Kerim Keskin
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382616 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kerim Keskin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kerim |
| FAMILY NAME | Keskin |
| SIGNATURE | KESKIN K |
| AFFILIATIONS | ADA University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8112-5574 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Survival of the foolest
A game theory approach to football predictions
Costly argumentation in bargaining
Titans that Clash and a State that Buffers
We present a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or survival of buffer states. We analyze a two-stage game with three players orderly located on a linear territory, where the player in the middle is passive, and the players on the two ends are aggressive with options to declare war against the others. We conduct an equilibrium analysis and characterize the conditions under which the passive player acts as a buffer state betwe…
Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments
A Dynamic Game Theory Model For Tourism Supply Chains
This article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple tour operators. We investigate the strategic dynamics (i.e., collaboration and competition) embedded in a market with two different tourism supply chains, and then we extend our model to an infinite-horizon repeated game arguing …
Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
Bribing in team contests
Sabotage in team contests
Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
Sabotage in team contests
Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
Titans that Clash and a State that Buffers
We present a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or survival of buffer states. We analyze a two-stage game with three players orderly located on a linear territory, where the player in the middle is passive, and the players on the two ends are aggressive with options to declare war against the others. We conduct an equilibrium analysis and characterize the conditions under which the passive player acts as a buffer state betwe…
A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
Sabotage in team contests
A Dynamic Game Theory Model For Tourism Supply Chains
This article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple tour operators. We investigate the strategic dynamics (i.e., collaboration and competition) embedded in a market with two different tourism supply chains, and then we extend our model to an infinite-horizon repeated game arguing …
Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
Bribing in team contests
Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments
Titans that Clash and a State that Buffers
We present a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or survival of buffer states. We analyze a two-stage game with three players orderly located on a linear territory, where the player in the middle is passive, and the players on the two ends are aggressive with options to declare war against the others. We conduct an equilibrium analysis and characterize the conditions under which the passive player acts as a buffer state betwe…
Costly argumentation in bargaining
Survival of the foolest
A game theory approach to football predictions
Economics (8 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Game theory (5 works) · Game Theory and Applications (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Repeated game (4 works) · Economic theories and models (3 works) · Equilibrium selection (3 works)