Marek P Hessel
Biographic Data
| ID | 4380616 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marek P Hessel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marek P |
| FAMILY NAME | Hessel |
| SIGNATURE | HESSEL M P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Fordham University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1981 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Threat Power in Sequential Games
The analysis of 2 × 2 ordinal games, in which both players can sequentially move and countermove after an initial outcome is chosen, is extended to repeated play of these games in which one player has ‘threat power’. This power enables this player to threaten the other player with a mutually disadvantageous outcome in order to deter certain moves in the future play of the game. Except for no-conflict games with a mutually best outcome, there are …
Bargaining Costs and Rational Behavior
This article presents a discussion of the effects of bargaining costs on the behavior of rational bargainers. Rationality is defined so as to reflect the bargainers' recognition of cooperative as well as conflictual aspects of bargaining. Bargaining is viewed as a sequential non-zero-sum game, which allows the bargainers to communicate through exchanges of their demands. It is shown that if the communication process were entirely costless, no nee…
Threat Power in Sequential Games
The analysis of 2 × 2 ordinal games, in which both players can sequentially move and countermove after an initial outcome is chosen, is extended to repeated play of these games in which one player has ‘threat power’. This power enables this player to threaten the other player with a mutually disadvantageous outcome in order to deter certain moves in the future play of the game. Except for no-conflict games with a mutually best outcome, there are …
Bargaining Costs and Rational Behavior
This article presents a discussion of the effects of bargaining costs on the behavior of rational bargainers. Rationality is defined so as to reflect the bargainers' recognition of cooperative as well as conflictual aspects of bargaining. Bargaining is viewed as a sequential non-zero-sum game, which allows the bargainers to communicate through exchanges of their demands. It is shown that if the communication process were entirely costless, no nee…
Bargaining Costs and Rational Behavior
This article presents a discussion of the effects of bargaining costs on the behavior of rational bargainers. Rationality is defined so as to reflect the bargainers' recognition of cooperative as well as conflictual aspects of bargaining. Bargaining is viewed as a sequential non-zero-sum game, which allows the bargainers to communicate through exchanges of their demands. It is shown that if the communication process were entirely costless, no nee…
Threat Power in Sequential Games
The analysis of 2 × 2 ordinal games, in which both players can sequentially move and countermove after an initial outcome is chosen, is extended to repeated play of these games in which one player has ‘threat power’. This power enables this player to threaten the other player with a mutually disadvantageous outcome in order to deter certain moves in the future play of the game. Except for no-conflict games with a mutually best outcome, there are …
Computer Science (2 works) · Computer security (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Adversary (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (1 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 works)