Bruce D Fitzgerald
Biographic Data
| ID | 4383035 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bruce D Fitzgerald |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bruce D |
| FAMILY NAME | Fitzgerald |
| SIGNATURE | FITZGERALD B D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Peace Science Department University of Pennsylvania |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1978 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The analytical foundations of extortionate terrorism
Extortionate terrorism is the threatened use of terrorist acts to gain concessions from the victim. In this article, game theory is used to seek answers to the following questions: (a) When will people resort to extortionate terrorism? (b) When will extortionate terrorism succeed and when will it fail? (c) What constitutes an “optimal” threat, i.e., what bribes, extortion, ransom, or payoff should be asked in exchange for which hostages or proper…
Self-Interest or Altruism: Corrections and Extensions
It is shown that altruism is not, in general, sufficient to reduce the area of contention between two actors. Altruism can reduce or eliminate contention, leave it unchanged, or lead to a new form of contention, a contest in beneficence. Which result obtains is an empirical question. Several recent applications of the assumption of altruism are summarized
The analytical foundations of extortionate terrorism
Extortionate terrorism is the threatened use of terrorist acts to gain concessions from the victim. In this article, game theory is used to seek answers to the following questions: (a) When will people resort to extortionate terrorism? (b) When will extortionate terrorism succeed and when will it fail? (c) What constitutes an “optimal” threat, i.e., what bribes, extortion, ransom, or payoff should be asked in exchange for which hostages or proper…
Self-Interest or Altruism: Corrections and Extensions
It is shown that altruism is not, in general, sufficient to reduce the area of contention between two actors. Altruism can reduce or eliminate contention, leave it unchanged, or lead to a new form of contention, a contest in beneficence. Which result obtains is an empirical question. Several recent applications of the assumption of altruism are summarized
Self-Interest or Altruism: Corrections and Extensions
It is shown that altruism is not, in general, sufficient to reduce the area of contention between two actors. Altruism can reduce or eliminate contention, leave it unchanged, or lead to a new form of contention, a contest in beneficence. Which result obtains is an empirical question. Several recent applications of the assumption of altruism are summarized
The analytical foundations of extortionate terrorism
Extortionate terrorism is the threatened use of terrorist acts to gain concessions from the victim. In this article, game theory is used to seek answers to the following questions: (a) When will people resort to extortionate terrorism? (b) When will extortionate terrorism succeed and when will it fail? (c) What constitutes an “optimal” threat, i.e., what bribes, extortion, ransom, or payoff should be asked in exchange for which hostages or proper…
Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Altruism (biology (1 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (1 works) · Autonomy (1 works) · Beneficence (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works)