Melvin Guyer
Biographic Data
| ID | 4382706 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Melvin Guyer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Melvin |
| FAMILY NAME | Guyer |
| SIGNATURE | GUYER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Michigan |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 73 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1970 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1982 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Boekbesprekings/Bookreviews
Child abuse and neglect statutes
E m h of the 50 stutes has enacted some version of a "mandatory reporting tict, " which requires mental health professionals t o report instances of suspected child cibuse or neglect. Requirements of these statutes may supersede putient-therapist confidentiality in the interest of protecting chil-dren. Clinical and ethical dilemmas created fo r the therapist by mandatory reporting requirements are explored. he last several decades have seen T som…
Mandatory reporting laws
Peer Reviewed
The 2x2 Game
Public” Choice and Cooperation in n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma
Four-person groups played repeated trials of an n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma game under two information conditions. In one condition, each player's choice was made known to the others following each trial. In the other information condition each subject was informed only of the number of others who cooperated or competed on each trial. The first condition was a “public choice” situation while the second was an “anonymous choice” situation. The dat…
Group Size and Others' Strategy in an N-Person Game
The effects of group size and cooperativeness of others upon an individual's propensity to cooperate is studied using the Take-Some format of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. By holding utility effects constant, this format permits comparisons to be made between the performances of subjects in different size groups. A 2 × 2 experimental design was employed in which 48 male subjects were assigned to stooge-player groups comprised of either two or elev…
Group Size and Cooperation
To compare the effects of group size on cooperation, we introduce a class of simple multiperson games. These games can be regarded as n-person generalizations of the two-person prisoner's dilemma with expected value payoffs. In order to ensure that identical expected-value monetary alternatives are available to players in different-sized groups, we introduced a certain formal constraint on payoffs. Results of an experimental study comparing three…
Equivalence and Stooge Strategies in Zero-Sum Games
Classes of two-person zero-sum games termed "equivalent games" are defined. These are games with identical value and identical optimal mixed-strategies but with different matrix entries and thus different opportunities for exploiting a nonrational opponent. An experiment was conducted to investigate the strategy-choice behavior of subjects playing pairs of these "equivalent games." Also investigated was the extent to which subjects would exploit …
Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Three different presentation formats of the same Prisoner's Dilemma game were investigated. Fifteen pairs of male subjects were assigned to each of three experimental conditions. One group played a conventional matrix representation of the game, one group played an expected value representation of the game, and one group played a simplified probabilistic version of the game called "Take-Some." Each pair of subjects played their game for fifty tri…
Games Played Once
Threat in a two-person game
Group Size and Cooperation
To compare the effects of group size on cooperation, we introduce a class of simple multiperson games. These games can be regarded as n-person generalizations of the two-person prisoner's dilemma with expected value payoffs. In order to ensure that identical expected-value monetary alternatives are available to players in different-sized groups, we introduced a certain formal constraint on payoffs. Results of an experimental study comparing three…
Public” Choice and Cooperation in n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma
Four-person groups played repeated trials of an n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma game under two information conditions. In one condition, each player's choice was made known to the others following each trial. In the other information condition each subject was informed only of the number of others who cooperated or competed on each trial. The first condition was a “public choice” situation while the second was an “anonymous choice” situation. The dat…
Group Size and Others' Strategy in an N-Person Game
The effects of group size and cooperativeness of others upon an individual's propensity to cooperate is studied using the Take-Some format of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. By holding utility effects constant, this format permits comparisons to be made between the performances of subjects in different size groups. A 2 × 2 experimental design was employed in which 48 male subjects were assigned to stooge-player groups comprised of either two or elev…
Games Played Once
Threat in a two-person game
Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Three different presentation formats of the same Prisoner's Dilemma game were investigated. Fifteen pairs of male subjects were assigned to each of three experimental conditions. One group played a conventional matrix representation of the game, one group played an expected value representation of the game, and one group played a simplified probabilistic version of the game called "Take-Some." Each pair of subjects played their game for fifty tri…
Threat in a two-person game
Games Played Once
Equivalence and Stooge Strategies in Zero-Sum Games
Classes of two-person zero-sum games termed "equivalent games" are defined. These are games with identical value and identical optimal mixed-strategies but with different matrix entries and thus different opportunities for exploiting a nonrational opponent. An experiment was conducted to investigate the strategy-choice behavior of subjects playing pairs of these "equivalent games." Also investigated was the extent to which subjects would exploit …
Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Three different presentation formats of the same Prisoner's Dilemma game were investigated. Fifteen pairs of male subjects were assigned to each of three experimental conditions. One group played a conventional matrix representation of the game, one group played an expected value representation of the game, and one group played a simplified probabilistic version of the game called "Take-Some." Each pair of subjects played their game for fifty tri…
Group Size and Cooperation
To compare the effects of group size on cooperation, we introduce a class of simple multiperson games. These games can be regarded as n-person generalizations of the two-person prisoner's dilemma with expected value payoffs. In order to ensure that identical expected-value monetary alternatives are available to players in different-sized groups, we introduced a certain formal constraint on payoffs. Results of an experimental study comparing three…
Group Size and Others' Strategy in an N-Person Game
The effects of group size and cooperativeness of others upon an individual's propensity to cooperate is studied using the Take-Some format of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. By holding utility effects constant, this format permits comparisons to be made between the performances of subjects in different size groups. A 2 × 2 experimental design was employed in which 48 male subjects were assigned to stooge-player groups comprised of either two or elev…
The 2x2 Game
Public” Choice and Cooperation in n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma
Four-person groups played repeated trials of an n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma game under two information conditions. In one condition, each player's choice was made known to the others following each trial. In the other information condition each subject was informed only of the number of others who cooperated or competed on each trial. The first condition was a “public choice” situation while the second was an “anonymous choice” situation. The dat…
Boekbesprekings/Bookreviews
Child abuse and neglect statutes
E m h of the 50 stutes has enacted some version of a "mandatory reporting tict, " which requires mental health professionals t o report instances of suspected child cibuse or neglect. Requirements of these statutes may supersede putient-therapist confidentiality in the interest of protecting chil-dren. Clinical and ethical dilemmas created fo r the therapist by mandatory reporting requirements are explored. he last several decades have seen T som…
Mandatory reporting laws
Peer Reviewed
Psychology (9 works) · Game theory (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (5 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Dilemma (4 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works)