Shmuel Zamir
Biographic Data
| ID | 4383059 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Shmuel Zamir |
| GIVEN NAMES | Shmuel |
| FAMILY NAME | Zamir |
| SIGNATURE | ZAMIR S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
One team must win, the other need only not lose: An experimental study of an asymmetric participation game
We studied asymmetric competition between two (three-person) groups. Each group member received an initial endowment and had to decide whether or not to contribute it. The group with more contributions won the competition and each of its members received a reward. The members of the losing group received nothing. The asymmetry was created by randomly and publicly selecting one group beforehand to be the winning group in the case of a tie. A theor…
The Fisherman’s Problem: Exploring the tension between cooperative and non-cooperative concepts in a simple game
Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken
The authors introduce a new team game, the intergroup chicken game, to model intergroup conflicts involving bilateral threats (e.g., military conflicts, industrial disputes). The group that wins the game is the one that competes while the other group yields, and the benefits associated with winning (e.g., territory, higher wages) are public goods for the members of that group. However, a failure to yield on the part of both groups leads to an out…
Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken
The authors introduce a new team game, the intergroup chicken game, to model intergroup conflicts involving bilateral threats (e.g., military conflicts, industrial disputes). The group that wins the game is the one that competes while the other group yields, and the benefits associated with winning (e.g., territory, higher wages) are public goods for the members of that group. However, a failure to yield on the part of both groups leads to an out…
One team must win, the other need only not lose: An experimental study of an asymmetric participation game
We studied asymmetric competition between two (three-person) groups. Each group member received an initial endowment and had to decide whether or not to contribute it. The group with more contributions won the competition and each of its members received a reward. The members of the losing group received nothing. The asymmetry was created by randomly and publicly selecting one group beforehand to be the winning group in the case of a tie. A theor…
Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken
The authors introduce a new team game, the intergroup chicken game, to model intergroup conflicts involving bilateral threats (e.g., military conflicts, industrial disputes). The group that wins the game is the one that competes while the other group yields, and the benefits associated with winning (e.g., territory, higher wages) are public goods for the members of that group. However, a failure to yield on the part of both groups leads to an out…
The Fisherman’s Problem: Exploring the tension between cooperative and non-cooperative concepts in a simple game
One team must win, the other need only not lose: An experimental study of an asymmetric participation game
We studied asymmetric competition between two (three-person) groups. Each group member received an initial endowment and had to decide whether or not to contribute it. The group with more contributions won the competition and each of its members received a reward. The members of the losing group received nothing. The asymmetry was created by randomly and publicly selecting one group beforehand to be the winning group in the case of a tie. A theor…
Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
Economics (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works)