Eugénia Da Conceição-Heldt
Biographic Data
| ID | 4383772 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eugénia Da Conceição-Heldt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eugénia |
| FAMILY NAME | Da Conceição-Heldt |
| SIGNATURE | DA CONCEIÇÃO-HELDT E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Dresden University of Technology, Department of Political Science01062 DresdenGermany |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 180 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Verantwortungszurechnung im EU-Mehrebenensystem während der Eurokrise: Wer kontrollierte die Troika-Institutionen
Mit der Einrichtung der Troika-Institutionen hat die Frage der Kontrollmöglichkeiten und Verschränkung von Macht im EU-Mehrebenensystem an Bedeutung gewonnen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht dieser Beitrag die Verantwortungszurechnung ( accountability ) der Troika-Institutionen während der Eurokrise. Dabei argumentiere ich, dass Delegations- und Treuhandmodi unterschiedlichen Logiken der Verantwortungszurechnung entsprechen, in denen die Kontro…
Machtverschiebung in internationalen Organisationen? Schwellenländer als Gestaltungs- und Verweigerungsmächte
Die „Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft“ versteht sich als Forum für die gesamte Politikwissenschaft. Sie bietet eine Plattform für alle Teildisziplinen und Felder sowie für alle Ansätze und Richtungen des Fachs. Als gemeinsames Band stehen dabei die Grundlagen-, Theorie- und Praxisorientierung sowie die kritische Diskussion im Vordergrund der wissenschaftlichen Beiträge
Why the European Commission is not the “unexpected winner” of the Euro Crisis: A Comment on Bauer and Becker
The protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic interest in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Com…
Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU As an Effective Actor in Global Governance
Speaking with a single voice: Internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of the EU in global governance
Under what conditions does the internal cohesiveness of the European Union (EU) determine its external effectiveness? In a first step, this introduction probes the frequent assumption that the more cohesive the EU presents itself to the world, the more effective it is in achieving its goals. The empirical contributions to this collection, which range from trade to foreign policy, highlight instead three configurations of internal cohesiveness and…
When speaking with a single voice isn't enough: Bargaining power (a)symmetry and EU external effectiveness in global trade governance
Does the European Union (EU) need to be a cohesive actor internally in order to be effective in global trade governance? And is internal cohesiveness a necessary and sufficient condition for the Union's external effectiveness? Even though these questions are central to explaining the EU's effectiveness, only few studies have dealt with it. In this contribution, I argue that internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for EU external effec…
Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round
There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority…
Two-level games and trade cooperation: What do we now know
The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations
While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis lit…
Australian Trade Policy under the Howard Government: The Impact of Organised Interested Groups
There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of globalisation on the Australian economy, but few studies focus on the domestic determinants of Australia's negotiating position in international trade negotiations. In order to close this gap, this article analyses the impact of organised interest groups in the Australian trade policy under the Howard government in the different World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings fr…
Variation in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round
During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from …
Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy
Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural p…
Pension reforms in France: The role of trade unions and the timing of the electoral cycle
The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade…
Taking Actors' Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: The EU Common Fisheries Policy
The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states' preferences and the institutional setting. This article is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It juxtaposes a conceptual framework for analyzing EU negotiations with an analysis of the bargaining process…
Speaking with a single voice: Internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of the EU in global governance
Under what conditions does the internal cohesiveness of the European Union (EU) determine its external effectiveness? In a first step, this introduction probes the frequent assumption that the more cohesive the EU presents itself to the world, the more effective it is in achieving its goals. The empirical contributions to this collection, which range from trade to foreign policy, highlight instead three configurations of internal cohesiveness and…
Variation in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round
During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from …
Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round
There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority…
When speaking with a single voice isn't enough: Bargaining power (a)symmetry and EU external effectiveness in global trade governance
Does the European Union (EU) need to be a cohesive actor internally in order to be effective in global trade governance? And is internal cohesiveness a necessary and sufficient condition for the Union's external effectiveness? Even though these questions are central to explaining the EU's effectiveness, only few studies have dealt with it. In this contribution, I argue that internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for EU external effec…
Why the European Commission is not the “unexpected winner” of the Euro Crisis: A Comment on Bauer and Becker
The protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic interest in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Com…
Two-level games and trade cooperation: What do we now know
Taking Actors' Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: The EU Common Fisheries Policy
The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states' preferences and the institutional setting. This article is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It juxtaposes a conceptual framework for analyzing EU negotiations with an analysis of the bargaining process…
Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy
Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural p…
The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations
While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis lit…
Pension reforms in France: The role of trade unions and the timing of the electoral cycle
The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade…
Taking Actors' Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: The EU Common Fisheries Policy
The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states' preferences and the institutional setting. This article is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It juxtaposes a conceptual framework for analyzing EU negotiations with an analysis of the bargaining process…
Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy
Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural p…
Pension reforms in France: The role of trade unions and the timing of the electoral cycle
The French political system tends to produce strong governments backed by stable majorities in parliament. Despite this, even governments with a large parliamentary majority have been reluctant to reform the pension system. This article argues that the degree of difficulty in passing pension legislation depends on the mobilization capacity of trade unions and on the timing of the electoral cycle. First, this article tries to demonstrate how trade…
Australian Trade Policy under the Howard Government: The Impact of Organised Interested Groups
There has been much debate in the literature about the impact of globalisation on the Australian economy, but few studies focus on the domestic determinants of Australia's negotiating position in international trade negotiations. In order to close this gap, this article analyses the impact of organised interest groups in the Australian trade policy under the Howard government in the different World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meetings fr…
Variation in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round
During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from …
Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round
There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority…
Two-level games and trade cooperation: What do we now know
The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations
While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis lit…
Speaking with a single voice: Internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of the EU in global governance
Under what conditions does the internal cohesiveness of the European Union (EU) determine its external effectiveness? In a first step, this introduction probes the frequent assumption that the more cohesive the EU presents itself to the world, the more effective it is in achieving its goals. The empirical contributions to this collection, which range from trade to foreign policy, highlight instead three configurations of internal cohesiveness and…
When speaking with a single voice isn't enough: Bargaining power (a)symmetry and EU external effectiveness in global trade governance
Does the European Union (EU) need to be a cohesive actor internally in order to be effective in global trade governance? And is internal cohesiveness a necessary and sufficient condition for the Union's external effectiveness? Even though these questions are central to explaining the EU's effectiveness, only few studies have dealt with it. In this contribution, I argue that internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for EU external effec…
Machtverschiebung in internationalen Organisationen? Schwellenländer als Gestaltungs- und Verweigerungsmächte
Die „Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft“ versteht sich als Forum für die gesamte Politikwissenschaft. Sie bietet eine Plattform für alle Teildisziplinen und Felder sowie für alle Ansätze und Richtungen des Fachs. Als gemeinsames Band stehen dabei die Grundlagen-, Theorie- und Praxisorientierung sowie die kritische Diskussion im Vordergrund der wissenschaftlichen Beiträge
Why the European Commission is not the “unexpected winner” of the Euro Crisis: A Comment on Bauer and Becker
The protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic interest in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Com…
Speaking with a Single Voice: The EU As an Effective Actor in Global Governance
Verantwortungszurechnung im EU-Mehrebenensystem während der Eurokrise: Wer kontrollierte die Troika-Institutionen
Mit der Einrichtung der Troika-Institutionen hat die Frage der Kontrollmöglichkeiten und Verschränkung von Macht im EU-Mehrebenensystem an Bedeutung gewonnen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht dieser Beitrag die Verantwortungszurechnung ( accountability ) der Troika-Institutionen während der Eurokrise. Dabei argumentiere ich, dass Delegations- und Treuhandmodi unterschiedlichen Logiken der Verantwortungszurechnung entsprechen, in denen die Kontro…
Political science (13 works) · Economics (11 works) · Law (10 works) · Law (10 works) · International trade (8 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (7 works) · International Development and Aid (6 works) · European union (5 works) · Negotiation (5 works) · Politics (5 works)