Maria Suojanen
Biographic Data
| ID | 4383027 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Maria Suojanen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Maria |
| FAMILY NAME | Suojanen |
| SIGNATURE | SUOJANEN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Turku |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Proportionality in the European Parliamentary Elections
Proportionality profiles developed by Taagepera and Laakso have earlier been used for describing effects of national electoral systems. In this article we apply these profiles to European parliamentary (EP) elections of the EU15 from 1979 to 2004. Since the electoral systems of the EP elections closely resemble the national elections in the respective countries, same kind of profiles emerge as in the national elections. Therefore the members of t…
The Role of Information in Choices Over Income Distributions
How people distribute income is investigated, using participants in two experimental treatments—one with and the other without a veil of ignorance. The experiment tests two major hypotheses: (1) the veil of ignorance generates Rawlsian choices, and (2) equal bargaining power and the veto rule generate Rawlsian choices, even though there is no veil of ignorance. Rawlsian choices are defined as those that maximize the income of the lowest income gr…
The Role of Information in Choices Over Income Distributions
How people distribute income is investigated, using participants in two experimental treatments—one with and the other without a veil of ignorance. The experiment tests two major hypotheses: (1) the veil of ignorance generates Rawlsian choices, and (2) equal bargaining power and the veto rule generate Rawlsian choices, even though there is no veil of ignorance. Rawlsian choices are defined as those that maximize the income of the lowest income gr…
The Role of Information in Choices Over Income Distributions
How people distribute income is investigated, using participants in two experimental treatments—one with and the other without a veil of ignorance. The experiment tests two major hypotheses: (1) the veil of ignorance generates Rawlsian choices, and (2) equal bargaining power and the veto rule generate Rawlsian choices, even though there is no veil of ignorance. Rawlsian choices are defined as those that maximize the income of the lowest income gr…
Proportionality in the European Parliamentary Elections
Proportionality profiles developed by Taagepera and Laakso have earlier been used for describing effects of national electoral systems. In this article we apply these profiles to European parliamentary (EP) elections of the EU15 from 1979 to 2004. Since the electoral systems of the EP elections closely resemble the national elections in the respective countries, same kind of profiles emerge as in the national elections. Therefore the members of t…
Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (1 works) · Economic Justice (1 works) · Electoral system (1 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (1 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 works)