Mathias Bukh Vestergaard
Biographic Data
| ID | 4377650 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mathias Bukh Vestergaard |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mathias Bukh |
| FAMILY NAME | Vestergaard |
| SIGNATURE | VESTERGAARD M B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0001-6323 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Overpromising populists? Why challenger parties make fewer, not more, promises than established parties
Many Western democracies have experienced an increase in the prevalence of parties that have never been in government. Since these so-called challenger parties are not held accountable to the same extent as established parties, there is a concern that they will simply churn out promises and fuel a process of rising political distrust. This paper explores the extent to which this image of overpromising populists is accurate. Instead of expecting m…
Following voters in the chain of representation
Election pledges are fundamental for representative democracy, linking parties’ campaigns before elections with their behavior afterwards. Yet little is known about voters’ awareness of these pledges before elections and how this affects post-election awareness of pledge fulfillment. Triangulating between a rich set of panel and pooled cross-sectional survey data surrounding the 2019 Danish national election ( N = 10,322), we show that voters who…
A Credible Change
When parties change their political positions, they risk being perceived as opportunistic and insincere by voters. How can parties change their positions without losing face? In this study, I argue that parties can combine positional change with a promise-based strategy to try to mitigate the reputational loss of this shift. Instead of focusing on the past, a party can attempt to gain credibility by taking high responsibility for a future policy.…
The paradox of positional convergence
Political parties often take similar stances to appeal to the same large voter segments. Yet, when parties converge, they paradoxically risk losing votes if the electorate cannot distinguish one party from the other. To deal with this paradox of positional convergence, I propose that vote-seeking parties follow a policy-committing strategy. By producing commitments, a party increases the costs of deviating from its position after the election, ma…
Why all these promises? How parties strategically use commitments to gain credibility in an increasingly competitive political landscape
Political parties face inherent risks when making election promises, as voters tend to penalize them for unfulfilled commitments. Nonetheless, parties make hundreds of promises. Why do parties engage in such precarious behaviour? I argue that parties employ a policy‐committing strategy when they need to increase the credibility of their policy programme and that they do so more today than previously because the political landscape has changed con…
Government responsiveness to voters’ economic vulnerabilities
Do governments represent the material needs and preferences of their voters? This is one of the central questions of political science with great consequences for how we should evaluate the state of democracy. A thorough test of the link between voters’ economic vulnerabilities and public policies is presented in the article. Using data covering 17 European democracies, it is shown empirically that economically vulnerable voters support generous …
The paradox of positional convergence
Political parties often take similar stances to appeal to the same large voter segments. Yet, when parties converge, they paradoxically risk losing votes if the electorate cannot distinguish one party from the other. To deal with this paradox of positional convergence, I propose that vote-seeking parties follow a policy-committing strategy. By producing commitments, a party increases the costs of deviating from its position after the election, ma…
Why all these promises? How parties strategically use commitments to gain credibility in an increasingly competitive political landscape
Political parties face inherent risks when making election promises, as voters tend to penalize them for unfulfilled commitments. Nonetheless, parties make hundreds of promises. Why do parties engage in such precarious behaviour? I argue that parties employ a policy‐committing strategy when they need to increase the credibility of their policy programme and that they do so more today than previously because the political landscape has changed con…
Government responsiveness to voters’ economic vulnerabilities
Do governments represent the material needs and preferences of their voters? This is one of the central questions of political science with great consequences for how we should evaluate the state of democracy. A thorough test of the link between voters’ economic vulnerabilities and public policies is presented in the article. Using data covering 17 European democracies, it is shown empirically that economically vulnerable voters support generous …
Government responsiveness to voters’ economic vulnerabilities
Do governments represent the material needs and preferences of their voters? This is one of the central questions of political science with great consequences for how we should evaluate the state of democracy. A thorough test of the link between voters’ economic vulnerabilities and public policies is presented in the article. Using data covering 17 European democracies, it is shown empirically that economically vulnerable voters support generous …
The paradox of positional convergence
Political parties often take similar stances to appeal to the same large voter segments. Yet, when parties converge, they paradoxically risk losing votes if the electorate cannot distinguish one party from the other. To deal with this paradox of positional convergence, I propose that vote-seeking parties follow a policy-committing strategy. By producing commitments, a party increases the costs of deviating from its position after the election, ma…
Why all these promises? How parties strategically use commitments to gain credibility in an increasingly competitive political landscape
Political parties face inherent risks when making election promises, as voters tend to penalize them for unfulfilled commitments. Nonetheless, parties make hundreds of promises. Why do parties engage in such precarious behaviour? I argue that parties employ a policy‐committing strategy when they need to increase the credibility of their policy programme and that they do so more today than previously because the political landscape has changed con…
Overpromising populists? Why challenger parties make fewer, not more, promises than established parties
Many Western democracies have experienced an increase in the prevalence of parties that have never been in government. Since these so-called challenger parties are not held accountable to the same extent as established parties, there is a concern that they will simply churn out promises and fuel a process of rising political distrust. This paper explores the extent to which this image of overpromising populists is accurate. Instead of expecting m…
Following voters in the chain of representation
Election pledges are fundamental for representative democracy, linking parties’ campaigns before elections with their behavior afterwards. Yet little is known about voters’ awareness of these pledges before elections and how this affects post-election awareness of pledge fulfillment. Triangulating between a rich set of panel and pooled cross-sectional survey data surrounding the 2019 Danish national election ( N = 10,322), we show that voters who…
A Credible Change
When parties change their political positions, they risk being perceived as opportunistic and insincere by voters. How can parties change their positions without losing face? In this study, I argue that parties can combine positional change with a promise-based strategy to try to mitigate the reputational loss of this shift. Instead of focusing on the past, a party can attempt to gain credibility by taking high responsibility for a future policy.…
Politics (6 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Federal election (2 works) · Government (linguistics (2 works)