Molly M Melin
Biographic Data
| ID | 4380214 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Molly M Melin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Molly M |
| FAMILY NAME | Melin |
| SIGNATURE | MELIN M M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Loyola University Chicago |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 123 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Connecting international and domestic dots
Purpose This paper aims to seek to and understand how civil conflict and international claims inform one another. Does the existence of ongoing civil and international conflicts affect how a government addresses an international claim? The paper builds on existing literature that link international and domestic conflict. However, it suggests that the logic behind civil conflicts may be different from that for international ones as states decide h…
Sticking it out
What explains UN member-state personnel withdrawals from peacekeeping operations? Withdrawals can occur at the behest of contributor states, as contributions are voluntary. We argue that withdrawal is motivated by violence in the peacekeeping operation host state. Research shows that well-resourced missions improve the prospects of success. Personnel withdrawals are dangerous, as they are more likely when continued deployments are needed. We thus…
Exploring the Threshold between Conflict Management and Joining in Biased Interventions
Recent research emphasizes the effectiveness of biased third parties and their use of leverage in resolving conflicts. However, scholars fail to explore systematically the conditions under which conflict management strategies straddle the confines between mediatory techniques and approaches more commonly associated with joining behavior. This article examines the threshold between neutral conflict management and overt joining by offering a model …
Escalation in international conflict management
Efforts to resolve interstate disputes are often characterized by repeated engagement and evolving strategies. What explains a state’s decision to continue conflict resolution efforts but escalate their management strategy? Drawing from foreign policy literature, I argue that third parties escalate policies in response to past failures, shifting conflict dynamics and their relationship with the disputants. Analysis of management efforts from 1946…
Connecting the Dots
We explore states’ decisions to escalate disputes over their territorial claims or settle them peacefully. We complement existing arguments by accounting for the fact that states are often simultaneously entangled in multiple territorial claims. We build on previous scholarship in positing that two states involved in a territorial dispute will act based on information they glean from each other’s reputation for dealing with claims with other stat…
Fear of rejection
How do factors that influence mediation offers affect belligerent behavior? The circumstances that attract potential mediators are not the same as those that make mediation desirable to belligerents. Third parties offer mediation when the conflict is intense, generation of an agreement is likely and they have ties to the conflict. However, mediation is less acceptable to belligerents in these circumstances. This dynamic creates a dilemma; the cha…
The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs1
This paper examines if, when, and how states act to manage militarized disputes. I argue that the relationship between the third party and disputants, the management history, and the characteristics of the conflict help us understand when management occurs and the management techniques employed. I find substantial evidence that biased third parties are quick to offer management services and to employ economic and diplomatic techniques. Conditions…
Jumping into the Fray
Our paper examines the question of when conflicts expand and what leads particular states to join more quickly than others. Using factors highlighted in the conflict expansion and joining literatures, we derive hypotheses about how these factors make resolve in the face of credible threats more likely and how this either increases or decreases the time to conflict expansion. We also generate expectations about when specific states are likely to j…
Incentives for Talking
This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepti…
Incentives for Talking
This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepti…
The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs1
This paper examines if, when, and how states act to manage militarized disputes. I argue that the relationship between the third party and disputants, the management history, and the characteristics of the conflict help us understand when management occurs and the management techniques employed. I find substantial evidence that biased third parties are quick to offer management services and to employ economic and diplomatic techniques. Conditions…
Jumping into the Fray
Our paper examines the question of when conflicts expand and what leads particular states to join more quickly than others. Using factors highlighted in the conflict expansion and joining literatures, we derive hypotheses about how these factors make resolve in the face of credible threats more likely and how this either increases or decreases the time to conflict expansion. We also generate expectations about when specific states are likely to j…
Escalation in international conflict management
Efforts to resolve interstate disputes are often characterized by repeated engagement and evolving strategies. What explains a state’s decision to continue conflict resolution efforts but escalate their management strategy? Drawing from foreign policy literature, I argue that third parties escalate policies in response to past failures, shifting conflict dynamics and their relationship with the disputants. Analysis of management efforts from 1946…
Fear of rejection
How do factors that influence mediation offers affect belligerent behavior? The circumstances that attract potential mediators are not the same as those that make mediation desirable to belligerents. Third parties offer mediation when the conflict is intense, generation of an agreement is likely and they have ties to the conflict. However, mediation is less acceptable to belligerents in these circumstances. This dynamic creates a dilemma; the cha…
Connecting the Dots
We explore states’ decisions to escalate disputes over their territorial claims or settle them peacefully. We complement existing arguments by accounting for the fact that states are often simultaneously entangled in multiple territorial claims. We build on previous scholarship in positing that two states involved in a territorial dispute will act based on information they glean from each other’s reputation for dealing with claims with other stat…
Sticking it out
What explains UN member-state personnel withdrawals from peacekeeping operations? Withdrawals can occur at the behest of contributor states, as contributions are voluntary. We argue that withdrawal is motivated by violence in the peacekeeping operation host state. Research shows that well-resourced missions improve the prospects of success. Personnel withdrawals are dangerous, as they are more likely when continued deployments are needed. We thus…
Exploring the Threshold between Conflict Management and Joining in Biased Interventions
Recent research emphasizes the effectiveness of biased third parties and their use of leverage in resolving conflicts. However, scholars fail to explore systematically the conditions under which conflict management strategies straddle the confines between mediatory techniques and approaches more commonly associated with joining behavior. This article examines the threshold between neutral conflict management and overt joining by offering a model …
Incentives for Talking
This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepti…
Jumping into the Fray
Our paper examines the question of when conflicts expand and what leads particular states to join more quickly than others. Using factors highlighted in the conflict expansion and joining literatures, we derive hypotheses about how these factors make resolve in the face of credible threats more likely and how this either increases or decreases the time to conflict expansion. We also generate expectations about when specific states are likely to j…
The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs1
This paper examines if, when, and how states act to manage militarized disputes. I argue that the relationship between the third party and disputants, the management history, and the characteristics of the conflict help us understand when management occurs and the management techniques employed. I find substantial evidence that biased third parties are quick to offer management services and to employ economic and diplomatic techniques. Conditions…
Fear of rejection
How do factors that influence mediation offers affect belligerent behavior? The circumstances that attract potential mediators are not the same as those that make mediation desirable to belligerents. Third parties offer mediation when the conflict is intense, generation of an agreement is likely and they have ties to the conflict. However, mediation is less acceptable to belligerents in these circumstances. This dynamic creates a dilemma; the cha…
Escalation in international conflict management
Efforts to resolve interstate disputes are often characterized by repeated engagement and evolving strategies. What explains a state’s decision to continue conflict resolution efforts but escalate their management strategy? Drawing from foreign policy literature, I argue that third parties escalate policies in response to past failures, shifting conflict dynamics and their relationship with the disputants. Analysis of management efforts from 1946…
Connecting the Dots
We explore states’ decisions to escalate disputes over their territorial claims or settle them peacefully. We complement existing arguments by accounting for the fact that states are often simultaneously entangled in multiple territorial claims. We build on previous scholarship in positing that two states involved in a territorial dispute will act based on information they glean from each other’s reputation for dealing with claims with other stat…
Exploring the Threshold between Conflict Management and Joining in Biased Interventions
Recent research emphasizes the effectiveness of biased third parties and their use of leverage in resolving conflicts. However, scholars fail to explore systematically the conditions under which conflict management strategies straddle the confines between mediatory techniques and approaches more commonly associated with joining behavior. This article examines the threshold between neutral conflict management and overt joining by offering a model …
Sticking it out
What explains UN member-state personnel withdrawals from peacekeeping operations? Withdrawals can occur at the behest of contributor states, as contributions are voluntary. We argue that withdrawal is motivated by violence in the peacekeeping operation host state. Research shows that well-resourced missions improve the prospects of success. Personnel withdrawals are dangerous, as they are more likely when continued deployments are needed. We thus…
Connecting international and domestic dots
Purpose This paper aims to seek to and understand how civil conflict and international claims inform one another. Does the existence of ongoing civil and international conflicts affect how a government addresses an international claim? The paper builds on existing literature that link international and domestic conflict. However, it suggests that the logic behind civil conflicts may be different from that for international ones as states decide h…
Law (9 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Law (8 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Economics (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Law and economics (4 works)