Bo Bjurulf
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382371 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bo Bjurulf |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bo |
| FAMILY NAME | Bjurulf |
| SIGNATURE | BJURULF B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lund University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 79 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1970 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Negotiating Transparency
On 30 May 2001, a new regulation on public access to EU documents was presented and was heralded in the European press as a breakthrough for transparency. We argue that a focus on institutions can cast light on the negotiation processes that led to this decision, and explain the final–for realist negotiation theory puzzling–outcome. We demonstrate the importance of institutions in EU negotiations by detailing actor interests and strategies in the…
Coalitions in European Union Negotiations
Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition‐building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure.…
The power of the chairman
A note on the paradox of voting
Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments
Increasingly a case is being made that voting systems are highly manipulable —whether by strategic voting, agenda setting, or vote trading. Yet there exists little hard evidence on the actual extent of manipulation in real world settings1 To a large degree this lack of evidence is a result of voting methods that allow only partial recovery of individual preferences over multiple alternatives and of a natural desire of legislators not to publicize…
A Simulation Analysis of Selected Voting Procedures
Party Cohesion and Party Cooperation in the Swedish Parliament in 1964 and 1966
The Social Democrats displayed a stronger cohesion than the non‐Socialist parties; the difference in comparison with the Center party, however, was not significant in 1964. The cohesion of the non‐Socialist parties was not significantly different in 1964. In 1966, however, the Conservatives had a stronger cohesion than the middle parties; these two parties did not differ from each other. The Communists had a stronger cohesion than all the other p…
Coalitions in European Union Negotiations
Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition‐building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure.…
Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments
Increasingly a case is being made that voting systems are highly manipulable —whether by strategic voting, agenda setting, or vote trading. Yet there exists little hard evidence on the actual extent of manipulation in real world settings1 To a large degree this lack of evidence is a result of voting methods that allow only partial recovery of individual preferences over multiple alternatives and of a natural desire of legislators not to publicize…
Negotiating Transparency
On 30 May 2001, a new regulation on public access to EU documents was presented and was heralded in the European press as a breakthrough for transparency. We argue that a focus on institutions can cast light on the negotiation processes that led to this decision, and explain the final–for realist negotiation theory puzzling–outcome. We demonstrate the importance of institutions in EU negotiations by detailing actor interests and strategies in the…
A note on the paradox of voting
Party Cohesion and Party Cooperation in the Swedish Parliament in 1964 and 1966
The Social Democrats displayed a stronger cohesion than the non‐Socialist parties; the difference in comparison with the Center party, however, was not significant in 1964. The cohesion of the non‐Socialist parties was not significantly different in 1964. In 1966, however, the Conservatives had a stronger cohesion than the middle parties; these two parties did not differ from each other. The Communists had a stronger cohesion than all the other p…
The power of the chairman
A Simulation Analysis of Selected Voting Procedures
Party Cohesion and Party Cooperation in the Swedish Parliament in 1964 and 1966
The Social Democrats displayed a stronger cohesion than the non‐Socialist parties; the difference in comparison with the Center party, however, was not significant in 1964. The cohesion of the non‐Socialist parties was not significantly different in 1964. In 1966, however, the Conservatives had a stronger cohesion than the middle parties; these two parties did not differ from each other. The Communists had a stronger cohesion than all the other p…
A Simulation Analysis of Selected Voting Procedures
Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments
Increasingly a case is being made that voting systems are highly manipulable —whether by strategic voting, agenda setting, or vote trading. Yet there exists little hard evidence on the actual extent of manipulation in real world settings1 To a large degree this lack of evidence is a result of voting methods that allow only partial recovery of individual preferences over multiple alternatives and of a natural desire of legislators not to publicize…
The power of the chairman
A note on the paradox of voting
Coalitions in European Union Negotiations
Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition‐building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure.…
Negotiating Transparency
On 30 May 2001, a new regulation on public access to EU documents was presented and was heralded in the European press as a breakthrough for transparency. We argue that a focus on institutions can cast light on the negotiation processes that led to this decision, and explain the final–for realist negotiation theory puzzling–outcome. We demonstrate the importance of institutions in EU negotiations by detailing actor interests and strategies in the…
Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Politics (6 works) · Voting (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (3 works)