Makito Takei
Biographic Data
| ID | 4380535 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Makito Takei |
| GIVEN NAMES | Makito |
| FAMILY NAME | Takei |
| SIGNATURE | TAKEI M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tecnológico de Monterrey |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3570-166X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Misreading the public? Rethinking surveys in interstate disputes
Do surveys provide reliable information on public opinion in interstate disputes? Politicians and critics frequently rely on surveys to understand public policy preferences in disputes. We provide empirical evidence that casts doubt on the reliability of such surveys: respondents may falsify their preferences when they favor contentious approaches, such as aggressive military activities and concessions to adversaries. Concessions are often percei…
Audience costs in the eyes of an adversary
Audience cost theory suggests that as a country increases its audience costs, it can send a credible threat to an opponent and prevail in an international crisis. Many experimental studies show that domestic citizens of a challenger state disapprove of a leader who backs down in a crisis, which constitutes evidence for audience costs. However, what about the audience’s perception in the target country? Even if audience costs emerge in a threateni…
International Reputation Costs and Assurances
How can states credibly commit to peace and assure other countries? One source of credible assurance identified in previous studies is the cost to a state’s international reputation. When a state violates a prior commitment to peace, it suffers reputational damage, which can be costly in various ways. These reputational costs, in turn, serve as a tying-hands signal that enhances the credibility of peaceful commitments. Nonetheless, empirical rese…
Audience Costs and the Credibility of Public versus Private Threats in International Crises
The credibility of public versus private threats in international crisis bargaining has received scholarly attention. While public threats are often believed to be more credible than private ones because of audience costs, others contend that private threats should be equally credible or even more. Also, the effect of public threats can be conditioned by other domestic factors such as domestic hawkishness and a leader’s unpopularity. To test thes…
Audience Costs and the Credibility of Public versus Private Threats in International Crises
The credibility of public versus private threats in international crisis bargaining has received scholarly attention. While public threats are often believed to be more credible than private ones because of audience costs, others contend that private threats should be equally credible or even more. Also, the effect of public threats can be conditioned by other domestic factors such as domestic hawkishness and a leader’s unpopularity. To test thes…
Audience Costs and the Credibility of Public versus Private Threats in International Crises
The credibility of public versus private threats in international crisis bargaining has received scholarly attention. While public threats are often believed to be more credible than private ones because of audience costs, others contend that private threats should be equally credible or even more. Also, the effect of public threats can be conditioned by other domestic factors such as domestic hawkishness and a leader’s unpopularity. To test thes…
International Reputation Costs and Assurances
How can states credibly commit to peace and assure other countries? One source of credible assurance identified in previous studies is the cost to a state’s international reputation. When a state violates a prior commitment to peace, it suffers reputational damage, which can be costly in various ways. These reputational costs, in turn, serve as a tying-hands signal that enhances the credibility of peaceful commitments. Nonetheless, empirical rese…
Misreading the public? Rethinking surveys in interstate disputes
Do surveys provide reliable information on public opinion in interstate disputes? Politicians and critics frequently rely on surveys to understand public policy preferences in disputes. We provide empirical evidence that casts doubt on the reliability of such surveys: respondents may falsify their preferences when they favor contentious approaches, such as aggressive military activities and concessions to adversaries. Concessions are often percei…
Audience costs in the eyes of an adversary
Audience cost theory suggests that as a country increases its audience costs, it can send a credible threat to an opponent and prevail in an international crisis. Many experimental studies show that domestic citizens of a challenger state disapprove of a leader who backs down in a crisis, which constitutes evidence for audience costs. However, what about the audience’s perception in the target country? Even if audience costs emerge in a threateni…
International Relations and Foreign Policy (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Credibility (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Adversary (1 work) · Autocracy (1 work) · China (1 work) · China-Japan territorial dispute (1 work)