Luca Panaccione
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382479 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Luca Panaccione |
| GIVEN NAMES | Luca |
| FAMILY NAME | Panaccione |
| SIGNATURE | PANACCIONE L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Rome Tor Vergata |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4059-3459 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution
In dyadic ultimatum bargaining proposers, who are privately informed about the pie size, can exploit their “moral wiggle room” by engaging in unfairness which is unobservable by responders. Our setup instead assumes better informed responders and, as a consequence, limits ultimatum power and questions conflict resolution via acceptance of ultimatum proposals. In addition to testing the game theoretic solution, based on common opportunism, we asse…
Behavioral spillovers in local public good provision
A hybrid public good experiment eliciting multi-dimensional choice data
Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution
In dyadic ultimatum bargaining proposers, who are privately informed about the pie size, can exploit their “moral wiggle room” by engaging in unfairness which is unobservable by responders. Our setup instead assumes better informed responders and, as a consequence, limits ultimatum power and questions conflict resolution via acceptance of ultimatum proposals. In addition to testing the game theoretic solution, based on common opportunism, we asse…
A hybrid public good experiment eliciting multi-dimensional choice data
A hybrid public good experiment eliciting multi-dimensional choice data
Behavioral spillovers in local public good provision
Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution
In dyadic ultimatum bargaining proposers, who are privately informed about the pie size, can exploit their “moral wiggle room” by engaging in unfairness which is unobservable by responders. Our setup instead assumes better informed responders and, as a consequence, limits ultimatum power and questions conflict resolution via acceptance of ultimatum proposals. In addition to testing the game theoretic solution, based on common opportunism, we asse…
Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Framing (construction (2 works)