Robert Gulotty
Biographic Data
| ID | 4379836 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert Gulotty |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert |
| FAMILY NAME | Gulotty |
| SIGNATURE | GULOTTY R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Chicago |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0957-9971 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 37 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Backsliding under contested oversight
Citizens do not directly observe democratic backsliding and, as a result, may hesitate to respond to subversion. We develop a model of third-party oversight bodies, such as the media or courts, that detect and assess actions that may be subversive to democracy and inform citizens. Oversight deters subversion, disciplines incumbents, and enables corrective actions by providing credible information about ambiguous incumbent behavior to citizens. Ho…
Must watch propaganda
Studies of political persuasion often use an exogenous encouragement as an instrument for persuasive messaging. However, for some people, such encouragement is insufficient, while for others, it is unnecessary. These individuals are excluded from methods that only estimate a treatment effect among compliers. Using the marginal treatment effect framework, we extend research finding that exposure to West German television increases support for comm…
Electoral Rewards and Punishments for Trade Compensation
When globalization harms a community, voters are expected to demand compensation programs. Why, then, would incumbents fail to provide additional compensation following an economic shock? The authors argue that in addition to offering material assistance, government compensation also informs voters about the costs of globalization, generating consternation in the electorate. As a result, providing compensation can hurt incumbents' electoral prosp…
The Arbitrage Lobby
Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-…
America and the Trade Regime
The era of American leadership in the multilateral trading regime has ended. This paper argues that this current antipathy to trade is unsurprising: support for US leadership of the regime has always rested on a precarious balance among domestic interests. To overcome a historic bias in favor of home market production, American leaders created incentives for exporters to organize while creating roadblocks for import-competing firms and their empl…
Narrowing the Channel
America and Trade Liberalization
Among scholars, delegation of power to the US president in 1934 is widely believed to have been a necessary requisite for tariff reductions in ensuing years. According to conventional wisdom, delegation to the president sheltered Congress from constituent pressure thereby facilitating the opening of the US economy and the emergence of the United States as a world power. This article suggests a revision to our understanding of just how that occurr…
America and the Trade Regime
The era of American leadership in the multilateral trading regime has ended. This paper argues that this current antipathy to trade is unsurprising: support for US leadership of the regime has always rested on a precarious balance among domestic interests. To overcome a historic bias in favor of home market production, American leaders created incentives for exporters to organize while creating roadblocks for import-competing firms and their empl…
America and Trade Liberalization
Among scholars, delegation of power to the US president in 1934 is widely believed to have been a necessary requisite for tariff reductions in ensuing years. According to conventional wisdom, delegation to the president sheltered Congress from constituent pressure thereby facilitating the opening of the US economy and the emergence of the United States as a world power. This article suggests a revision to our understanding of just how that occurr…
Narrowing the Channel
Electoral Rewards and Punishments for Trade Compensation
When globalization harms a community, voters are expected to demand compensation programs. Why, then, would incumbents fail to provide additional compensation following an economic shock? The authors argue that in addition to offering material assistance, government compensation also informs voters about the costs of globalization, generating consternation in the electorate. As a result, providing compensation can hurt incumbents' electoral prosp…
The Arbitrage Lobby
Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-…
America and Trade Liberalization
Among scholars, delegation of power to the US president in 1934 is widely believed to have been a necessary requisite for tariff reductions in ensuing years. According to conventional wisdom, delegation to the president sheltered Congress from constituent pressure thereby facilitating the opening of the US economy and the emergence of the United States as a world power. This article suggests a revision to our understanding of just how that occurr…
Narrowing the Channel
America and the Trade Regime
The era of American leadership in the multilateral trading regime has ended. This paper argues that this current antipathy to trade is unsurprising: support for US leadership of the regime has always rested on a precarious balance among domestic interests. To overcome a historic bias in favor of home market production, American leaders created incentives for exporters to organize while creating roadblocks for import-competing firms and their empl…
The Arbitrage Lobby
Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-…
Electoral Rewards and Punishments for Trade Compensation
When globalization harms a community, voters are expected to demand compensation programs. Why, then, would incumbents fail to provide additional compensation following an economic shock? The authors argue that in addition to offering material assistance, government compensation also informs voters about the costs of globalization, generating consternation in the electorate. As a result, providing compensation can hurt incumbents' electoral prosp…
Must watch propaganda
Studies of political persuasion often use an exogenous encouragement as an instrument for persuasive messaging. However, for some people, such encouragement is insufficient, while for others, it is unnecessary. These individuals are excluded from methods that only estimate a treatment effect among compliers. Using the marginal treatment effect framework, we extend research finding that exposure to West German television increases support for comm…
Backsliding under contested oversight
Citizens do not directly observe democratic backsliding and, as a result, may hesitate to respond to subversion. We develop a model of third-party oversight bodies, such as the media or courts, that detect and assess actions that may be subversive to democracy and inform citizens. Oversight deters subversion, disciplines incumbents, and enables corrective actions by providing credible information about ambiguous incumbent behavior to citizens. Ho…
Economics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Market economy (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Business (3 works) · International economics (3 works) · Global trade and economics (2 works) · Globalization (2 works)