Kerim Can Kavakli
Biographic Data
| ID | 4379952 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kerim Can Kavakli |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kerim Can |
| FAMILY NAME | Kavakli |
| SIGNATURE | KAVAKLI K C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bocconi University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2652-9976 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 55 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The Power to Hurt and the Effectiveness of International Sanctions
Although costs of trade disruption play a central role in theories of interstate conflict, scholars have had difficulty in constructing appropriate measures of trade wars, and few have explored how states can mitigate the resulting costs, reducing vulnerability to economic coercion. We study these questions in the context of economic sanctions, arguing that each side’s comparative advantage in exports and domestic production capabilities determin…
Dangerous Contenders: Election Monitors, Islamic Opposition Parties, and Terrorism
How do international observers decide whether to criticize or condone electoral fraud in a country? We argue that this decision depends on the identity of the victims of electoral fraud. A monitoring organization is more likely to overlook fraud committed against groups that are deemed dangerous by its sponsor. Based on this insight, we hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era election monitors are more tolerant of fraud against Islamic challeng…
Domestic Politics and the Motives of Emerging Donors: Evidence from Turkish Foreign Aid
Why do developing countries give foreign aid? Although emerging donors are gaining importance in development finance, lack of systematic data on their aid allocation limits our understanding of their motives. We address this gap using detailed data on a major new donor, Turkey, since 1992. We show that domestic politics has had a large impact on Turkey’s priorities in giving aid. Turkish aid used to be determined by international alignments and c…
From Economic Competition to Military Combat: Export Similarity and International Conflict
The vast majority of the extant literature on trade and conflict focuses on bilateral trade to determine whether commerce has a pacifying effect upon pairs of states. We argue that this focus neglects a critical role of international trade: creating tension between states that sell similar goods to the global market. We consider this role explicitly and operationalize its effects empirically. Using commodity-level trade data from 1962 to 2000, we…
From Economic Competition to Military Combat: Export Similarity and International Conflict
The vast majority of the extant literature on trade and conflict focuses on bilateral trade to determine whether commerce has a pacifying effect upon pairs of states. We argue that this focus neglects a critical role of international trade: creating tension between states that sell similar goods to the global market. We consider this role explicitly and operationalize its effects empirically. Using commodity-level trade data from 1962 to 2000, we…
The Power to Hurt and the Effectiveness of International Sanctions
Although costs of trade disruption play a central role in theories of interstate conflict, scholars have had difficulty in constructing appropriate measures of trade wars, and few have explored how states can mitigate the resulting costs, reducing vulnerability to economic coercion. We study these questions in the context of economic sanctions, arguing that each side’s comparative advantage in exports and domestic production capabilities determin…
Domestic Politics and the Motives of Emerging Donors: Evidence from Turkish Foreign Aid
Why do developing countries give foreign aid? Although emerging donors are gaining importance in development finance, lack of systematic data on their aid allocation limits our understanding of their motives. We address this gap using detailed data on a major new donor, Turkey, since 1992. We show that domestic politics has had a large impact on Turkey’s priorities in giving aid. Turkish aid used to be determined by international alignments and c…
Dangerous Contenders: Election Monitors, Islamic Opposition Parties, and Terrorism
How do international observers decide whether to criticize or condone electoral fraud in a country? We argue that this decision depends on the identity of the victims of electoral fraud. A monitoring organization is more likely to overlook fraud committed against groups that are deemed dangerous by its sponsor. Based on this insight, we hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era election monitors are more tolerant of fraud against Islamic challeng…
From Economic Competition to Military Combat: Export Similarity and International Conflict
The vast majority of the extant literature on trade and conflict focuses on bilateral trade to determine whether commerce has a pacifying effect upon pairs of states. We argue that this focus neglects a critical role of international trade: creating tension between states that sell similar goods to the global market. We consider this role explicitly and operationalize its effects empirically. Using commodity-level trade data from 1962 to 2000, we…
Domestic Politics and the Motives of Emerging Donors: Evidence from Turkish Foreign Aid
Why do developing countries give foreign aid? Although emerging donors are gaining importance in development finance, lack of systematic data on their aid allocation limits our understanding of their motives. We address this gap using detailed data on a major new donor, Turkey, since 1992. We show that domestic politics has had a large impact on Turkey’s priorities in giving aid. Turkish aid used to be determined by international alignments and c…
The Power to Hurt and the Effectiveness of International Sanctions
Although costs of trade disruption play a central role in theories of interstate conflict, scholars have had difficulty in constructing appropriate measures of trade wars, and few have explored how states can mitigate the resulting costs, reducing vulnerability to economic coercion. We study these questions in the context of economic sanctions, arguing that each side’s comparative advantage in exports and domestic production capabilities determin…
Dangerous Contenders: Election Monitors, Islamic Opposition Parties, and Terrorism
How do international observers decide whether to criticize or condone electoral fraud in a country? We argue that this decision depends on the identity of the victims of electoral fraud. A monitoring organization is more likely to overlook fraud committed against groups that are deemed dangerous by its sponsor. Based on this insight, we hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era election monitors are more tolerant of fraud against Islamic challeng…
Economics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · International Development and Aid (2 works) · International economics (2 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (2 works) · International trade (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works)