Felix Brandt

Datos Biográficos

ID4385985
NOMBREFelix Brandt
NOMBRESFelix
APELLIDOBrandt
FIRMABRANDT F
AFILIACIONESTechnical University of Munich
ORCID0000-0002-4179-9897
VERIFICADOSí
TOTAL DE OBRAS11
TOTAL DE CITAS3
TOTAL COMO AUTOR11
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN2008
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN2026
ÍNDICE H1

  • The Banks set and the bipartisan set may be disjoint

    Open AccessFelix Brandt, Florian GrundbacherARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2026

    Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 that can be partitioned into the Banks set and the bipartisan set. As a consequence, the Banks set, as well as its refinements, such as the minimal extending set and the tournament equilibrium set, can be disjoint from the bipartisan set

  • On locally rationalizable social choice functions

    Open AccessFelix Brandt, Chris DongARTICLETheory and Decision2026

    We consider a notion of rationalizability, where the rationalizing relation may depend on the set of feasible alternatives. More precisely, we say that a choice function is locally rationalizable if it is rationalized by a family of rationalizing relations such that a strict preference between two alternatives in some feasible set is preserved when removing other alternatives. It is known that a choice function is locally rationalizable if and on…

  • Special Issue on Fair Public Decision Making

    Open AccessHaris Aziz, Felix Brandt et al.ARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2025

  • Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes

    Open AccessFelix Brandt, Patrick Lederer et al.ARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2024

    Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of m alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard (Econometrica 45(3):665–681, 1977) implies that there are no strategyproof Condorcet extensions and that only random dictatorships satisfy ex post efficiency and strategyproofness. The latter is known as the random dictatorship theor…

  • An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes

    Open AccessFlorian Brandl, Felix Brandt et al.ARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2022

    Maximal lottery ( $$ ML $$ ML ) schemes constitute an interesting class of randomized voting rules that were proposed by Peter Fishburn in 1984 and have been repeatedly recommended for practical use. However, the subtle differences between different $$ ML $$ ML schemes are often overlooked. Two canonical subsets of $$ ML $$ ML schemes are "Image missing"schemes (which only depend on unweighted majority comparisons) and "Image missing"schemes (whi…

  • Minimal voting paradoxes

    Open AccessFelix Brandt, Marie Matthäus et al.ARTICLEJournal of Theoretical Politics2022Referencias: 34

    Voting paradoxes date back to the origin of social choice theory in the 18th century, when the Chevalier de Borda pointed out that plurality—then and now the most common voting rule—may elect a candidate who loses pairwise majority comparisons against every other candidate. Since then, a large number of similar, seemingly paradoxical, phenomena have been observed in the literature. As it turns out, many paradoxes only materialize under some rathe…

  • Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving

    Open AccessFelix Brandt, Christian Geist et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2017Citada por: 2Referencias: 19

  • Minimal extending sets in tournaments

    Open AccessFelix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2017Referencias: 20

  • Special Issue on Computational Foundations of Social Choice

    Open AccessFelix Brandt, William S ZwickerARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2012

  • Computing the minimal covering set

    Open AccessFelix Brandt, Felix FischerARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2008Citada por: 1Referencias: 22

  • Fractional hedonic games

    Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt et al.

    An important issue in multi-agent systems is the exploitation of synergies via coalition formation. We initiate the formal study of fractional hedonic games. In fractional hedonic games, the utility of a player in a coalition structure is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which there are several types of agents and each agent desires to be in a coalition in which the fra…