Philippe Van Gruisen
Biographic Data
| ID | 4377841 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philippe Van Gruisen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philippe |
| FAMILY NAME | Van Gruisen |
| SIGNATURE | VAN GRUISEN P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Leiden University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2582-4877 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 44 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Lobbying and rotating leadership
Economic and political decisions are increasingly made in international organizations (IOs). A distinctive feature of many IOs is that they operate under a system of rotating leadership (e.g. a committee chair that rotates annually). Despite the widespread use of such systems and their potential value to interest groups, we know surprisingly little about how interest groups respond to rotating leadership in IOs. Using both micro- and macro-level …
Preferences and Institutions in European (Dis)Integration
In this article, we present a game-theoretical model of political (dis)integration, and the incentives voters and politicians face during integration processes. We apply the model to the European Union. Preference homogeneity and economies of scale do not suffice to explain European integration. Rather, integration decisions are taken within an institutional setting that involves politicians with interests that may diverge from those of the voter…
Subsidiarity Ex Ante and Ex Post: From the Early Warning System to the Court of Justice of the European Union
The subsidiarity principle divides competences between the European Union and its Member States. The Lisbon Treaty suggests a connection between ex ante and ex post subsidiarity review. Ex ante, national parliaments were given a role via the early warning system (EWS). Ex post, legislation is subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). More than 10 years after Lisbon, this article is the first to theorize and evaluate …
The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union: Strategic interactions and legislative powers
This paper develops spatial, game-theoretical models of European Union (EU) policy-making that include the rotating Council Presidency as one of the main actors. Previous such models have typically ignored the Presidency's role, even though it is instrumental in shepherding the Commission's proposals through the legislative process. We study whether the Commission takes the Presidency's preferences into account when formulating proposals, and whe…
Substance and subsidiarity: The economic dimension of conflict in the early warning system
The Early Warning System (EWS) allows national Parliaments in the EU to issue Reasoned Opinions (ROs) against proposed new legislation. If one-third of them do, a yellow card is triggered. In theory, the goal of this system is for Parliaments to police the subsidiarity principle, and not to address substance. This article confirms quantitatively that the EWS is also about substance by studying the co-issuance of ROs by Parliaments. It finds that …
The Early Warning System and policymaking in the European Union
Does the Early Warning System alert the European Commission about the prospects of passing new policy? We present a model of European Union policymaking in which the Early Warning System plays an important signalling role. In our model, the Commission uses signals from the Early Warning System to update its belief about governments’ voting strategies in the Council. The Commission may then anticipate difficult negotiations by withdrawing its prop…
Voting Behavior in the Council of the European Union: The Effect of the Trio Presidency
This paper examines the Trio Presidency and its impact on voting behavior in the Council of the European Union. Trios of Member States cooperate for 18-month periods, with each member holding the Presidency for six months. We study whether belonging to the Trio increases the probability that a Member State votes in favor of a measure. We analyze roll call votes on 1038 legislative acts from January 2007 till June 2014. Conducting probit analyses …
National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union
This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game‐theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more l…
The Trio Presidency and the Efficiency of Council Decision‐Making: An Empirical Study
Does the trio presidency system enhance efficiency in EU legislative decision‐making? Since 2007, fixed groups of three Member States have been required to set a joint 18‐month agenda, with each Member State taking 6‐month turns at the presidency. To date, however, there has been no empirical evidence that either confirms or refutes the notion that this system is efficient. In a study of the duration of Council decision‐making on 1,927 legislativ…
Voting Behavior in the Council of the European Union: The Effect of the Trio Presidency
This paper examines the Trio Presidency and its impact on voting behavior in the Council of the European Union. Trios of Member States cooperate for 18-month periods, with each member holding the Presidency for six months. We study whether belonging to the Trio increases the probability that a Member State votes in favor of a measure. We analyze roll call votes on 1038 legislative acts from January 2007 till June 2014. Conducting probit analyses …
The Trio Presidency and the Efficiency of Council Decision‐Making: An Empirical Study
Does the trio presidency system enhance efficiency in EU legislative decision‐making? Since 2007, fixed groups of three Member States have been required to set a joint 18‐month agenda, with each Member State taking 6‐month turns at the presidency. To date, however, there has been no empirical evidence that either confirms or refutes the notion that this system is efficient. In a study of the duration of Council decision‐making on 1,927 legislativ…
The Early Warning System and policymaking in the European Union
Does the Early Warning System alert the European Commission about the prospects of passing new policy? We present a model of European Union policymaking in which the Early Warning System plays an important signalling role. In our model, the Commission uses signals from the Early Warning System to update its belief about governments’ voting strategies in the Council. The Commission may then anticipate difficult negotiations by withdrawing its prop…
National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union
This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game‐theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more l…
Substance and subsidiarity: The economic dimension of conflict in the early warning system
The Early Warning System (EWS) allows national Parliaments in the EU to issue Reasoned Opinions (ROs) against proposed new legislation. If one-third of them do, a yellow card is triggered. In theory, the goal of this system is for Parliaments to police the subsidiarity principle, and not to address substance. This article confirms quantitatively that the EWS is also about substance by studying the co-issuance of ROs by Parliaments. It finds that …
Voting Behavior in the Council of the European Union: The Effect of the Trio Presidency
This paper examines the Trio Presidency and its impact on voting behavior in the Council of the European Union. Trios of Member States cooperate for 18-month periods, with each member holding the Presidency for six months. We study whether belonging to the Trio increases the probability that a Member State votes in favor of a measure. We analyze roll call votes on 1038 legislative acts from January 2007 till June 2014. Conducting probit analyses …
National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union
This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game‐theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more l…
The Trio Presidency and the Efficiency of Council Decision‐Making: An Empirical Study
Does the trio presidency system enhance efficiency in EU legislative decision‐making? Since 2007, fixed groups of three Member States have been required to set a joint 18‐month agenda, with each Member State taking 6‐month turns at the presidency. To date, however, there has been no empirical evidence that either confirms or refutes the notion that this system is efficient. In a study of the duration of Council decision‐making on 1,927 legislativ…
Substance and subsidiarity: The economic dimension of conflict in the early warning system
The Early Warning System (EWS) allows national Parliaments in the EU to issue Reasoned Opinions (ROs) against proposed new legislation. If one-third of them do, a yellow card is triggered. In theory, the goal of this system is for Parliaments to police the subsidiarity principle, and not to address substance. This article confirms quantitatively that the EWS is also about substance by studying the co-issuance of ROs by Parliaments. It finds that …
The Early Warning System and policymaking in the European Union
Does the Early Warning System alert the European Commission about the prospects of passing new policy? We present a model of European Union policymaking in which the Early Warning System plays an important signalling role. In our model, the Commission uses signals from the Early Warning System to update its belief about governments’ voting strategies in the Council. The Commission may then anticipate difficult negotiations by withdrawing its prop…
The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union: Strategic interactions and legislative powers
This paper develops spatial, game-theoretical models of European Union (EU) policy-making that include the rotating Council Presidency as one of the main actors. Previous such models have typically ignored the Presidency's role, even though it is instrumental in shepherding the Commission's proposals through the legislative process. We study whether the Commission takes the Presidency's preferences into account when formulating proposals, and whe…
Preferences and Institutions in European (Dis)Integration
In this article, we present a game-theoretical model of political (dis)integration, and the incentives voters and politicians face during integration processes. We apply the model to the European Union. Preference homogeneity and economies of scale do not suffice to explain European integration. Rather, integration decisions are taken within an institutional setting that involves politicians with interests that may diverge from those of the voter…
Subsidiarity Ex Ante and Ex Post: From the Early Warning System to the Court of Justice of the European Union
The subsidiarity principle divides competences between the European Union and its Member States. The Lisbon Treaty suggests a connection between ex ante and ex post subsidiarity review. Ex ante, national parliaments were given a role via the early warning system (EWS). Ex post, legislation is subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). More than 10 years after Lisbon, this article is the first to theorize and evaluate …
Lobbying and rotating leadership
Economic and political decisions are increasingly made in international organizations (IOs). A distinctive feature of many IOs is that they operate under a system of rotating leadership (e.g. a committee chair that rotates annually). Despite the widespread use of such systems and their potential value to interest groups, we know surprisingly little about how interest groups respond to rotating leadership in IOs. Using both micro- and macro-level …
Economics (8 works) · European union (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · Law and economics (6 works) · International trade (5 works)