Wolfgang Leininger
Biographic Data
| ID | 4383207 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Wolfgang Leininger |
| GIVEN NAMES | Wolfgang |
| FAMILY NAME | Leininger |
| SIGNATURE | LEININGER W |
| AFFILIATIONS | TU Dortmund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3611-7430 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 38 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods
We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an anarchic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the ‘big-man’ in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members’…
Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests
Duels and the Management of Conflict over Honour
Duels and the Management of Conflict over Honour: A Bargaining-Theoretic Perspective
More efficient rent-seeking ? A M nchhausen solution
Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations
We present a new game-theoretic analysis of an abstract auction game that captures essential strategic aspects of escalation phenomena. Two competitive adversaries commit resources irreversibly in order to win an indivisible prize; the winner will take the prize while both winner and loser incur the cost of their bids (investments). Following O'Neill (1986), we first reexamine a discrete version of the game and emphasize some strategic considerat…
More efficient rent-seeking ? A M nchhausen solution
Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations
We present a new game-theoretic analysis of an abstract auction game that captures essential strategic aspects of escalation phenomena. Two competitive adversaries commit resources irreversibly in order to win an indivisible prize; the winner will take the prize while both winner and loser incur the cost of their bids (investments). Following O'Neill (1986), we first reexamine a discrete version of the game and emphasize some strategic considerat…
Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests
Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods
We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an anarchic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the ‘big-man’ in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members’…
Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations
We present a new game-theoretic analysis of an abstract auction game that captures essential strategic aspects of escalation phenomena. Two competitive adversaries commit resources irreversibly in order to win an indivisible prize; the winner will take the prize while both winner and loser incur the cost of their bids (investments). Following O'Neill (1986), we first reexamine a discrete version of the game and emphasize some strategic considerat…
More efficient rent-seeking ? A M nchhausen solution
Duels and the Management of Conflict over Honour
Duels and the Management of Conflict over Honour: A Bargaining-Theoretic Perspective
Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests
Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods
We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an anarchic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the ‘big-man’ in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members’…
Economics (5 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Economic theories and models (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Game theory (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Public finance (3 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (2 works)