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Bo Ram Kwon

Biographic Data

ID4380009
NAMEBo Ram Kwon
GIVEN NAMESBo Ram
FAMILY NAMEKwon
SIGNATUREKWON B R
AFFILIATIONSInstitute for Defense Analyses
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS2
TOTAL CITATIONS48
WORKS AS AUTHOR2
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2015
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX1
  • Revisiting the drivers and conditions of South Korea’s defense industry development

    Bo Ram Kwon•ARTICLE•Defence Studies•2025•References: 2

  • When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework

    Open Access•Navin A Bapat, Bo Ram Kwon•ARTICLE•International Organization•2015•Cited by: 48•References: 42

    Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, giv…

  • When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework

    Open Access•Navin A Bapat, Bo Ram Kwon•ARTICLE•International Organization•2015•Cited by: 48•References: 42

    Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, giv…

  • When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework

    Open Access•Navin A Bapat, Bo Ram Kwon•ARTICLE•International Organization•2015•Cited by: 48•References: 42

    Although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful, few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms. Using a game theoretic model, we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders. We demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies, giv…

  • Revisiting the drivers and conditions of South Korea’s defense industry development

    Bo Ram Kwon•ARTICLE•Defence Studies•2025•References: 2

Business (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Alliance (1 work) · Communication source (1 work) · Competitor analysis (1 work) · Defence industry (1 work) · Defense industry (1 work)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae