Andrea Mattozzi
Biographic Data
| ID | 4376262 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrea Mattozzi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrea |
| FAMILY NAME | Mattozzi |
| SIGNATURE | MATTOZZI A |
| AFFILIATIONS | California Institute of Technology |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The fiscal effects of political tenure
On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems
We link the intensity of campaign competition in different electoral systems with the number of candidates running for public office and their ideological differentiation. We show that proportional elections have more candidates, competing less aggressively in campaign spending, than those in majoritarian elections. Candidates’ ideological positions, however, can in general be more differentiated in majoritarian or proportional elections. We also…
Political careers or career politicians?
Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. stock market
Voter Rationality and Democratic Government
From a 1996 survey comparing the views of economists and ordinary voters, Bryan Caplan deduces several biases—anti-market, anti-foreign, pessimistic, and makework biases—to support his thesis that voters are rationally irrational, i.e., that, aware of the inconsequentiality of their votes, they rationally indulge their “preferences” for public policies that have harmful results. Yet if the standard of comparison is the public's opposition to harm…
On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems
We link the intensity of campaign competition in different electoral systems with the number of candidates running for public office and their ideological differentiation. We show that proportional elections have more candidates, competing less aggressively in campaign spending, than those in majoritarian elections. Candidates’ ideological positions, however, can in general be more differentiated in majoritarian or proportional elections. We also…
Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. stock market
Voter Rationality and Democratic Government
From a 1996 survey comparing the views of economists and ordinary voters, Bryan Caplan deduces several biases—anti-market, anti-foreign, pessimistic, and makework biases—to support his thesis that voters are rationally irrational, i.e., that, aware of the inconsequentiality of their votes, they rationally indulge their “preferences” for public policies that have harmful results. Yet if the standard of comparison is the public's opposition to harm…
Political careers or career politicians?
Can we insure against political uncertainty? Evidence from the U.S. stock market
Voter Rationality and Democratic Government
From a 1996 survey comparing the views of economists and ordinary voters, Bryan Caplan deduces several biases—anti-market, anti-foreign, pessimistic, and makework biases—to support his thesis that voters are rationally irrational, i.e., that, aware of the inconsequentiality of their votes, they rationally indulge their “preferences” for public policies that have harmful results. Yet if the standard of comparison is the public's opposition to harm…
On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems
We link the intensity of campaign competition in different electoral systems with the number of candidates running for public office and their ideological differentiation. We show that proportional elections have more candidates, competing less aggressively in campaign spending, than those in majoritarian elections. Candidates’ ideological positions, however, can in general be more differentiated in majoritarian or proportional elections. We also…
The fiscal effects of political tenure
Economics (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Democracy (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political economy (2 works)