Anastasia Ershova
Biographic Data
| ID | 4378354 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anastasia Ershova |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anastasia |
| FAMILY NAME | Ershova |
| SIGNATURE | ERSHOVA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Politics and Public Administration, GSDS, Konstanz, Germany |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2925-2706 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 23 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Just to be clear? Strategic vagueness of the European Parliament in EU policy negotiations
Vague legislative language can facilitate law adoption and implementation but reduce policy effectiveness and application uniformity. So, when do legislators employ it? Building on policymaking and responsiveness theories, we argue that legislators use vague language to overcome institutional conflict and public opinion constraints but avoid it when they seek to assert their positions in legislative output and policy outcomes. Empirically, we stu…
More Than One Agent? Authority Expansion and Delegation Dynamics in the EU
Recent studies focus on the issue of authority transfer to supranational institutions. While examining the opportunities and obstacles for expanding the Union's competencies, this literature often overlooks the effects of adopting ambitious policies on their implementation modes. This paper argues that the costs associated with the expansion of EU authority and opportunities for blame‐shifting drive delegation choices and define the relative disc…
When the EU Council responds to public opinion
While the Council of the European Union has long been deciding on EU policy insulated from public scrutiny, we argue that enhanced transparency and EU politicisation have strengthened the linkage between its positions and public opinion. We further expect the Council to be more responsive to public opinion in member states, in which citizens view EU policy action as salient and are relatively united in their stance on it. To assess these expectat…
Curb EU enthusiasm
International institutions are often challenged for being detached from the citizens. Focusing on the European Union, this article studies whether this is the case and, if so, when the European Commission responds to public opinion when pursuing policy integration. It argues that the Commission has legitimacy incentives encouraging it to be responsive but politicisation can suppress responsiveness by transmitting competing demands on the Commissi…
Constraining the European Commission to please the public
When and how does public opinion affect the delegation choices of legislatorsin the EU? We argue the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers limitthe discretion of the Commission in response to EU-wide scepticism andpoliticisation of EU policies. Public opposition to EU policies, theircontestation, and potential scrutiny motivate the EU legislators to minimisethe discrepancies between the adopted and implemented policies. They doso to av…
When parties collide
The EP plays a crucial role in defining the power of implementing agencies in the EU. In this article, we move beyond the 'unitary actor' approach to the EP and examine the influence of intra-parliamentary dynamics on the delegation patterns in the Union. We maintain that party polarization as well as the level of policy salience shape delegation patterns in the EU. Reflecting the differences between political elites, increasing party polarizatio…
The Watchdog or the Mandarin? Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process
This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: 'the Watchdog' and 'the Mandarin' of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs will notify the EU principals of prospective bureaucratic drift, leading to more restrictive discretionary limits imposed on the Commission in the implementation stage. …
The Watchdog or the Mandarin? Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process
This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: 'the Watchdog' and 'the Mandarin' of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs will notify the EU principals of prospective bureaucratic drift, leading to more restrictive discretionary limits imposed on the Commission in the implementation stage. …
Constraining the European Commission to please the public
When and how does public opinion affect the delegation choices of legislatorsin the EU? We argue the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers limitthe discretion of the Commission in response to EU-wide scepticism andpoliticisation of EU policies. Public opposition to EU policies, theircontestation, and potential scrutiny motivate the EU legislators to minimisethe discrepancies between the adopted and implemented policies. They doso to av…
When parties collide
The EP plays a crucial role in defining the power of implementing agencies in the EU. In this article, we move beyond the 'unitary actor' approach to the EP and examine the influence of intra-parliamentary dynamics on the delegation patterns in the Union. We maintain that party polarization as well as the level of policy salience shape delegation patterns in the EU. Reflecting the differences between political elites, increasing party polarizatio…
Curb EU enthusiasm
International institutions are often challenged for being detached from the citizens. Focusing on the European Union, this article studies whether this is the case and, if so, when the European Commission responds to public opinion when pursuing policy integration. It argues that the Commission has legitimacy incentives encouraging it to be responsive but politicisation can suppress responsiveness by transmitting competing demands on the Commissi…
The Watchdog or the Mandarin? Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process
This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: 'the Watchdog' and 'the Mandarin' of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs will notify the EU principals of prospective bureaucratic drift, leading to more restrictive discretionary limits imposed on the Commission in the implementation stage. …
When parties collide
The EP plays a crucial role in defining the power of implementing agencies in the EU. In this article, we move beyond the 'unitary actor' approach to the EP and examine the influence of intra-parliamentary dynamics on the delegation patterns in the Union. We maintain that party polarization as well as the level of policy salience shape delegation patterns in the EU. Reflecting the differences between political elites, increasing party polarizatio…
Constraining the European Commission to please the public
When and how does public opinion affect the delegation choices of legislatorsin the EU? We argue the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers limitthe discretion of the Commission in response to EU-wide scepticism andpoliticisation of EU policies. Public opposition to EU policies, theircontestation, and potential scrutiny motivate the EU legislators to minimisethe discrepancies between the adopted and implemented policies. They doso to av…
More Than One Agent? Authority Expansion and Delegation Dynamics in the EU
Recent studies focus on the issue of authority transfer to supranational institutions. While examining the opportunities and obstacles for expanding the Union's competencies, this literature often overlooks the effects of adopting ambitious policies on their implementation modes. This paper argues that the costs associated with the expansion of EU authority and opportunities for blame‐shifting drive delegation choices and define the relative disc…
When the EU Council responds to public opinion
While the Council of the European Union has long been deciding on EU policy insulated from public scrutiny, we argue that enhanced transparency and EU politicisation have strengthened the linkage between its positions and public opinion. We further expect the Council to be more responsive to public opinion in member states, in which citizens view EU policy action as salient and are relatively united in their stance on it. To assess these expectat…
Curb EU enthusiasm
International institutions are often challenged for being detached from the citizens. Focusing on the European Union, this article studies whether this is the case and, if so, when the European Commission responds to public opinion when pursuing policy integration. It argues that the Commission has legitimacy incentives encouraging it to be responsive but politicisation can suppress responsiveness by transmitting competing demands on the Commissi…
Just to be clear? Strategic vagueness of the European Parliament in EU policy negotiations
Vague legislative language can facilitate law adoption and implementation but reduce policy effectiveness and application uniformity. So, when do legislators employ it? Building on policymaking and responsiveness theories, we argue that legislators use vague language to overcome institutional conflict and public opinion constraints but avoid it when they seek to assert their positions in legislative output and policy outcomes. Empirically, we stu…
European Union Policy and Governance (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · European union (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Law and economics (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (4 works) · Public Administration (4 works)