Benjamin Leidorf‐tidå
Biographic Data
| ID | 4381266 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Benjamin Leidorf‐tidå |
| GIVEN NAMES | Benjamin |
| FAMILY NAME | Leidorf‐tidå |
| SIGNATURE | TIDÅ B L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4425-825X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Who benefits from stakeholder consultations? Fire alarms or procedural politicking?
Stakeholder consultations have become increasingly common. By allowing societal interests to provide input on regulatory proposals, stakeholder consultations are meant to bolster the input legitimacy of regulatory decisions. Yet, despite a wealth of scholarship on stakeholder participation in EU regulatory processes, it is still unclear how stakeholder consultations affect the traditional democratic oversight of regulatory agencies. Following sem…
Account-Holding Intensity
Measurements of accountability tend to gauge account-holding powers or frequencies while neglecting the quality of the account-holding process. In this article we address this with a conceptual innovation, defining account-holding intensity as a combination of both the frequency and the diligence of account holding. We propose this as a framework that is sensitive to both the quantity and the quality of account holding. Subsequently, we provide s…
Legislative oversight of EU agencies through hearings
European Parliament hearings are a core mechanism of oversight of EU agencies, largely understudied in extant literature. Drawing on a unique dataset of hand-coded minutes of 1314 meetings held by the 12 parliamentary parent committees of EU agencies, we investigate how the EP deploys hearings in its account-holding role. We are guided in our investigation by the influential framework of ‘police patrol’ vs. ‘fire alarm’ oversight. The framework s…
From accountability victim to accountability entrepreneur
Recent research reveals that EU agencies have initiated a whole set of voluntary accountability practices. Reputational considerations have been put forward as an important mechanism driving such organisational behaviour. This paper tests this theoretical explanation in a quantitative manner based on a survey among EU agency leaders. We find that the factors explaining voluntary accountability differ depending on the audience to whom account is r…
Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape
In this article, we propose a novel conceptualization of account‐holding intensity – defined as both the frequency and diligence of account‐holding – as an instrument for analysing the behaviour of account‐holders in the accountability landscape of EU agencies. We examine the account‐holding intensity of six major institutional EU account‐holders through a complementary mixed‐methods approach that combines quantitative survey data and qualitative…
Reputational drivers and deterrents of accountability
Empirical studies have shown how some (semi-)independent agencies are intensely scrutinised by various public account-holders, while others are overlooked. Such variations in account-holding intensity have also been observed for EU agencies. This article aims to explain variations in the account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to. To this end, the account-holding that EU agencies experience from six major institutional EU account…
Seeking the spotlight
The behavior of account‐holders has been a blind spot in the accountability literature. Relatively little is known about why account‐holders prioritize certain aspects of their account‐holding mandates and emphasize certain account‐holding tasks over others. A reputational perspective has the potential to fill this knowledge gap. This article illustrates how reputational considerations shape the ways in which account‐holders manage their account‐…
Seeking the spotlight
The behavior of account‐holders has been a blind spot in the accountability literature. Relatively little is known about why account‐holders prioritize certain aspects of their account‐holding mandates and emphasize certain account‐holding tasks over others. A reputational perspective has the potential to fill this knowledge gap. This article illustrates how reputational considerations shape the ways in which account‐holders manage their account‐…
Reputational drivers and deterrents of accountability
Empirical studies have shown how some (semi-)independent agencies are intensely scrutinised by various public account-holders, while others are overlooked. Such variations in account-holding intensity have also been observed for EU agencies. This article aims to explain variations in the account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to. To this end, the account-holding that EU agencies experience from six major institutional EU account…
From accountability victim to accountability entrepreneur
Recent research reveals that EU agencies have initiated a whole set of voluntary accountability practices. Reputational considerations have been put forward as an important mechanism driving such organisational behaviour. This paper tests this theoretical explanation in a quantitative manner based on a survey among EU agency leaders. We find that the factors explaining voluntary accountability differ depending on the audience to whom account is r…
Seeking the spotlight
The behavior of account‐holders has been a blind spot in the accountability literature. Relatively little is known about why account‐holders prioritize certain aspects of their account‐holding mandates and emphasize certain account‐holding tasks over others. A reputational perspective has the potential to fill this knowledge gap. This article illustrates how reputational considerations shape the ways in which account‐holders manage their account‐…
Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape
In this article, we propose a novel conceptualization of account‐holding intensity – defined as both the frequency and diligence of account‐holding – as an instrument for analysing the behaviour of account‐holders in the accountability landscape of EU agencies. We examine the account‐holding intensity of six major institutional EU account‐holders through a complementary mixed‐methods approach that combines quantitative survey data and qualitative…
Reputational drivers and deterrents of accountability
Empirical studies have shown how some (semi-)independent agencies are intensely scrutinised by various public account-holders, while others are overlooked. Such variations in account-holding intensity have also been observed for EU agencies. This article aims to explain variations in the account-holding intensities that EU agencies are subject to. To this end, the account-holding that EU agencies experience from six major institutional EU account…
Account-Holding Intensity
Measurements of accountability tend to gauge account-holding powers or frequencies while neglecting the quality of the account-holding process. In this article we address this with a conceptual innovation, defining account-holding intensity as a combination of both the frequency and the diligence of account holding. We propose this as a framework that is sensitive to both the quantity and the quality of account holding. Subsequently, we provide s…
Legislative oversight of EU agencies through hearings
European Parliament hearings are a core mechanism of oversight of EU agencies, largely understudied in extant literature. Drawing on a unique dataset of hand-coded minutes of 1314 meetings held by the 12 parliamentary parent committees of EU agencies, we investigate how the EP deploys hearings in its account-holding role. We are guided in our investigation by the influential framework of ‘police patrol’ vs. ‘fire alarm’ oversight. The framework s…
From accountability victim to accountability entrepreneur
Recent research reveals that EU agencies have initiated a whole set of voluntary accountability practices. Reputational considerations have been put forward as an important mechanism driving such organisational behaviour. This paper tests this theoretical explanation in a quantitative manner based on a survey among EU agency leaders. We find that the factors explaining voluntary accountability differ depending on the audience to whom account is r…
Who benefits from stakeholder consultations? Fire alarms or procedural politicking?
Stakeholder consultations have become increasingly common. By allowing societal interests to provide input on regulatory proposals, stakeholder consultations are meant to bolster the input legitimacy of regulatory decisions. Yet, despite a wealth of scholarship on stakeholder participation in EU regulatory processes, it is still unclear how stakeholder consultations affect the traditional democratic oversight of regulatory agencies. Following sem…
Business (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Accountability (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Accounting (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Public Policy and Administration Research (3 works) · Public relations (3 works) · Accounting (2 works)