Todd Allee
Biographic Data
| ID | 4379966 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Todd Allee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Todd |
| FAMILY NAME | Allee |
| SIGNATURE | ALLEE T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Maryland, College Park |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 422 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Are the Contents of International Treaties Copied and Pasted? Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements
Most accounts of international negotiations suggest that global agreements are individually crafted and distinct, while some emerging scholarship suggests a heavy reliance on models and templates. In this research, we present a comprehensive test of whether new international treaties are heavily copied and pasted from past ones. We specify several reasons to expect widespread copying and pasting, and argue that both the most and least powerful co…
When Free Traders Become Protectionists: Constituent Advocacy at the International Trade Commission
Although Members of Congress vote on few trade bills, they participate regularly in venues such as the International Trade Commission (ITC), where important trade policy decisions are made. We assert that once removed from the voting chambers of Congress, legislators are motivated overwhelmingly by the desire to advance constituents’ trade policy interests, even those that contradict the member’s established positions on trade. Utilizing an origi…
Veto players and the design of preferential trade agreements
The concept of domestic veto players has become a popular explanation for foreign policy rigidity. We argue that veto players can be amenable to new policy initiatives – in our case preferential trade agreements (PTAs) – but then choose to exert a strong influence on their contents. Drawing upon more than a dozen PTA-design variables for an expanded collection of postwar trade agreements, our quantitative tests reveal that veto players systematic…
Who wrote the rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Twelve governments recently signed the much-anticipated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), sparking heated debate about its merits. As a primary motivation for this first “mega-regional” agreement, US President Barack Obama argues that the TPP is a way for the USA, and not China or someone else, to write the global trade rules of the future. This begs some important questions, namely which country or countries really did write most of the TPP and t…
Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Although many features of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are consistent from one agreement to the next, a closer look reveals that the treaties exhibit considerable variation in terms of their enforcement provisions, which legal scholars have singled out as the central component of the treaties. An original data set is compiled that captures three important treaty-design differences: whether the parties consent in advance to international a…
The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession
Governments have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in vastly different ways: some have taken mere days to join without undertaking any trade liberalization, while others have taken more than a decade and been forced to undergo significant liberalization. We argue that the more rigorous a state's accession to an international organization (IO), and thus the greater policy change required to join, the greater the benefits it will receive fr…
Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment
During the past few decades governments have signed nearly 2,700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with one another in an attempt to attract greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). By signing BITs, which contain strong enforcement provisions, investment-seeking governments are thought to more credibly commit to protecting whatever FDI they receive, which in turn should lead to increased confidence among investors and ultimately grea…
Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the dominant source of rules on foreign direct investment (FDI), yet these treaties vary significantly in at least one important respect: whether they allow investment disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Through the compilation and careful coding of the text of nearly 1,500 treaties, we identify systematic variation in "legal de…
The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes
Territorial disputes are a common source of armed conflict and war, yet, during the twentieth century, governments have resolved dozens of territorial disputes through recourse to international arbitration or adjudication. In this research we consider why governments agree to international legal dispute settlement as a means of resolving territorial disputes. We put forward and test three explanations for the decision to pursue legal dispute sett…
Introduction to CMPS Special Issue on Territorial Conflict Management1
1Most of the articles in this special issue were first presented at the Conference on Territorial Conflict Management held at the University of Illinois in October 2004. The editors would like to thank the Hewlett Foundation as well as International Programs and Studies, the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, the Center for International Business Education and Research, the Center for Global Studies, the Department …
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
We develop and test a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes. Our central claim is that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are likely to seek the “political cover” of an international legal ruling. In such cases, it will be ea…
Dimensions of territorial conflict and resolution: Tangible and intangible values of territory
The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
This book presents a systematic reassessment of the theoretical and empirical foundations of the democratic peace literature. Three distinct theoretical models of how domestic political institutions shape the foreign policy choices of state leaders are developed and Huth and Allee then test hypotheses from each model against an original data set of 348 territorial disputes from 1919–95. Each territorial dispute is divided into three separate but …
Questions of Research Design in Developing New Tests of the Democratic Peace
We argue that the prevailing dyad-year research design employed in quantitative tests of the theoretical literature on the democratic peace suffers from several limitations. We propose an alternative research design that focuses on three different stages or "games" that typically emerge in the evolution of international disputes over time. In this type of research design the units of observation are the policy choices of "challenger" and "target"…
Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes
A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumbent democratic leaders to domestic political opposition influences the diplomatic and military policies of governments. The model is situated within the democratic peace literature and compared with existing theoretical work. Empirically, the hypotheses are tested on a new data set of 348 territorial disputes for the period from 1919 to 1995. Each dispute is …
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
We develop and test a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes. Our central claim is that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are likely to seek the “political cover” of an international legal ruling. In such cases, it will be ea…
Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment
During the past few decades governments have signed nearly 2,700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with one another in an attempt to attract greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). By signing BITs, which contain strong enforcement provisions, investment-seeking governments are thought to more credibly commit to protecting whatever FDI they receive, which in turn should lead to increased confidence among investors and ultimately grea…
Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the dominant source of rules on foreign direct investment (FDI), yet these treaties vary significantly in at least one important respect: whether they allow investment disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Through the compilation and careful coding of the text of nearly 1,500 treaties, we identify systematic variation in "legal de…
Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes
A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumbent democratic leaders to domestic political opposition influences the diplomatic and military policies of governments. The model is situated within the democratic peace literature and compared with existing theoretical work. Empirically, the hypotheses are tested on a new data set of 348 territorial disputes for the period from 1919 to 1995. Each dispute is …
Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Although many features of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are consistent from one agreement to the next, a closer look reveals that the treaties exhibit considerable variation in terms of their enforcement provisions, which legal scholars have singled out as the central component of the treaties. An original data set is compiled that captures three important treaty-design differences: whether the parties consent in advance to international a…
Are the Contents of International Treaties Copied and Pasted? Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements
Most accounts of international negotiations suggest that global agreements are individually crafted and distinct, while some emerging scholarship suggests a heavy reliance on models and templates. In this research, we present a comprehensive test of whether new international treaties are heavily copied and pasted from past ones. We specify several reasons to expect widespread copying and pasting, and argue that both the most and least powerful co…
The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession
Governments have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in vastly different ways: some have taken mere days to join without undertaking any trade liberalization, while others have taken more than a decade and been forced to undergo significant liberalization. We argue that the more rigorous a state's accession to an international organization (IO), and thus the greater policy change required to join, the greater the benefits it will receive fr…
The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes
Territorial disputes are a common source of armed conflict and war, yet, during the twentieth century, governments have resolved dozens of territorial disputes through recourse to international arbitration or adjudication. In this research we consider why governments agree to international legal dispute settlement as a means of resolving territorial disputes. We put forward and test three explanations for the decision to pursue legal dispute sett…
Veto players and the design of preferential trade agreements
The concept of domestic veto players has become a popular explanation for foreign policy rigidity. We argue that veto players can be amenable to new policy initiatives – in our case preferential trade agreements (PTAs) – but then choose to exert a strong influence on their contents. Drawing upon more than a dozen PTA-design variables for an expanded collection of postwar trade agreements, our quantitative tests reveal that veto players systematic…
Who wrote the rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Twelve governments recently signed the much-anticipated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), sparking heated debate about its merits. As a primary motivation for this first “mega-regional” agreement, US President Barack Obama argues that the TPP is a way for the USA, and not China or someone else, to write the global trade rules of the future. This begs some important questions, namely which country or countries really did write most of the TPP and t…
When Free Traders Become Protectionists: Constituent Advocacy at the International Trade Commission
Although Members of Congress vote on few trade bills, they participate regularly in venues such as the International Trade Commission (ITC), where important trade policy decisions are made. We assert that once removed from the voting chambers of Congress, legislators are motivated overwhelmingly by the desire to advance constituents’ trade policy interests, even those that contradict the member’s established positions on trade. Utilizing an origi…
Dimensions of territorial conflict and resolution: Tangible and intangible values of territory
Questions of Research Design in Developing New Tests of the Democratic Peace
We argue that the prevailing dyad-year research design employed in quantitative tests of the theoretical literature on the democratic peace suffers from several limitations. We propose an alternative research design that focuses on three different stages or "games" that typically emerge in the evolution of international disputes over time. In this type of research design the units of observation are the policy choices of "challenger" and "target"…
Questions of Research Design in Developing New Tests of the Democratic Peace
We argue that the prevailing dyad-year research design employed in quantitative tests of the theoretical literature on the democratic peace suffers from several limitations. We propose an alternative research design that focuses on three different stages or "games" that typically emerge in the evolution of international disputes over time. In this type of research design the units of observation are the policy choices of "challenger" and "target"…
Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes
A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumbent democratic leaders to domestic political opposition influences the diplomatic and military policies of governments. The model is situated within the democratic peace literature and compared with existing theoretical work. Empirically, the hypotheses are tested on a new data set of 348 territorial disputes for the period from 1919 to 1995. Each dispute is …
The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
This book presents a systematic reassessment of the theoretical and empirical foundations of the democratic peace literature. Three distinct theoretical models of how domestic political institutions shape the foreign policy choices of state leaders are developed and Huth and Allee then test hypotheses from each model against an original data set of 348 territorial disputes from 1919–95. Each territorial dispute is divided into three separate but …
Dimensions of territorial conflict and resolution: Tangible and intangible values of territory
The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes
Territorial disputes are a common source of armed conflict and war, yet, during the twentieth century, governments have resolved dozens of territorial disputes through recourse to international arbitration or adjudication. In this research we consider why governments agree to international legal dispute settlement as a means of resolving territorial disputes. We put forward and test three explanations for the decision to pursue legal dispute sett…
Introduction to CMPS Special Issue on Territorial Conflict Management1
1Most of the articles in this special issue were first presented at the Conference on Territorial Conflict Management held at the University of Illinois in October 2004. The editors would like to thank the Hewlett Foundation as well as International Programs and Studies, the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, the Center for International Business Education and Research, the Center for Global Studies, the Department …
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
We develop and test a general argument about the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to choose legal dispute resolution over bilateral negotiations as a means to settle international disputes. Our central claim is that leaders who anticipate significant domestic audience costs for the making of voluntary, negotiated concessions are likely to seek the “political cover” of an international legal ruling. In such cases, it will be ea…
Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the dominant source of rules on foreign direct investment (FDI), yet these treaties vary significantly in at least one important respect: whether they allow investment disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Through the compilation and careful coding of the text of nearly 1,500 treaties, we identify systematic variation in "legal de…
Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment
During the past few decades governments have signed nearly 2,700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with one another in an attempt to attract greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). By signing BITs, which contain strong enforcement provisions, investment-seeking governments are thought to more credibly commit to protecting whatever FDI they receive, which in turn should lead to increased confidence among investors and ultimately grea…
The Divergent Effects of Joining International Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession
Governments have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in vastly different ways: some have taken mere days to join without undertaking any trade liberalization, while others have taken more than a decade and been forced to undergo significant liberalization. We argue that the more rigorous a state's accession to an international organization (IO), and thus the greater policy change required to join, the greater the benefits it will receive fr…
Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Although many features of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are consistent from one agreement to the next, a closer look reveals that the treaties exhibit considerable variation in terms of their enforcement provisions, which legal scholars have singled out as the central component of the treaties. An original data set is compiled that captures three important treaty-design differences: whether the parties consent in advance to international a…
Who wrote the rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Twelve governments recently signed the much-anticipated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), sparking heated debate about its merits. As a primary motivation for this first “mega-regional” agreement, US President Barack Obama argues that the TPP is a way for the USA, and not China or someone else, to write the global trade rules of the future. This begs some important questions, namely which country or countries really did write most of the TPP and t…
Veto players and the design of preferential trade agreements
The concept of domestic veto players has become a popular explanation for foreign policy rigidity. We argue that veto players can be amenable to new policy initiatives – in our case preferential trade agreements (PTAs) – but then choose to exert a strong influence on their contents. Drawing upon more than a dozen PTA-design variables for an expanded collection of postwar trade agreements, our quantitative tests reveal that veto players systematic…
When Free Traders Become Protectionists: Constituent Advocacy at the International Trade Commission
Although Members of Congress vote on few trade bills, they participate regularly in venues such as the International Trade Commission (ITC), where important trade policy decisions are made. We assert that once removed from the voting chambers of Congress, legislators are motivated overwhelmingly by the desire to advance constituents’ trade policy interests, even those that contradict the member’s established positions on trade. Utilizing an origi…
Are the Contents of International Treaties Copied and Pasted? Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements
Most accounts of international negotiations suggest that global agreements are individually crafted and distinct, while some emerging scholarship suggests a heavy reliance on models and templates. In this research, we present a comprehensive test of whether new international treaties are heavily copied and pasted from past ones. We specify several reasons to expect widespread copying and pasting, and argue that both the most and least powerful co…
Political science (15 works) · Law (13 works) · Economics (12 works) · Law (12 works) · International trade (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · World Trade Organization Law (7 works) · International Arbitration and Investment Law (6 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (6 works)