisingly heavily. In this article, I argue that leftwing taxation depends on the institutional context, not constraints from unions or overall spending. Using novel data, I demonstrate that the left tax more regressively in countries using proportional electoral systems, and more progressively in majoritarian countries. The…
Democracy, Urbanization, and Tax Revenue
During the last two centuries, taxation has not only increased dramatically in level and volume; its structure has also changed: from a heavy reliance on customs revenue in the early nineteenth century to a stronger emphasis on income taxation in the twentieth. A common explanation for this development is the spread of democracy, which supposedly increases redistribution and the size of government. This paper argues that the effect of democratiza…
The Double-Edged Sword
This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites …
Democracy, Urbanization, and Tax Revenue
During the last two centuries, taxation has not only increased dramatically in level and volume; its structure has also changed: from a heavy reliance on customs revenue in the early nineteenth century to a stronger emphasis on income taxation in the twentieth. A common explanation for this development is the spread of democracy, which supposedly increases redistribution and the size of government. This paper argues that the effect of democratiza…
Crises, investments, and political institutions
On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained b…
Taxation and Left-Wing Redistribution
Recent research claims that the link between partisanship and policy is weak and that left-wing governments tax the poor surprisingly heavily. In this article, I argue that leftwing taxation depends on the institutional context, not constraints from unions or overall spending. Using novel data, I demonstrate that the left tax more regressively in countries using proportional electoral systems, and more progressively in majoritarian countries. The…
The Double-Edged Sword
This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites …
Financing the state
The 19th and 20th centuries are key periods in the development of the modern fiscal state, but a lack of reliable historical revenue data remains an obstacle for students of the period. In this research note, we introduce the Government Revenue Dataset (Govrev), which provides information on central government revenues in 31 countries in Europe, the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan from 1800 to 2012. Compared to previous efforts, our d…
Economics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Public economics (3 works) · Democracy (2 works) · Democratization (2 works) · Direct tax (2 works)