Scott Moser
Biographic Data
| ID | 4380326 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Scott Moser |
| GIVEN NAMES | Scott |
| FAMILY NAME | Moser |
| SIGNATURE | MOSER S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Nottingham |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4812-4825 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 32 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Explaining Differences in Voting Patterns across Voting Domains Using Hierarchical Bayesian Models
Spatial voting models are widely used in political science to analyze legislators’ preferences and voting behavior. Traditional models assume that legislators’ ideal points are static across different types of votes. This article extends the Bayesian spatial voting model to incorporate hierarchical Bayesian methods, allowing for the identification of covariates that explain differences in legislators’ ideal points across voting domains. We apply …
Multiple Ideal Points: Revealed Preferences in Different Domains
We extend classical ideal point estimation to allow voters to have different preferences when voting in different domains—for example, when voting on agricultural policy than when voting on defense policy. Our scaling procedure results in estimated ideal points on a common scale. As a result, we are able to directly compare a member’s revealed preferences across different domains of voting (different sets of motions) to assess if, for example, a …
The University of Kansas School of Medicine
Medical Education Program Highlights Following 3 years of development, we launched a comprehensively revised curriculum in 2017. We designed the revision process to involve all stakeholders in planning, development, and implementation.1,2 Using a “ground-up” evidence-based approach, we developed content, delivery methods, and assessment strategies de novo. The Active-learning, Competency-based, Excellence-driven (ACE) curriculum features: Learnin…
Heresthetics and choice from tournaments
Moser et al. provide a formalization of heresthetics, the “art of political strategy”, in collective choice settings. In doing so they introduce the heresthetically stable set as the set of outcomes least susceptible to manipulation of issue dimension. In this note we correct a small error in the original paper, and close several open questions asked there in. We examine the heresthetically stable set as a tournament solution, establishing some b…
The Domestic Politics of Strategic Retrenchment, Power Shifts, and Preventive War
We present a formal model of international bargaining between two states in which one government must negotiate with a domestic opposition faction to secure tax revenue for military spending. The model examines how robust the international order is to domestic political crises that activate a stark trade-off to a governing coalition. Namely, offering fiscal relief to stave off domestic revolution can simultaneously undermine the larger internatio…
Taking the Leap: Voting, Rhetoric, and the Determinants of Electoral Reform
The Second Reform Act ushered in the age of democratic politics in the United Kingdom by expanding the voting franchise and remedying legislative malapportionment. Analyzing parliamentary debates and divisions, we investigate why reform successfully passed the House of Commons in 1867. We consider why reform passed under a minority Conservative government yet failed under a majority Liberal government despite no election or change in membership. …
The Structure of Heresthetical Power
This article considers manipulation of collective choice — in such environments, a potential alternative is powerful only to the degree that its introduction can affect the collective decision. Using the Banks set (Banks, 1985), we present and characterize alternatives that can, and those that can not, affect sophisticated collective decision-making. Along with offering two substantive findings about political manipulation and a link between our …
The Domestic Politics of Strategic Retrenchment, Power Shifts, and Preventive War
We present a formal model of international bargaining between two states in which one government must negotiate with a domestic opposition faction to secure tax revenue for military spending. The model examines how robust the international order is to domestic political crises that activate a stark trade-off to a governing coalition. Namely, offering fiscal relief to stave off domestic revolution can simultaneously undermine the larger internatio…
Taking the Leap: Voting, Rhetoric, and the Determinants of Electoral Reform
The Second Reform Act ushered in the age of democratic politics in the United Kingdom by expanding the voting franchise and remedying legislative malapportionment. Analyzing parliamentary debates and divisions, we investigate why reform successfully passed the House of Commons in 1867. We consider why reform passed under a minority Conservative government yet failed under a majority Liberal government despite no election or change in membership. …
The Structure of Heresthetical Power
This article considers manipulation of collective choice — in such environments, a potential alternative is powerful only to the degree that its introduction can affect the collective decision. Using the Banks set (Banks, 1985), we present and characterize alternatives that can, and those that can not, affect sophisticated collective decision-making. Along with offering two substantive findings about political manipulation and a link between our …
Multiple Ideal Points: Revealed Preferences in Different Domains
We extend classical ideal point estimation to allow voters to have different preferences when voting in different domains—for example, when voting on agricultural policy than when voting on defense policy. Our scaling procedure results in estimated ideal points on a common scale. As a result, we are able to directly compare a member’s revealed preferences across different domains of voting (different sets of motions) to assess if, for example, a …
The Structure of Heresthetical Power
This article considers manipulation of collective choice — in such environments, a potential alternative is powerful only to the degree that its introduction can affect the collective decision. Using the Banks set (Banks, 1985), we present and characterize alternatives that can, and those that can not, affect sophisticated collective decision-making. Along with offering two substantive findings about political manipulation and a link between our …
Taking the Leap: Voting, Rhetoric, and the Determinants of Electoral Reform
The Second Reform Act ushered in the age of democratic politics in the United Kingdom by expanding the voting franchise and remedying legislative malapportionment. Analyzing parliamentary debates and divisions, we investigate why reform successfully passed the House of Commons in 1867. We consider why reform passed under a minority Conservative government yet failed under a majority Liberal government despite no election or change in membership. …
The Domestic Politics of Strategic Retrenchment, Power Shifts, and Preventive War
We present a formal model of international bargaining between two states in which one government must negotiate with a domestic opposition faction to secure tax revenue for military spending. The model examines how robust the international order is to domestic political crises that activate a stark trade-off to a governing coalition. Namely, offering fiscal relief to stave off domestic revolution can simultaneously undermine the larger internatio…
Heresthetics and choice from tournaments
Moser et al. provide a formalization of heresthetics, the “art of political strategy”, in collective choice settings. In doing so they introduce the heresthetically stable set as the set of outcomes least susceptible to manipulation of issue dimension. In this note we correct a small error in the original paper, and close several open questions asked there in. We examine the heresthetically stable set as a tournament solution, establishing some b…
The University of Kansas School of Medicine
Medical Education Program Highlights Following 3 years of development, we launched a comprehensively revised curriculum in 2017. We designed the revision process to involve all stakeholders in planning, development, and implementation.1,2 Using a “ground-up” evidence-based approach, we developed content, delivery methods, and assessment strategies de novo. The Active-learning, Competency-based, Excellence-driven (ACE) curriculum features: Learnin…
Multiple Ideal Points: Revealed Preferences in Different Domains
We extend classical ideal point estimation to allow voters to have different preferences when voting in different domains—for example, when voting on agricultural policy than when voting on defense policy. Our scaling procedure results in estimated ideal points on a common scale. As a result, we are able to directly compare a member’s revealed preferences across different domains of voting (different sets of motions) to assess if, for example, a …
Explaining Differences in Voting Patterns across Voting Domains Using Hierarchical Bayesian Models
Spatial voting models are widely used in political science to analyze legislators’ preferences and voting behavior. Traditional models assume that legislators’ ideal points are static across different types of votes. This article extends the Bayesian spatial voting model to incorporate hierarchical Bayesian methods, allowing for the identification of covariates that explain differences in legislators’ ideal points across voting domains. We apply …
Political science (6 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Econometrics (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Politics (3 works)